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Embedding security enforcement code into applications is an alternative to tradi-
tional security mechanisms. This dissertation supports the thesis that such Inlined
Reference Monitors, or IRMs, offer many advantages and are a practical option
in modern systems. IRMs enable flexible general-purpose enforcement of security
policies, and they are especially well suited for extensible systems and other non-
traditional platforms. IRMs can exhibit similar, or even better, performance than
previous approaches and can help increase assurance by contributing little to the
size of a trusted computing base. Moreover, IRMs’ agility in distributed settings
allows for their cost-effective and trustworthy deployment in many scenarios.
In this dissertation, IRM implementations are derived from formal automata-
based specifications of security policies. Then, an IRM toolkit for Java is described
in detail. This Java IRM toolkit uses an imperative policy language that allows
a security policy, in combination with the details of its enforcement, to be given
in a single complete specification. Various example policies, including the stack-
inspection policy of Java, illustrate the approach. These examples shed light on
practical issues in policy specification, the support needed from an IRM toolkit,
and the advantages of the IRM approach.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The thesis this dissertation supports is that a non-traditional implementation of
software security enforcement—one that merges the code of the enforcement mech-
anism into the software whose activity is to be restricted—has numerous advan-
tages and is practical in many modern systems.
Such Inlined Reference Monitors (IRMs) use a trusted rewriter that inserts
security code into a target application in a manner that prevents the target from
subverting the security code. A security policy specification guides this rewriting
and determines where security update code is inserted and what security state is
added to the application. Security updates are inlined program fragments that
(i) maintain in the added security state a summary of the application’s execution
history, as relevant to the policy being enforced, and (ii) take remedial action if the
policy is violated. The resulting secured application is guaranteed not to violate
at runtime the security policy embedded within it.
By residing within a target, an IRM can observe more potentially security-
relevant activity than could a traditional enforcement mechanism positioned at an
underlying system interface. Observing these actions is, arguably, a prerequisite
for security enforcement in an increasingly common class of software that includes
extensible and scriptable systems, and where security policies must be expressed
in terms of application abstractions. Triggering security updates by such a rich
set of actions—and allowing updates to modify the added security state arbitrarily
and, thus, to maintain any property of the application’s execution—gives IRMs
unprecedented flexibility in enforcing security policies.
1
2The IRM approach is facilitated by the trend towards using higher-level lan-
guages, especially type safe languages, for software development. Not only do those
languages define application abstractions on which policies can be enforced, but
they also provide strong guarantees that can be used to ensure a secured applica-
tion cannot compromise its IRM. By leveraging these guarantees, an IRM security
policy can provide a single cohesive description of both the intent and the means
by which a policy is enforced. This potentially allows the IRM approach to give
greater assurance, since enforcement now relies on a trustworthy component of
moderate size whose full specification can be studied in isolation.
1.1 Motivation
Software is increasingly developed using the abstractions of high-level program-
ming languages, object-oriented or component-based programming, and modular
software engineering methodologies [CO65, GMS77]. By abstracting from imple-
mentation details, high-level languages and modular design hide complexity and
permit the programmer’s task to be partitioned into simpler pieces. This enhances
programmer productivity and allows the construction of more complex and flexi-
ble software [Boe99, Ous98] but often degrades the performance of the final sys-
tem, effectively exploiting increases in hardware performance to increase software-
developer productivity. Recently, this has continued with the advent of the Java
programming language [GJS96] which employs program analysis, interpretation,
and run-time garbage collection—techniques that provide strong guarantees but
often suffer from poor performance [MTC+96, RLV+96, Wil92, DAK00].
The modular development of modern software systems often results in a lay-
ered design, where software components extend the functionality of other soft-
3ware components, with the former now relying on the latter’s correct behav-
ior [Lam03, HLP98]. Building software systems in layers of such extensions facili-
tates component reuse as well as the partitioning of complex software (components
often can provide functionality useful in several software systems). Extensibility
can even allow reuse of entire software systems by permitting a system’s users
to specialize its behavior for particular needs [Lam83]. Today, commonly used
software consists of such extensible systems that allow for end-user extension or
programming: operating systems can be extended and perform scripted activ-
ity, databases allow stored procedures and reusable queries, word processors and
spreadsheets support macro programming, graphics software allows addition of
new filters and shaders, and Internet web browsers can be extended with plugins
and webpage applets and can be programmed with scripting languages.1
The concept of a software“application,”and its relation to its operating system,
has thus changed. Today, all applications extend libraries built on top of operat-
ing system services and much software is application extensions, executing within
application platforms such as spreadsheets or databases, rather than as traditional
operating system processes [Sal74, Tan92].
One of the major failures in software construction—and of extensible systems—
is the lack of assurance about application behavior. The roots of this failure are
both social and technical: production of high-assurance software holds few com-
mercial rewards and is technically difficult [Lam00, Sch99a]. One may wish to
defend against this failure by relying on security enforcement mechanisms which
1 Examples of this trend include: Microsoft WordTM and Microsoft ExcelTM
macros, Adobe PhotoShopTM plugin filters, Microsoft DirectXTM shaders, In-
formix DataBladesTM, Netscape NavigatorTM plugins, Sun’s JavaTM webpage ap-
plets, webpages programmed in JavaScriptTM, and Microsoft WindowsTM Internet
ExplorerTM scripting.
4aim to ensure automatically that software behavior complies with a security policy,
a formal specification of the restrictions to be enforced [Ste91].
Unfortunately, available security enforcement mechanisms are unlikely to pro-
vide the assurance desired—a problem compounded by software’s modular and
extensible structure. Many security mechanisms are too inflexible or tied to a sin-
gle interface or module, others are too complex or too closely tied to ill-defined
semantics, and few, if any, allow for isolated specification and study of poli-
cies. As a result, desired security policies may be hard or impossible to spec-
ify and, in practice, are incompletely specified in ways that allow their subver-
sion [LBMC94, Asl95, LJ97, How97].
At the same time, there is increased need for assured application behavior.
With communication overtaking computation as the major use of computers, users
are more inclined to enter data of uncertain origin and of unknown effect into
applications—a known security risk [Sib96, Wag99]. The problem is acute when the
untrustworthy “data” contains user-level extensions that run on the users’ extensi-
ble software systems. Examples include macros for Microsoft WordTM (MSWord)
as well as plugins and Java applets for web browsers [DFW96, Vig98]. In numer-
ous recent incidents, such as the Melissa and ExploreZip “email viruses” [CER99a,
CER99b, Sch99b], the security flaws of extensible systems have been exploited and,
as predicted, these vulnerabilities are subject to successful attacks at an increasing
rate [Sch99a, JK99].
1.2 Reference Monitors
Reference monitors observe software execution and take remedial action on op-
erations that violate a policy. Thus, reference monitors encompass most current
5a. The reference monitor must fully mediate all operations rel-
evant to the enforced security policy.
b. The integrity of the reference monitor must be protected,
either by the reference monitor itself or by some external
means.
c. The correctness of the reference monitor must be assured,
in part by making the reference monitor be small enough to
analyze and test.
Figure 1.1: Requirements for a reference monitor implementation.
runtime security enforcement. Reference monitors were introduced in a 1972 U.S.
Air Force report [And72] based on ideas derived from early work at Cambridge
University and by Lampson [Lam69, GD72, WN79]. Their original motivation was
the security problems raised by shared access to general purpose computers by mul-
tiple categories of users.2 A key problem in these systems was limiting the set of
resources that could be directly and indirectly referenced as a result of each user’s
activity through their invocation of system services or support routines. Such er-
rant references posed risk to system resources, potentially allowing malicious users
to learn secrets by dishonest reading, to violate integrity by writing of incorrect
values, or to deny legitimate use by others (e.g., by exhausting resources).
Reference monitors addressed the problem by capturing all references made
by user activity, either directly or indirectly, and subjecting each reference to a
validity check. Reference monitor implementations were required to provide high-
assurance and complete mediation of relevant activity by meeting the require-
ments shown in Figure 1.1 [And72]. Because the set of resources at risk included
2At the time, the terminology for this type of security was protection, defined as
those issues in computer security not solvable by the traditional means of physical
security and organizational methods. Unfortunately, the term has fallen out of
favor and the phrase “computer security” is more commonly used today although
in technical literature (as in this dissertation) “computer security” usually refers
only to this restricted form of security.
6all memory accessible to user and operating system activity, efficiency concerns
dictated that the above requirements were best discharged with the support of
specialized hardware. Thus a standard hardware-assisted implementation became
prevalent, the traditional reference monitor, which combines memory virtualiza-
tion with a restricted set of protected operating system entry points or system
calls [Ame81, RT78, GS91, SR99].
Reference monitors are part of the trusted computing base (TCB)—that part of
the computer system whose correct behavior is necessary to guarantee enforcement
of the system’s security policy [SS84]. Ensuring TCB correctness for realistic sys-
tems has proven surprisingly hard. That goal was at the heart of the Secure Com-
puting Initiative, a grand programme embraced by the computer security research
community [Tas81, DoD85]. Although heavily funded by the U.S. Department of
Defense for more than a decade, this initiative is seen as a failure by most [Sch99a].
Despite the difficulty of constructing a high-assurance TCB, which has both
technical and social causes [Tan76, DLP79], TCBs remain fundamental to secu-
rity. No alternative exists for assuring software trustworthiness than to create a
separate component that guarantees the semantics of fundamental interfaces and
data structures [Sho97]; eventually, such a trusted component must exist, even if
only at the level of the underlying hardware. Assurance comes from having this
component simple enough and constructed in such a way that it can be examined
in isolation and shown to provide the right semantics.
1.3 Reference Monitor Implementations
When introduced, the reference monitor implementation was seen as separate from
the validity check for the mediated references:
7It is clear that the reference validation mechanism described above is
not a model of secure computing. It is a device to provide containment
of programs in execution, and as such, is at the heart of any imple-
mentation of these ideas. Surrounding this particular element [i.e.,
the reference monitor] are others that collectively make up the secu-
rity part of a system. These include the authorization mechanism, the
access control mechanism, . . . [And72, p. 18]
Modern reference monitors implement both the mechanism for mediating security-
relevant references as well as the mechanism that judges the validity of those ref-
erences. These validity checks commonly involve examining page tables for virtual
memory access or filesystem access-control metadata for file access.3 This expanded
role for reference monitor implementations has not, however, changed their three
requirements given in Figure 1.1.
Example 1.1 shows one such expanded reference monitor that combines both
mediation and validity checks; this reference monitor prevents the opening of more
than one graphical window. This security policy specification enumerates what
references to mediate and specifies for each the details of how it should be validated;
a form of pseudo-code is used that can be converted into a full-fledged modern
reference monitor implementation using techniques described in Chapter 3. In this
example, the opening and closing of windows are the policy-relevant operations
that the reference monitor mediates. At these security events, the policy performs
security updates which modify its security state (here the boolean flag openWindow
records whether a window is open) and encodes the validity checks, which here
3This somewhat blurs the reference monitor concept with that of the security
kernel [And72] but, arguably, at no great loss.
8STATE {
Boolean flag openWindow, initially false.
}
EVENT Any graphical user interface operation
CONDITION The operation opens a graphical window
UPDATE {
If openWindow {
REJECT the operation.
} Else {
Set openWindow to true.
ALLOW the operation.
}
}
EVENT Any graphical user interface operation
CONDITION The operation closes a graphical window
UPDATE {
Set openWindow to false.
}
Example 1.1: A security policy that disallows more than one open window.
reject the opening of multiple windows.
Extending reference monitors to include validity checks has not increased their
capabilities as there are hard limits to what security policies can be enforced by
monitoring software execution at runtime. Schneider [Sch00] defines a class of such
enforcement mechanisms as EM (for Execution Monitoring) and proves that se-
curity policies enforceable by EM-class mechanisms are safety properties [AS87].
Unfortunately, safety properties4 do not encompass all security policies of inter-
est [ZL97, McL90]. Liveness properties [AS87]5 cannot be enforced with EM-class
reference monitors, and “availability”—the target of denial-of-service attacks—is
an example of a liveness property. Information-flow policies, which preclude inap-
propriate disclosure of sensitive information [DD77, Mye99, McL94], are another
4Informally, safety properties prevent “bad events” from occurring.
5Informally, liveness properties ensure “good events” do occur (e.g., guaranteed
service after payment).
9example of a security policy that is not a safety property and, therefore, not in the
class EM.6
Recent work has sought to more accurately characterize the exact properties
of runtime enforcement mechanisms [BLW02b, HMS03, Vis00]. These characteri-
zations encompass all practical reference monitor implementations—in particular
those whose remedial actions are not simply termination, as necessary in EM.
Also included in these recent formulations are reference monitors that perform
static analysis of the target software to establish properties of all possible execu-
tion paths. Although theoretically these extended formulations describe reference
monitors capable of enforcing virtually all security policies, in practice they intro-
duce only a few that are not in EM and that actually can be implemented. Most
importantly, these extended formulations allow for the formal specification of IRM
toolkits that leverage static analysis, like that described in Chapter 3.
Extending reference monitor formulations with static analysis and alternate
remedial actions no more eliminates the practical limitations of traditional refer-
ence monitors than did the inclusion of validity checks. The primary restriction
on what security policies are enforceable by a reference monitor is the difficulty of
mediating arbitrary application operations. Traditional reference monitors cannot,
for instance, easily distinguish whether a system call originates in a web browser
or in a Java applet running inside that browser. This prevents a traditional refer-
ence monitor from enforcing the security policy of Example 1.1 to defend against
6 General enforcement of liveness and information-flow policies requires analysis
of all possible application executions, so the monitoring of a single execution is not
sufficient. However, a reference monitor may well enforce a more restrictive security
policy which implies either of these security policies. For example, prohibiting all
filesystem access—a security policy that can be enforced with a reference monitor—
can preclude disclosure of any information stored in the filesystem.
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Figure 1.2: Three approaches to reference monitor implementation.
a denial-of-service attack on the graphical user interface (viz., opening a myriad of
windows).7
In particular, traditional reference monitors do not have access to the abstrac-
tions of extensible systems, which precludes enforcement of most security policies
on those extensions, because the policies are likely to be specified in terms of those
abstractions. For example, a security policy restricting the operations of MSWord
macros [Mic00] will probably refer to MSWord abstractions, such as “documents”
and “paragraphs.” Traditional reference monitors, tied to a single interface, are
unable to enforce these application-specific policies. Because such reference mon-
itors only mediate system calls, they can restrict use of the operating system’s
abstractions (e.g., files) but not the use of application abstractions.
As shown in Figure 1.2, there are several ways that reference monitors can
mediate all application operations. A traditional reference monitor is implemented
by halting execution before certain machine instructions and invoking the reference
monitor with the instruction as input. An alternate implementation, not limited
by hardware support, runs applications inside an interpreter that executes the
application code and invokes a reference monitor before each instruction. This
7Reportedly, this security policy is desirable for HTML web pages [RHJ98],
and any JavaScript [Fla98], Dynamic HTML [Rul98], and Java applets [LaD96]
contained within them.
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Figure 1.3: The IRM approach to security policy enforcement.
alternative was dismissed in [And72] as having unacceptable performance overhead,
since a cost is incurred on every executed machine instruction regardless of its
relevance to the security policy.8 This dissertation examines the third option shown
in Figure 1.2—embedding reference monitors in the target software—and shows
how this approach overcomes the limitations of traditional reference monitors, yet
exhibits reasonable performance.
1.4 Inlined Reference Monitors
An inlined reference monitor is obtained by modifying an application to include
the functionality of a reference monitor. IRMs are inserted into applications by
a rewriter that reads a target application and a security policy and produces a
secured application, whose execution is guaranteed not to violate that security
policy. This is depicted in Figure 1.3. The security policy is enforced on the
secured application by the IRM enforcement code inserted by the rewriter. This
IRM enforcement code encompasses both the reference monitor security state and
security updates needed for this policy.
Like all reference monitors, IRMs are subject to the requirements given in Fig-
8Even so, this approach is used, for instance, in the Berkeley Packet Fil-
ter [SV93].
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a. The IRM must fully mediate all security-policy-relevant op-
erations in the secured application.
b. The integrity of the IRM must be protected, either by the
IRM itself or by some external means. In particular, the se-
cured application must not be able to circumvent or subvert
IRM enforcement code.
c. The correctness of IRMs must be assured, in part by hav-
ing the IRM rewriter and its input security policy be small
enough to analyze and test them.
d. In the absence of security policy violations, the secured ap-
plication output by the IRM rewriter must be functionally
equivalent to the original; rewriting the target application
must not modify its observable behavior.
Figure 1.4: Requirements for IRMs, based on those in Figure 1.1.
ure 1.1. IRMs are additionally constrained, however, because despite the insertion
of IRM enforcement code, the semantics of the original target application must
be preserved. Figure 1.4 gives this additional requirement as well as restating the
general requirements of Figure 1.1 instantiated for the IRM approach.
Compared to traditional reference monitors, IRMs can enforce a richer set of
security policies. In particular, because the code and state of the IRM exist as
a part of the application, the IRM can mediate the execution of any application
instruction and, therefore, can restrict uses of application-level abstractions. To
enforce such richer security policies, the rewriter must identify where the applica-
tion uses application-level abstractions and insert at those points the appropriate
IRM enforcement code—i.e., the rewriter must identify where security-relevant ac-
tions occur and insert an appropriate security check or update. An IRM thus can
enforce application-specific security policies such as “A Java applet running in-
side the Netscape browser may only open one graphical window,” or “An MSWord
macro may only modify the MSWord document that contains the macro.” Neither
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Application′
Kernel
Application′′Application
RM RM′
Figure 1.5: Three different applications, two of which have a distinct IRM.
of these security policies can be enforced by a traditional reference monitor because
the policies involve application operations—not operating system operations.
IRMs are also able to enforce policies of traditional reference monitors, such
as filesystem access control and memory protection. IRM enforcement code can
be inserted into the application before and after each system call [PH98] and each
memory-relevant operation [WLAG93]. In fact, because IRM security state can
summarize an application’s execution history, IRMs are strictly more flexible than
traditional reference monitors for enforcing policies involving operating system ab-
stractions. This permits IRMs to enforce a policy like “The application may not
send network messages after it has read the filesystem” which is not enforceable
with existing traditional reference monitor implementations, e.g., using the stan-
dard file permission bit flags of UNIX [RT78, GS91].
Typically, operating systems implement only such simple low-overhead secu-
rity mechanisms that track state relevant to almost every circumstance. A more
general-purpose mechanism that tracks additional state comes at a higher enforce-
ment overhead, which penalizes all those applications that do not make use of this
state. With IRMs, the enforcement mechanism can be made to fit the intent, and
state kept in proportion to the security policy.
IRMs also have the potential to be more efficient than traditional reference
monitors. Not only do IRMs not incur overhead by context switching to an oper-
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ating system for enforcement: as shown in Figure 1.5, applications can be subject
to different specialized IRMs, reducing the total overhead of security enforcement.
Also, moving security enforcement from the operating system into an IRM is likely
to make the operating system itself smaller and more efficient, in particular for
activity not subject to security enforcement, such as Application′′ in Figure 1.5.
This said, the use of IRMs introduces new challenges that must be resolved in
practice. For instance, if each application has a different IRM then many copies
may be made of otherwise common code such as libraries, with each copy slightly
different. This can adversely affect code sharing and locality, resulting in lower
performance and increased resource consumption. In addition, because IRMs are
embedded in secured applications, it can be difficult understand how IRMs com-
pose, e.g., as a result of multiple rewritings, and to determine what is the security
policy being currently enforced. This dissertation presents several such challenges
to the implementation of IRMs and how they may be resolved.
1.5 Terminology
IRMs are best described using a consistent vocabulary, since notational clarity
both helps explain what is novel as well as resolve what is ambiguous. This section
introduces the terminology that is specific to IRMs and is used in this document.
Terms are italicized twice, both in the below paragraphs and also at the time of
their first use.
An IRM is a security enforcement mechanism that is inserted into a target
application by a rewriter that is part of an IRM system implementation, or toolkit.
The rewriter is guided by a security policy in its insertion of IRM enforcement code,
which consists of security state and security updates to that state. The output of
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the rewriter is a secured application which is guaranteed to comply with the input
security policy.
IRMs mediate runtime application activity, subject that activity to validity
checks, and take remedial action if those checks fail. Validity checks and remedial
actions are specific to the security policy being enforced. However, the low-level
actions comprising the target application’s execution on its runtime platform are
independent of any specific security policy, and it is those low-level actions that
an IRM mediates.
The structure of a target application’s static image determines what low-level
actions can occur during its execution. When rewriting a target application, the
IRM rewriter uses this structure to identify places in the application where low-level
actions may occur at runtime; each such place forms an insertion point for IRM
enforcement code.9 Also, low-level actions that do not occur in the application
may be exposed by the IRM toolkit rewriter through the addition of code that
forms an insertion point for that action.
Given a particular security policy, only a subset of a target application’s low-
level actions may actually be security-relevant actions and thus at runtime be
relevant to compliance with the security policy. An IRM toolkit makes media-
tion specific to a security policy by identifying and exposing only security-relevant
actions. At a particular insertion point, the rewriter inserts—as specified by the
security policy—the IRM enforcement code that should be triggered at runtime by
that particular security-relevant action.
Although security enforcement only requires the mediation of security-relevant
actions, those actions are too low-level to be the only basis for the validity checks
9Thus, insertion points correspond to join points and IRM enforcement code to
advice in the work of [KLM+97, WZL03].
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of actual security policies. Typically, therefore, the security policy input to an
IRM toolkit synthesizes, or abstracts, from the low-level activity higher-level se-
curity events by using security updates and security state. As a result, in order
to separate policy and mechanism, some security policy specifications may restrict
their attention to synthesis of security events, leaving the validity checking of those
events to future security policy extensions. With careful event synthesis, an IRM
toolkit can provide the facilities of a higher-level reference monitor that operates
by mediating such higher-level security events.
1.6 Dissertation Structure
This dissertation explores the IRM approach, discusses the issues raised, and
demonstrates the generality and practicality of the approach by describing some
prototype implementations, thereby expanding on the work published in [ES99,
ES00].
Chapter 2 describes the SASI (Security Automata SFI Implementation) pro-
totypes, which process security policies specified using a form of finite-state au-
tomata. SASI was implemented both for the Intel x86 [INT94] and JVML [YL96]
instruction set architectures. The x86 SASI used the SFI (Software-based Fault
Isolation) technique of [WLAG93] to protect the integrity of the IRM; the integrity
of the JVML SASI prototype relies on guarantees provided by the JVML verifier.
Chapter 2 offers a close look at how SASI would enforce an example security policy,
the Chinese Wall policy of [BN89], and offers a retrospective on the prototypes.
Chapter 3 refines the ideas of inlined reference monitors, describing how to over-
come practical challenges in their implementation as well as discussing issues of
deployment and management. The chapter introduces a second-generation proto-
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type IRM implementation based on JVML: the PoET Policy Enforcement Toolkit
and its PSLang security Policy Specification Language. Numerous examples, writ-
ten as PSLang security policy specifications (including those listed in Appendix B),
are given to illustrate the applicability of the IRM approach.
Chapter 4 offers a detailed case study of applying the IRM approach to Java 2
(or JDK 1.2) stack inspection [Gon99, WF98], describing the tradeoffs and perfor-
mance of different implementation strategies. The chapter compares IRM imple-
mentations of stack inspection with other known implementations.
Chapters 5 and 6 describe related and future work, and offer concluding re-
marks, respectively.
Appendix A gives the syntax and informal semantics of the PoET and PSLang
prototypes, relative to JVML, as well as describing relevant details of their im-
plementation. Finally, Appendix B provides complete listings for PSLang policies
relevant to the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4.
Chapter 2
Security Automata SFI Implementation
Most reference monitors observe the execution of a target system and halt that
system whenever it is about to violate some security policy of concern. Secu-
rity mechanisms found in system software and hardware typically either directly
implement reference monitors or are intended to facilitate the implementation of
reference monitors. For example, an operating system might mediate access to
files and other abstractions it supports, thereby implementing a reference moni-
tor for policies concerning those objects. As another example, the context switch
(trap) caused when a system call instruction is executed forces a transfer of con-
trol, thereby facilitating invocation of a reference monitor whenever a system call
is executed.
The IRM approach, described in Chapter 1, constitutes an alternative to placing
the reference monitor and target systems in separate address spaces: modify the
target system code, effectively merging the reference monitor in-line. This is the
basis for SFI (Software-based Fault Isolation) [WLAG93], which provides memory
protection by enforcing the security policy that prevents reads, writes, or branches
to memory locations outside of certain predefined memory regions associated with
a target system. In theory, a reference monitor for any security policy—not just
memory protection—could be inlined into a target application, provided the target
can be prevented from circumventing the inlined code. This chapter describes two
prototype systems that have successfully reduced this theory to practice.
The prototypes implement the IRM approach by inlining security policy en-
forcement code into the object code for a target system. The prototypes work at
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the level of object code, and not source code, both to be source-language indepen-
dent and, also, to minimize the size of the trusted computing base. In particular,
by rewriting object code, high-level language processors are not made part of the
TCB. However, the IRM rewriter (which performs analysis and modification of
object code) is added to the TCB, but this rewriter can be relatively modest is
size (as described in §2.3). Also, working at the object code level makes available
a rich vocabulary of low-level activity—the machine-language instructions of the
target system—over which any security policy can presumably be crafted.1
One of the prototypes transforms Intel x86 [INT94] assembly language out-
put from the gcc compiler; another prototype transforms JVML (Java Virtual
Machine Language) [YL96]. With each, security policies are specified using secu-
rity automata, a notation that has been shown to be in the class EM (described
in the previous chapter), and expressive enough to define any security policy that
halts the target system and is enforceable through execution monitoring [Sch00].
The chapter proceeds as follows. The use of security automata for specifying
security policies is discussed in §2.1. A general approach to merging enforcement
code into a target system is the subject of §2.2. The two prototype realizations of
this approach are then discussed in §2.3. For each prototype, ensuring enforcement
code integrity is discussed and results of performance experiments are given. In
§2.4 a detailed example of how the prototypes could be used to enforce the Chinese
Wall security policy [BN89] is given. And, §2.5 critiques the prototypes, offering
the conceptual basis for further implementations of the IRM approach.
1As will become clear, this belief—although appearing reasonable—is a fallacy.
By observing only machine instructions, a reference monitor is unable to mediate
certain security-relevant actions and, also, security events often require complicated
analysis that reduces both assurance and runtime performance. Resolving these
concerns is the subject of Chapter 3.
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2.1 Security Automata
As defined in [Sch00], a security automaton involves a (not necessarily finite) set
of states, a (not necessarily finite) input alphabet, and a transition relation. The
transition relation defines a next state for the automaton given its current state
and an input symbol. It is often convenient to define this transition relation using
first-order predicates: such a transition predicate is true for a current state q, an
input symbol s, and a next state q′ iff whenever the security automaton is in state
q and input symbol s is read, the automaton state changes to state q′.
Security automata are similar to ordinary non-deterministic finite-state au-
tomata [HU69]. Both classes of automata involve a set of states and a transition
relation such that reading an input symbol causes the automaton to make a transi-
tion from one state to another. However, an ordinary finite-state automaton rejects
a sequence of symbols if and only if that automaton does not make a transition
into an accepting state upon reading the final symbol of the input. In a security
automaton, all states are accepting states; the automaton rejects an input upon
reading a symbol for which the automaton’s current state has no transition defined.
Formally, a security automaton is defined by
• a set Q of automaton states,
• a set Q0 ⊆ Q of initial automaton states,
• a (countable) set I of input symbols, and
• a transition function, δ ⊆ (Q× I)→ 2Q.
The set I of input symbols depends on the security policy being enforced; it may
correspond to the set of unique system states or to the set of unique atomic actions
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Figure 2.1: Security automaton: “No messages sent after reading a file”.
in the target system (such as machine instructions). To process a sequence s1s2 . . .
of input symbols in I, the automaton starts with its current state set Q′ equal to
Q0 and reading the sequence one symbol at a time changes its current state set Q
′
to the set Q′′, where
Q′′ =
⋃
q∈Q′
δ(q, si).
If the current state set Q′ is ever empty, the input is rejected (and does not comply
with the policy being defined by the automaton); otherwise the input is accepted.
As mentioned above, transition function δ may be given in terms of transition
predicates, which are Boolean-valued effectively computable total functions with
domain I. If pij denotes the predicate for the transition from automaton state qi
to automaton state qj, then the security automaton, upon reading an input symbol
s with current state set Q′, changes it’s current state set Q′ to Q′′, where
Q′′ = {qj | qi ∈ Q′ ∧ s |= pij}.
Security automata can be regarded as defining reference monitors in the class
EM described in Chapter 1. The input alphabet corresponds to low-level actions
that are mediated by the reference monitor. The transition relation encodes a
security policy—the automaton rejects sequences of inputs corresponding to target
system executions in which the security policy would be violated. For example,
Figure 2.1 depicts a security automaton for a security policy that prohibits message
sends after file reads. The automaton’s states are represented by the two nodes
labeled start and noSnd . (Automaton state start is the initial state of this security
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automaton.) The transition predicates read and send characterize target-system
instructions that cause files to be read and messages to be sent, respectively. Thus,
the security automaton of Figure 2.1 rejects any input corresponding to a target
system’s attempt to execute a send instruction while in state noSnd (i.e. after a
file read).
The remainder of this chapter only considers deterministic security automata
with only a finite number of states. Standard automata techniques allow this
simplification with no practical limitation to the discussion or to the applicability
of the conclusions drawn [ASU85, Sch00].
2.2 Inlining a Security Automaton
Security Automata SFI Implementation (SASI) is an instantiation of the IRM ap-
proach that generalizes SFI to any security policy specified as a security automaton.
With SFI, new target system code is inserted immediately before any instruction
that accesses memory (i.e. any read, write, branch, subroutine call, or subroutine
return). This new code ensures that (i) all reads and writes to memory will access
addresses within the target’s data region, (ii) all branches, calls, and returns will
transfer control to an instruction within the original target program, and (iii) the
functionality of this added security checking cannot be circumvented by the target
system.2
With SASI, new code is inserted into the target system immediately preceding
every instruction. The added code simulates a security automaton. Specifically,
2 In addition, with SFI, the instruction itself may be modified in a way that
preserves semantics in absence of security policy violation. Thus, an instruction
that writes to a memory location contained in register r1 might be modified to use
register r2, with r2 containing the original address of r1 modified to lie inside a
certain memory region.
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Figure 2.2: An overview of the SASI implementation of the IRM approach.
new variables—accessible only to the code added for SASI—represent the current
state of the security automaton, and new code—that cannot be circumvented—
simulates an automaton state transition. The new code also causes the target
system to halt (because the current automaton state does not allow a transition
for the next target instruction) whenever the automaton rejects its input. Thus,
the automaton simulation is equivalent to inlining a reference monitor into the
target system (as shown in Figure 2.2).
The set of security automata input symbols—in SASI the set of target system
instructions—determines which security policies can be enforced by the security
automata. For instance, the set of automata input symbols could be limited to the
set of function calls and returns. Such a restriction would reduce the number of
insertions of IRM enforcement code, thereby reducing security enforcement over-
head. However, such a restriction would also preclude SASI from enforcing some
security policies—for example, policies concerning individual machine instructions
like SFI (which restricts memory access operations) or a policy that disallows di-
vision by zero. This is because both memory access and division by zero do not
necessarily involve any function calls.
SASI reduces security enforcement overhead (without restricting the set of en-
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Figure 2.3: Security automaton: “Push once, and only once, before returning.”
forceable policies) by simplifying the inserted code. Simple analysis of the target
system often allows the code for simulating a security automaton to be greatly
reduced by using the context in which that code appears. To achieve this, SASI
performs the processing diagrammed in Figure 2.2:
Insert security automata. A copy of the security automaton SA, which enforces
the desired security policy, is associated with every application instruction.
Specialize security automata. Each copy of SA is specialized according to its
associated instruction. In Figure 2.2, SA′ and SA′′ are the result of such a
specialization.
Compile security automata. Emulation code is generated for the each special-
ized security automaton and inserted before its associated instruction. In
Figure 2.2, SA′ happens to be effect-free (i.e., does not restrict the target
system execution) and, thus, only emulation code for SA′′ is inserted. For
example, this is the case if SA specifies a security policy that prohibits divi-
sion by zero, SA′ is associated with a load instruction, and SA′′ is associated
with a division instruction.
By specializing the transition predicates of security automata as well as by using
the automaton structure, irrelevant tests and updates to the security automaton
state can be removed during the security automaton specialization step. SASI
specializes security automata to each insertion point using methods from program
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Figure 2.4: Simplification of inserted code.
optimization [ASU85] and partial evaluation of programs [JGS93]. Figure 2.4 de-
picts the inlining of a security automaton specification (given in Figure 2.3) into
a three-instruction routine that squares a value in register r0. The security policy
in Figure 2.3 restricts execution to pushing exactly one value onto a stack before
returning.3
In Figure 2.4 the “Specialize” column of Figure 2.2 has been expanded into two
separate columns to better illustrate the processing:
Evaluate transitions. Partially-evaluate the transition predicates of each secu-
rity automaton, given information at each insertion point.
Simplify automata. Delete any transitions whose predicates evaluated to false
in the previous step of evaluating the transition predicates.
The final step (shown in the last column of Figure 2.4) compiles the simplified
security automata into code that, if inserted at these points, simulates the operation
3 For exposition purposes, the security policy shown doesn’t handle some cases,
e.g., those involving the pop instruction.
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of the security automaton. ABORT is invoked by the inserted code if the automaton
being simulated must reject its input.
SASI eliminates security enforcement code—and thereby reduces security en-
forcement overhead—by utilizing the structure of security automata in two ways:
1. If each state of an automaton has a transition labeled with predicate p back to
that same state, the automaton can be simplified to a one-state automaton
that only accepts inputs that satisfy p. In addition, when p ≡ true the
resulting automaton will accept all inputs, and when p ≡ false the resulting
automaton will reject all inputs.
2. If each state of an automaton has a transition labeled with predicate p to
a distinguished state q, the automaton can be simplified to a two-state au-
tomaton that only accepts inputs that satisfy p and update the state to q.
The above automaton-structure simplification methods are an instance of an opti-
mization for “switch statements” in programming languages like C [EKR96, HS94].
A security automaton can be emulated by branching (or“switching”) on the current
automaton state to code that updates that state, contingent on the satisfaction of
a transition predicate. In such emulation, simplifications 1 and 2 above apply when
all branch targets update the state in the same way, collapsing multiple equivalent
branch targets.
Because SASI evaluates and simplifies security automata using only local infor-
mation, a more global analysis can sometimes show inserted code to be redundant.
For example, in Figure 2.4, if the ret instruction can be reached only through
straight-line execution, then state==0 will necessarily be false before ret is exe-
cuted. In this case, the code appearing in Figure 2.4 before the ret instruction
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might not be needed. The partial evaluator in SASI doesn’t attempt this global
analysis because this would increase both the size and complexity of the SASI
TCB.4 Recent work indicates, however, that only a small addition to the TCB may
be required for this type of analysis, if integrated into existing partial-evaluation
frameworks [Thi03].
2.3 Two SASI Prototypes
Security policies for the SASI prototypes are represented in SAL (for Security
Automaton Language), a language devised to provide a textual way to specify
security automata.5 Each SAL specification consists of a (finite) list of states, with
each state having a list of transitions to other states. Macros are defined at the
start of the SAL specification and are expanded fully bottom-up before use (and
therefore may not be recursive).
SAL transition predicates are expressions constructed from constants, variables,
C-style arithmetic and logical operators, and function calls. SAL functions are
either general-purpose and platform-independent, or platform-specific:
• For the x86 SASI prototype, the platform-specific functions evaluate to the
opcode and operands of the next target instruction, as well as defining the
sets of addresses corresponding to data values that can be read/written and
4For this particular example, the analysis would need to statically propagate
between instructions the set of potential “current” automata states and give strong
guarantees about execution of branches. For arbitrary object code, this analysis
is complex and somewhat unreliable. However, if restricted to individual JVML
basic blocks, the analysis becomes simple enough to even be directly encoded in
security policies, as shown by the IRM toolkit of Chapter 3.
5 SAL is just one language, of many, that could be used to specify security
automata for security policies. Another language—of strictly greater expressive-
ness than SAL—is introduced in Chapter 3 and described in detail in Appendix A.
Therefore, this dissertation does not give details of SAL syntax and semantics.
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/*
** Macro definitions
*/
MethodCall(name) ::= op=="invokevirtual"
&& param[1]==name;
FileRead() ::= MethodCall("java/io/FileInputStream/read()I");
Send() ::= MethodCall("java/net/SocketOutputStream/write(I)V");
/*
** The Security Automaton
*/
start ::=
!FileRead() -> start
FileRead() -> noSnd
;
noSnd ::=
!Send() -> noSnd
;
Example 2.1: SAL specification for “No messages sent after reading a file.”
defining addresses of instructions in the target system that can be branch,
call, or return destinations.
• For the JVML SASI prototype, the platform-specific functions allow access
to class name, method name, method type signature, JVML opcode, instruc-
tion operands, as well the JVM state in which the target instruction will be
executed.
As an illustration, Example 2.1 contains SAL for a JVML SASI specification of
the security policy (given in Figure 2.1) prohibiting message sends after file reads.6
Associated with each SASI prototype is a rewriter that inlines a security au-
tomaton simulation into the object code for a target system. The rewriter operates
as outlined in §2.2, i.e., it inserts IRM enforcement code for the security automaton
6 For expository simplicity, this SAL specification does not consider all ways in
which JVML programs can access the filesystem and the network. The relevant
details are given in §3.4.
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simulation immediately before each target instruction. To construct this code, the
platform-specific SAL functions appearing in transition predicates are instantiated
with actual values, if they are known, and with code that will compute the val-
ues at runtime, otherwise. A generic partial evaluator is next run to simplify the
resulting automaton. Finally, object code for the simplified security automaton is
generated and inserted in the target system code.
The integrity of a reference monitor inlined by the SASI rewriter into the ob-
ject code of a target system depends on preventing corruption of that security
automaton simulation. This entails
• preventing the target system from modifying variables being used in security
automaton transition predicates and variables being used to encode the state
of the security automaton,
• preventing the target system from circumventing the code that implements
transitions by the security automaton, and
• preventing the target system from improperly modifying its own code or
causing other code to be executed (e.g. by using dynamic linking, which
most operating systems support), since this could nullify the measures just
described for preserving security automaton integrity.
Thus, the secured application must not be able to violate the integrity of the IRM—
by circumventing the security updates, by compromising the security state, or by
generating some security-related action not mediated by the IRM. Discharging
these obligations is platform dependent, but can, for instance, verify the object code
to establish that the unwelcome behavior is impossible or modify the object code
to rule out the unwelcome behavior. The prototypes make use of both approaches.
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readMemOp() ∧
canRead(sourceAddr)
∨
retOp() ∧
validRetPt(topOfStack)
writeMemOp() ∧
canWrite(targetAddr)
...
∨
callOp() ∧
validCallPt(destAddr)
jumpOp() ∧
validJumpPt(destAddr)
Figure 2.5: A security automaton for SFI-like memory protection.
2.3.1 The x86 Prototype
The x86 SASI prototype works with the assembly language output of the GNU
gcc C compiler [Woe94]. Like most SFI implementations, x86 SASI makes several
assumptions about its target programs. For instance, x86 SASI excludes self-
modifying programs, relies on the register-usage conventions of gcc, and the fol-
lowing assumptions:
• Program behavior is insensitive to silent modifications such as adding stutter-
steps, i.e., functional null operations, or no-ops.
• Variables and branch-targets are restricted to the set of labels identified by
gcc during compilation.
These restrictions considerably simplify the task of preventing a security automaton
simulation from being corrupted by the target system.
Figure 2.5 shows the x86 SASI security automaton for a security policy that
enforces the guarantees of SFI,7 with Example 2.2 showing some details of its
SAL specification. The transitions of Figure 2.5 are labeled with predicates that
7 The policy of Figure 2.5 even deals with difficulties that arise because valid x86
instructions might exist at non-instruction boundaries in a target system—a bit
pattern for one instruction might encompass the bit pattern for another. By lim-
iting branch destination to valid labels, jumping into the middle of an instruction
is prevented.
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correspond to macros in the SAL specification. These macros serve to restrict
allowed inputs to each type of machine instruction.
In the figure, each transition uses a predicate for a certain type of machine
instruction—branch instructions in the case of jumpOp()—and it holds when that
type of instruction is executed at runtime. Each of these instruction types operates
on arguments that must be restricted at runtime. These instruction operands are
represented in the figure by distinct macro names, e.g., targetAddr for the recipient
operand in instructions that write a new value.
It suffices to apply x86 SASI with the simple memory-protection policy of Fig-
ure 2.5 in order to obtain target-system object code that cannot subvert an inlined
security automaton simulation. The x86 SASI prototype, therefore, prepends a
SAL description of the security policy in Figure 2.5 to the SAL input describing
any security policy P to be enforced. This effectively inlines into the target system
a security automaton that enforces security policy P and cannot be circumvented
or corrupted.
This recursive use of x86 SASI works because the transition predicates in Fig-
ure 2.5 are defined entirely in terms of SAL platform-specific functions which, by
virtue of being constructed from information provided by gcc, accurately char-
acterize the target program. An informal proof that the transformation suffices
proceeds by contradiction, along the following lines. Only branch, call, return,
and write instructions can subvert the security automaton simulation. Let i be
the first instruction that accomplishes the subversion. Before each branch, call,
return, and write instruction, code to check that instruction’s operand is added
by x86 SASI for the policy in Figure 2.5. Thus, such checking code must imme-
diately precede instruction i. Since, by assumption, i is the first instruction that
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/*
** Macro definitions
*/
...
/* define trusted operands */
trusted(N) ::= indirectBaseRegisterName[N]=="%ebp"
&& ...;
/* ensure address is trusted or in right segment */
sandbox(N,address) ::= trusted(N)
|| (address & writeMask)==writeSegment;
/* can operand N be written to? */
canWrite(N) ::= ( type[N]=="register" )
|| ( type[N]=="direct"
&& sandbox(N,memoryLabel[N]) )
|| ( type[N]=="indirect"
&& sandbox(N,indirectAddress[N]) );
...
/*
** The Security Automaton
*/
start ::=
/* exchange instruction writes to both its operands */
op=="xchg" && canWrite(1) && canWrite(2) -> start
/* return instruction must have valid target address */
op=="ret" && validReturnPoint(%esp[0]) -> start
...
;
Example 2.2: Excerpts from the SAL specification for x86 SASI SFI.
accomplishes the subversion, the checking code that precedes it must have been
reached and executed. And since the transition predicates are, by construction, ac-
curate, the checking code that precedes i will prevent instruction i from executing.
This contradicts the assumption that i is able to execute and subvert the security
automaton simulation.
33
x86 SASI SFI Implementation
Example 2.2 shows parts of the x86 SASI SAL specification for the SFI security
policy of Figure 2.5. Shown are the parts relevant to the xchg and ret instruc-
tions. In the specification, the instruction-type predicates of Figure 2.5 have been
expanded to designate particular opcode names; similarly, the argument macros
have been expanded, so that, for example, topOfStack has become %esp[0].
The xchg instruction swaps the contents of two memory locations and, thus,
must have write access to both locations (here, write access implies read access).
The x86 SASI SAL specification of Example 2.2 ensures that only certain memory
addresses can be written through sandboxing target addresses, a method developed
in previous SFI implementations [WLAG93]. Sandboxing a write instruction, such
as xchg, entails comparing the first few bits of the target address to a specific
value, for which all writes are legal—i.e., this sandboxing requires addresses in the
writable memory segment to have a specific prefix.8
The ret instruction returns from a function call by performing an indirect jump
to the address on top of the call stack. The SFI security policy requires this address
to be a valid return point, i.e., the address of an instruction following a call
instruction. In Example 2.2 this is enforced by the validReturnPoint platform-
specific function, which is constructed by the x86 SASI rewriter from the set of
labels following call instructions in the target program. Indirect jumps and calls
are subject to a similar constraint, also enforced by platform-specific functions
constructed by the rewriter from target-program labels.9
8 SFI implementations typically sandbox addresses in this manner rather than
comparing against a lower and upper bound, because this allows for more efficient
security enforcement code [WLAG93].
9 The x86 SASI prototype implements these functions using balanced binary
trees, generated using the relative order of labels in the input assembly. A more
34
For return instructions, indirect jumps, and some calls, these platform-specific
functions must be executed at run time in order to determine whether the target
address is a valid label. However, when the target address is a directly-named
label (e.g., as in a function call to a known function), the rewriter can statically
determine the platform-specific function’s result. This is the case for the function
memoryLabel in Example 2.2; that function is constructed by the rewriter and only
invoked during the rewriting of the target program.
Finally, the SFI specification in Example 2.2 exploits the fact that code gener-
ated by gcc makes indirect stack references by using x86 register %ebp, and %ebp
is guaranteed by gcc to point to a valid location in the stack. Thus, the SFI se-
curity policy does not require run-time checks for indirect references through %ebp
(see the trusted macro in Example 2.2). Since indirect references through %ebp
constitute a significant fraction of the indirect memory references in executables
produced by gcc, avoiding such checks significantly reduces enforcement overhead.
But exploiting assumptions about code generated by gcc in order to reduce the
cost of an enforcement mechanism does expand the TCB to include gcc—a ques-
tionable trade-off.
For SFI processing of machine object code it seems necessary to make additional
simplifying assumptions of the type described in this section. In particular, the SFI
implementations in the literature, have had difficulty with function pointers, and
other computed jumps, self-modifying and dynamically-loaded code, and variable-
length machine opcodes (as mentioned on page 30, in a footnote). As a result, SFI
implementations often unrealistically constrain the set of their input programs,
efficient x86 SASI implementation could make use of the labels’ absolute mem-
ory addresses, determined when the target program is linked into memory, and
implement these functions by hashing on target addresses.
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pushl %ebx
leal dirty(,%eax,4), %ebx
andl offsetMask, %ebx
orl writeSegment, %ebx
movl %edx, (%ebx)
popl %ebx
pushl %ebx
leal dirty(,%eax,4), %ebx
andl segmentMask, %ebx
cmpl writeSegment, %ebx
jne SASIx86_ABORT
popl %ebx
movl %edx, dirty(,%eax,4)
MiSFIT x86 SASI SFI
Figure 2.6: SFI’d x86 assembly instruction movl %edx, dirty(,%eax,4).
even after the guaranteed use of a certain compiler, e.g., excluding C programs
with trampolines or other inline assembly. Only by modifying the compiler and
language semantics has this SFI limitation been overcome [ATLLW96]—thereby
moving towards the verifiable certification of code discussed in §3.1.2.
x86 SASI in Action
The SFI memory protection policy given by the SAL specification of Example 2.2
is the same security policy as implemented by MiSFIT, a special-purpose SFI
transformation tool for x86 operating system extensions [Sma97]. MiSFIT thus
constitutes a benchmark for measuring the SFI performance of x86 SASI.10 Con-
sequently, a set of target systems was input both to MiSFIT and to x86 SASI with
no additional SAL input (so that it enforces the same policy as MiSFIT).
The modifications MiSFIT and x86 SASI SFI make to a target system are not
very different. Figure 2.6 shows the gcc assembly output (target operand on the
right) generated by MiSFIT and x86 SASI SFI for a movl instruction that transfers
the contents of register %edx into integer array dirty at a position specified by the
10 Like the SFI security policy of Example 2.2, MiSFIT relies on the %ebp register
being inaccessible to actual application code. The primary reason for including this
performance optimization in x86 SASI was to allow meaningful comparisons with
MiSFIT; without this assumption, overhead would approximately double.
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Table 2.1: Relative performance of MiSFIT and x86 SASI SFI.
Benchmark MiSFIT x86 SASI SFI
Page-eviction hotlist 2.378 (0.3%) 3.643 (2.6%)
Logical log-structured disk 1.576 (0.3%) 1.654 (0.5%)
MD5 message digest 1.331 (1.4%) 1.363 (0.1%)
contents of register %eax. (In Figure 2.6, code inserted by x86 SASI is typeset in
a slanted font; original target system code is typeset in an upright font.) Notice
that MiSFIT actually replaces the original movl whereas x86 SASI only prepends
additional instructions. In both, the %ebx register is made usable by saving its
contents on the stack.11 In some rare cases, the stack is also used to save the
processor flags, which on the x86 architecture are implicitly changed by execution of
most instructions. For efficiency, the x86 SASI rewriter uses a load-time generated
function that performs a conservative data-flow analysis to determine when these
flags must be saved.
Table 2.1 gives running times for three target systems from [SS96, Sma97] that
have been processed by MiSFIT and by the x86 SASI prototype. The running
times are relative to execution of the unmodified target system, and the numbers
shown are averages (with standard deviation in parentheses) over 30 runs on a
266mhz Pentium II running Linux 2.0.30. Thus, executing MD5 processed by
MiSFIT took on average 33.1% longer than running an unmodified MD5, with
31.2% and 35% overhead at one standard deviation from the norm. The “Page-
eviction hotlist” benchmark is a memory intensive application; not surprisingly, it
has a high overhead in both implementations, since a check must be executed on
11MiSFIT and x86 SASI thus both require that enough stack space be available
for saving the %ebx register. This can be ensured at load time. Note, however,
that MiSFIT’s use of %ebx after the sandboxed memory access may be incorrect
if the array dirty overlaps the stack, a subtle bug that may result in insidious
modifications of program behavior.
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each indirect memory access.
As Table 2.1 shows, x86 SASI and MiSFIT produce target systems having
comparable performance. But there are target systems where MiSFIT performs
considerably better. This might be expected, since MiSFIT is a specialized tool,
customized to enforce one specific policy, and MiSFIT optimizes the code it adds.
Also, adding additional analysis and optimization capabilities to the x86 SASI
rewriter would improve its relative performance, albeit at the cost of increased
complexity, creating more risk for security bugs, like that described for MiSFIT
in the footnote on page 36. In general, however, the flexibility of being able to
enforce any policy should make IRM-based security enforcement attractive, even
at the cost of some increase in enforcement overhead.
2.3.2 The JVML Prototype
Type safe languages, such as JVML, provide guarantees about execution, includ-
ing guarantees that imply the simple memory-protection policy given in Figure 2.5
cannot be violated. A program that does not satisfy this simple memory-protection
policy is simply not type safe. The JVML SASI prototype exploits the type safety
of JVML programs to prevent a security automaton simulation from being cor-
rupted by the target system in which it resides, thus ensuring that IRM integrity
is preserved.
Variables that JVML SASI adds to JVML object programs as part of a security
automaton simulation cannot be compromised because they are inaccessible to
the target-system object code by virtue of their names and types, given the type
safety of JVML. Code that JVML SASI adds for the security automaton simulation
cannot be circumvented because JVML type safety prevents jumps to unlabeled
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...
ldc 1 ; noSnd state number
putstatic SASIJVML/state ; change state to noSnd
invokevirtual java/io/FileInputStream/read()I ; read file
...
getstatic SASIJVML/state ; get current state number
ifeq SUCCEED ; if state = start goto SUCCEED
invokestatic SASIJVML/ABORT()V ; else violation
SUCCEED:
invokevirtual java/net/SocketOutputStream/write(I)V ; send msg
...
Figure 2.7: JVML SASI enforcement of “no messages sent after reading a file.”
instructions, and the security automaton simulation code segments are constructed
so they do not contain labels.12
The type safety of JVML also empowers the JVML SASI user who is formu-
lating a security policy that concerns application abstractions. JVML instructions
contain information about classes, objects, methods, threads, and types. This
information is made available (though platform-specific functions) in SAL to the
author of a security policy. Security policies for JVML SASI thus can define per-
missible computations in terms of these application abstractions. In contrast, x86
code contains virtually no information about a C program it represents, so the au-
thor of a security policy for x86 SASI may be forced to synthesize, or abstract, from
sequences of object code instructions those security events that use abstractions
from the programming language or the application. Such synthesis is necessarily
brittle, since those instruction sequences depend on target application implemen-
tation details (such as what high-level language it was written in).
12 JVML SASI security policies must also rule out indirect ways of compromising
the variables or circumventing the code added for policy enforcement. For example,
JVML dynamic class loading and program reflection must be disallowed, or its
behavior suitably modified to ensure IRM integrity (as discussed in Chapter 3).
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JVML SASI in Action
Figure 2.7 shows code that was produced by the JVML SASI prototype for enforc-
ing the security policy specification of Example 2.1 (corresponding to the security
automaton of Figure 2.1 which prohibits sends after file reads). Code inserted by
the JVML SASI prototype is typeset in a slanted font; original target system code
is typeset in an upright font. Because the target system’s instruction to invoke
the FileInputStream/read method satisfies the security automaton’s read pred-
icate, this instruction has been prefixed by security automaton simulation code;
that code causes an automaton transition to state noSnd . And because the target
system’s instruction to invoke the write method satisfies the send predicate, it
too has been prefixed with security automaton simulation code; that code halts
the application if start is not the current state of the security automaton.
To gain some understanding about the performance overhead of policy enforce-
ment with JVML SASI, the prototype was used to implement the functionality
of Sun’s Java 1.1 SecurityManager (SM). There, enforcement is based on a secu-
rity automaton that specifies checks to be performed at exactly those points in
the Java system libraries where Sun’s SM performs runtime security checks in the
java.lang, java.io, and java.util libraries.
Parts of this specification are shown in Example 2.3. The parts shown stipulate
that whenever a file is opened for reading, given a string filename, the Security-
Manager (if one is present) must check for read access to the file denoted by that
filename. This is implemented by—at the very beginning of the constructor method
for java.io.FileInputStream object instances—invoking the SecurityManager’s
checkRead method with the string filename argument of that constructor.
To ensure the JVML SASI implementation is behaviorally equivalent to Sun’s
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/*
** Define SecurityManager
*/
SM() ::= invokestatic("java/lang/System",
"getSecurityManager",
"()Ljava/lang/SecurityManager;");
...
/*
** Perform SecurityManager check, if it’s present
*/
check(sm,name,sig,arg) ::=
sm==null
|| invokevirtual(sm,"java/lang/SecurityManager",name,sig,arg);
...
/*
** Checks related to ‘‘file input streams’’
*/
FileInputStream_Emulation_Points() ::=
class=="java/io/FileInputStream"
&& atStartOfMethod()
&& (
/* must have read access at time of construction */
( method=="<init>"
&& signature=="(Ljava/lang/String;)V"
&& check(SM(),"checkRead",signature,objectArg(1)) )
||
/* other FileInputStream emulation points */
...
);
...
/*
** The Security Automaton
*/
start ::=
FileInputStream_Emulation_Points() -> start
...
non_emulation_points() -> start
;
Example 2.3: Excerpts of the JVML SASI SecurityManager SAL specification.
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original implementation, it calls the same Java 1.1 check functions as Sun’s SM
does. However, the JVML SASI implementation is more flexible than Sun’s SM—
check functions as well as new check points can be added to ours simply by
modifying the security automaton. Modifying the SM in Sun’s implementation
requires a new release of Java: just subclassing the SM would not suffice, because
the SM’s invocation points are fixed by Sun’s implementation.
The JVML SASI implementation of the Java 1.1 SecurityManager turns out to
be quite efficient. Microbenchmarks to compare the security overhead of the imple-
mentation with Sun’s SM show no real differences in the overhead. Moreover, the
JVML SASI implementation has the possibility of being cheaper than the Java 1.1
SM implementation. Sun’s SM is invoked at predefined points, whether the check
will succeed or not. In settings where access checks are known to succeed—say, be-
cause a component is trusted or because of pre-existing access-control rights—the
JVML SASI prototype does not add checking code (because the rewriter simplifies
the security automaton as it is being inserted). Data for the Blast and the Tar
benchmarks in [ET99] suggest that as much as a fourfold performance improvement
can be expected when checking code is eliminated in what arguably are realistic
applications.
When the JVML SASI SM is violated, the SASI-inserted security enforcement
code does not halt the execution of the target system but, rather, throws a Java
exception of type java.lang.SecurityException. This corresponds to the be-
havior of Sun’s SM, but does not fit in the framework of security automata: the
security automaton rejects its input without halting the target system’s execution,
and the thrown exception will modify the target system’s behavior. This suggests
that SASI might be extended to handle security policies such as this one—and, in
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STATE {
Assume Categories maps each company to a category.
Let usedCategories be an empty set.
Let seenCompanies be an empty set.
}
EVENT Any application-level operation
CONDITION The operation involves an access to a company
UPDATE {
Let company be the company being accessed.
Let category be company’s category in Categories.
If category ∈ usedCategories and company 6∈ seenCompanies {
REJECT the operation.
} Else {
Add category to usedCategories.
Add company to seenCompanies.
ALLOW the operation.
}
}
Example 2.4: The Chinese Wall security policy.
fact, Chapter 3 describes such an extension.
2.4 The Chinese Wall Security Policy in SASI
To gauge how flexible SASI is in enforcing various security policies, it is worth-
while to consider how SASI might be used to enforce the Chinese Wall security
policy [BN89], one concrete policy from the literature.
Chinese Wall, outlined in Example 2.4, was introduced into the computer secu-
rity literature as an example of a security policy that could not be enforced using
the access control mechanisms typically found in operating systems. The policy
aims to prevent the same individual (e.g., a consultancy analyst) from handling
sensitive data about competing companies by separating companies into disjoint
categories and only allowing the analyst access to one company from each category.
As shown in this section, SASI IRMs can easily enforce Chinese Wall policies. How-
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Figure 2.8: Security automaton encoding all possible states of Chinese Wall.
ever, the necessary SAL specifications quickly become both awkward and opaque,
which leads to the introduction, in the next chapter, of a new policy language
similar to that used in Example 2.4, supported by a new IRM implementation.
For expository purposes, the remainder of this section makes some simplifying
assumptions about the security policy particulars. First, the assumption is of a
Chinese Wall security policy with a fixed number of companies and categories.
In particular, the security policy is assumed to have three company categories,
named A, B, and C, with three companies in each category. Within a category
X, companies are named X1 through X3. (E.g., companies in category A are A1,
A2, and A3.) The only way a user can access data concerning a company Xi is
assumed to be through invoking the command read(Xi), which may, e.g., display
information about company Xi on the user’s screen. Further, users are assumed
to be perpetually subject to the security policy—i.e., each user has a copy of the
security state, and that security state is never reset.
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A Multi-state Security Automaton
Figure 2.8 shows part of a multi-state security automaton for the Chinese Wall
security policy, specified with regard to the simplifying assumptions. This security
automaton encodes each valid combination of concurrently accessed companies—
that is any subset of companies with at most one company from each category—in
a distinct automaton state. For example, the security automaton will be in a
state that encodes the set {A1, B1} of accessed companies after companies A1 and
B1 (and only those two) have been accessed. Each such automaton state, which
encodes a set S of accessed companies, has a transition back to itself iff company X
is accessed and X ∈ S. (Here, only read(X) commands are assumed to form input
symbols to the security automaton; all other program actions are being ignored.)
In Figure 2.8, this transition predicate is denoted by A1 ∨ B1 for the automaton
state that encodes the set {A1, B1}. Finally, an automaton state for the subset S
has a transition to the automaton state for each strict superset S ∪ {X}, whose
transition predicate is satisfied on read(X). Thus, the automaton state for {A1}
has a transition with predicate B1 to the automaton state for {A1, B1}.
The size of a SAL security automaton specification is relative to number of
automaton states, transitions, and transition predicate size. This Chinese Wall
security automaton has 64 states, for three categories and three companies in each
category. In general, for N company categories and k companies in each category,
this Chinese Wall security automaton will be of size:13
states(N, k) =
N∑
i=0
N
i
ki, transitions(N, k) = N∑
i=0
N
i
ki ((N − i)k + 1) .
13 The first formula sums over states required to encode that i categories (of k
companies each) have been accessed. The second formula sums over the transitions
from states of i categories to states of i+ 1 categories and adds the self-loop.
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Figure 2.9: Category-specific security automaton for Chinese Wall.
Thus, for 33 categories of three companies each, it will have approximately 266
states and 271 transitions. Thus, writing a SAL specification for this formulation
of the Chinese Wall security policy quickly becomes infeasible.
One Security Automaton per Category
The Chinese Wall security policy is less difficult to specify in SAL if it is formu-
lated as a collection of security automata, rather than one large automaton. This
formulation associates each company category with a security automaton that en-
codes whether any company in that category has been accessed, and, if so, ensures
that only that company can be accessed from that category.
Figure 2.9 depicts the security automaton for category A. This security au-
tomaton has an initial state to encode that no company from category A has been
accessed, and three states that, respectively, encode the three companies in cate-
gory A: A1, A2, and A3. From the initial state there is a transition whose predicate
is satisfied for accesses to company Ai and whose target is the state for Ai. Also,
there is a transition from the initial state to itself whose predicate is denoted ¬A
and is satisfied for operations that access companies not in category A. (If com-
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Figure 2.10: Incorrect attempt at constructing a security automaton.
mands besides read(X) form input symbols to the security automaton, then the
predicate ¬A must also be true for operations that do not access companies.) Fi-
nally, from each state encoding company Ai, there is a transition back to that state
for accesses to company Ai or to companies in other categories, denoted Ai ∨ ¬A.
This Chinese Wall security policy formulation is more convenient to specify in
SAL because its security automata are of size linear in the number of companies.
Even so, this policy formulation may incur a large security enforcement overhead,
because there are as many security automata as there are company categories. If
each security automaton receives an input symbol whenever a company is accessed,
i.e., on each read(X) command, the enforcement overhead is linear in the number
of company categories. However, this runtime overhead will be greatly reduced if
the company name X forms a static argument to read(X) since the simplification
performed during rewriting by SASI will eliminate all but one of the automata.
Thus, depending on the circumstances, this formulation of Chinese Wall as security
automata can be both simple to manage and offer good performance.
This last formulation of Chinese Wall used static simplification to reduce over-
head by forwarding an input symbol to a category’s security automaton only when
a company in that category is accessed. If the set of input symbols is guaranteed
to always be restricted in this manner then the security automaton of Figure 2.9
can be simplified by removing the ¬A from its transition predicate. It is tempting
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Figure 2.11: Single-state security automaton for Chinese Wall.
to further simplify the security automaton of Figure 2.9 into the “security automa-
ton”of Figure 2.10. However, security automata can only summarize the execution
history of the target system through distinct automata states. The right state of
Figure 2.10 implicitly encodes three different states that summarize the execution
history—that of companies A1, A2, and A3 having been accessed—and, therefore,
the figure does not show a security automaton.
A Single-state Security Automaton
Security automata must summarize in a distinct state each security-policy-relevant
execution history of the target system—this causes the prohibitively large size of
Figure 2.8’s automaton and disallows attempts like that of Figure 2.10. Some
policy-relevant state might already be maintained, either internally in the target
system itself, or externally (e.g., by the operating system). For example, applica-
tions that access files are likely to contain handles to currently open files and, for
each application, the operating system will know which files those are. Referring
to this pre-existing state might well allow the number of states in a security au-
tomaton to be reduced. For instance, a security policy that prohibits more than
10 open files can be enforced by a single-state security automaton that queries the
operating system about the number of open files.
The security automaton of Figure 2.11 is a single-state formulation of the Chi-
nese Wall security policy. The automaton uses functions, freshCategory and seen-
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Before, that summarize what companies have been accessed and that are assumed
to be supported by the target system. Thus, when a company X is accessed,
freshCategory(X) function returns true if company X is in a category in which no
company has been previously accessed, and seenBefore(X) function returns true
if company X has been accessed before.
If general-purpose state and computation can be explicitly added to the target
system—such as the map usedCategories and the security update of Example 2.4—
security enforcement need not rely on policy-relevant state already existing and
being correctly maintained in the target system. For instance, in Example 2.4 the
specification of the Chinese Wall security policy updates the variables usedCate-
gories and seenCompanies when a DeMorgan’s form of the predicate in Figure 2.11
holds true, thereby implementing freshCategory and seenBefore.
Instead of specifying security policies as state-by-state automata, as done in
SAL, security automata can equivalently be specified using structured state and
computation. Explicitly specifying the addition of state and computation into the
target system also removes the need for many assumptions. The x86 SASI rewriter
had special support for SFI, through platform-specific functions, and the security
automaton of Figure 2.11 can only be enforced if freshCategory and seenBefore
already exist in the target system or are added by the rewriter. Also, neither the
security automata of Figure 2.8 nor that of Figure 2.9 can support the addition
of new companies and categories. This flexibility is easily supported by a security
policy specification for the Chinese Wall security policy that uses structured state
and general-purpose computation.
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2.5 SASI in Retrospect
The SASI prototypes proved instructive, but neither x86 SASI or JVML SASI is a
practical tool. First, SAL is an awkward language for writing real security policies
because SAL forces relevant execution history of target system to be summarized
in a single, unstructured “current” state of one or more security automata. Values
from the target system that are instances of application-level abstractions must be
encoded in order for them to play any role in subsequent enforcement decisions.
It is difficult, for example, to write in SAL a policy specifying that the same
character string is used in a sequence of operations—SAL cannot directly store
strings in automaton states. Changing SAL so that security state can contain typed
variables—with types that may be application-level abstractions (e.g., strings)—
eliminates this difficulty.
A second difficulty with the SASI prototypes concerns what low-level actions
can be used in defining security policies. A reference monitor that checks every
machine language instruction initially seemed like a powerful basis for defining
application-specific security policies. In practice, this power has proved difficult to
harness. Most x86 object code, for example, does not make explicit the application-
level abstractions that are being manipulated by that code. There is no explicit
notion of a“function” in x86 assembly language, and“function calls”must be found
by searching for code sequences resembling the target system’s calling convention.
The author of a security policy thus finds it necessary to embed a disassembler,
or other analysis mechanism, within each SAL security policy description. This is
cumbersome and error-prone. One solution would be to build a SASI that modified
high-level language programs rather than object code. A security automata could
be inlined into the C++ program (say) for the target system rather than being inlined
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into the object code produced by the C++ compiler.14 But this is unattractive,
because a SASI that modifies C++ programs adds the C++ compiler to the TCB.
The approach taken in JVML SASI is the more promising way to handle secu-
rity policies involving application-level abstractions. That is, rely on annotations
of the object code that are easily checked and that expose application-level abstrac-
tions. This approach is not limited to JVML code, or even to type safe high-level
languages; even x86 object code can include the necessary annotations [MWCG98].
The next chapter, therefore, builds on the SASI experience and develops the IRM
approach to its full potential.
14This is the approach taken by the Aspect-oriented programming methodol-
ogy [KLM+97, WZL03].
Chapter 3
Inlined Reference Monitors Refined
The previous chapter described one strategy for implementing an IRM toolkit
that used the SAL policy language, and two prototypes based on that strategy.
These SASI prototypes failed by not fully providing the properties required of
reference monitors, namely (to paraphrase from Figure 1.1), to be a trustworthy
mechanism that fully mediates all security-relevant actions in the execution of a
target application and subjects each to a validity check. There are three primary
reasons why the SASI prototypes failed to meet this criterion.
1. The low-level actions fundamental to SASI were the set of machine lan-
guage operations in the target application (i.e., the machine’s Instruction
Set Architecture, or ISA). This is problematic because the ISA is both too
rudimentary for some critical security-relevant actions, like function calls,
and too high-level for others, like interrupt and signal handling.
2. Certain characteristics of the SAL policy language proved an obstacle to
writing useful IRM security policies. In particular, SAL forces users to
encode all security-relevant information in an automaton state, and when
security-relevant actions occur SAL allows only the evaluation of side-effect-
free state-transition expressions. This awkward automata-state encoding
of intended security policies facilitates automatic analysis and optimiza-
tion [Wal99a, BR02], but makes writing SAL specifications difficult.
3. Finally, SAL and SASI cannot be seen as trustworthy, because they might
require convoluted constructions for those security events that do not di-
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rectly correspond to machine opcodes. The occurrence of higher-level secu-
rity events must be synthesized from a sequence of fundamental ISA actions
and encoded into the single “current” automaton state, along with all other
security-relevant information. This is unfortunate, because security policies
are more likely to proscribe higher-level events (like launching missiles or
sending email) than they are to forbid integer multiplication.1 Inference from
low-level execution does not form a sound basis for mediating these events,
especially in SAL policies, where a single automaton state must encode all
relevant information.
This chapter describes how to overcome the above limitations and provides a more
satisfactory implementation of the IRM approach, the PoET Policy Enforcement
Toolkit. The writer of IRM security policies is given a new language, the PSLang
Policy Specification Language, where security state is maintained explicitly in
named variables, security updates are imperative program fragments, and IRM
enforcement code can use the types and abstractions of the target application.
PSLang/PoET IRMs operate on a set of fundamental low-level actions strictly
richer than the machine ISA and can easily specify how higher-level security events
are synthesized and what enforcement activity they trigger. Security policies that
operate on synthesized higher-level security events are just one example of a new
capability of security policy extensions ; in particular, a PSLang/PoET IRM can
fully implement the mediation of all security-relevant actions, including any re-
quired security event synthesis, and leave the specification of validity checks to
other PSLang policies, or even to the run-time system. As a result, PSLang/PoET
1Note that even a security policy restricting how integers can be multiplied
might need to synthesize when the multiplication security event has happened, for
example, as a result of a sequence of addition actions.
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IRMs are more trustworthy, because they can observe relevant activity without un-
necessarily complicated analysis or inference, and because specifications are written
in a familiar structured style that promotes reuse.
The next section, §3.1, expands on what constitutes a complete set of security-
relevant actions and how to mediate those actions in a trustworthy manner. The
PSLang/PoET IRM toolkit for JVML and Java target applications is described in
§3.2, with §3.2.1 and §3.2.2, respectively, giving details on the toolkit’s PoET
rewriter and PSLang security policy language. Section 3.3 describes how, for
JVML, a full set of fundamental security-related events can be synthesized us-
ing PoET and PSLang. The remaining issues facing PSLang users, many of which
are common to implementors of any security mechanism, are discussed in §3.4.
Deployment of IRM-based security enforcement, and how it can be adopted in
existing infrastructures, is the topic of §3.5. Finally, §3.6 shows how the scope of
the IRM approach, and of PSLang/PoET, can be expanded to include activity not
generally considered to be security enforcement.
3.1 Mediating Security Events
Before embarking on a new implementation of the IRM approach, it is prudent,
given the experience of SASI, to carefully consider the different trustworthy means
for the synthesis and mediation of security events, as well as whether any new
low-level actions must added to the proposed IRM toolkit.
An IRM toolkit must, at least, provide high-assurance mediation of the sys-
tem’s low-level actions—as any security policy could be formed by such actions.
These low-level actions include activity like the callbacks and interrupts that are
generated by the target application’s execution environment. For such actions an
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IRM toolkit must build upon their actual system implementation to capture the
correct semantics. Fortunately, IRMs can usually interpose on these particular
actions by registering a handler with the runtime system and by preventing the
secured application from overriding that handler.
It seems natural, however, to dismiss approaches that address with ease low-
level actions such as ISA operations but can only with great difficulty mediate
other significant and common activity such as exceptions or function calls.
3.1.1 Dealing with High-level Languages
Function calls, and other language-based structures in the target application, will
typically be important for security policies. For these (except in a handful of
interpreted systems), an IRM cannot receive explicit notification from the runtime
system—such language-based primitives are most often implicitly encoded in the
ISA operations of the target application as a result of compilation and translation
from a higher-level language. Attempts like those of x86 SASI that synthesize the
original language-based events from their ISA encoding will necessarily be both
complex and incomplete, and therefore untrustworthy.2
Fortunately, the compilation mechanism that creates the binaries of target ap-
plications also creates evidence in the form of debug information, types, and tables
of imported and exported symbols, for example. This evidence is persistently
maintained throughout the translation process, compilation, linking, and loading,
and can show where high-level language abstractions are encoded in an applica-
2In general, such synthesis might not even be feasible, because it must solve com-
binatorial pattern matching and semantic equivalence problems [KS94], as illus-
trated by the policy forbidding multiplication mentioned in a footnote on page 52.
Although this may be an acceptable limitation for abstruse policies, like that of
the footnote, an IRM toolkit must do better on key activities, like function calls.
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tion [KBA02, SBN+97]. This information should be sufficient for IRM needs, at
least for target applications written in type-safe languages.
Unfortunately, an IRM toolkit cannot directly trust this type of compiled-in
evidence. Unlike signals in Unix [GS91] and other low-level actions triggered by
the system runtime, language-based information is usually not produced by part
of the TCB, but rather, by an external, possibly malicious, entity. The common
means of establishing that information originates from a trusted party, such as
cryptographic signatures or trusted servers, all introduce additional complexity
and the potential for new vulnerabilities.
Even if a trusted external party has truly vouched for some compiler-generated
evidence, the integrity of that evidence may later be invalidated by runtime activity.
Languages like C and C++, although popular, fail to guarantee that an application’s
control-flow and memory will not be corrupted in a way that violates the intent
of the high-level source code and compiler [Koz98]. For such common languages,
reliance on compiler annotations, even when certified by a trusted entity, is likely
only to increase the size of the TCB and allow novel types of attack. In particular,
cryptographic evidence showing the use of a trusted compiler (a strategy used, for
example, in Vino [SESS96]) or the inclusion of a compiler in the IRM toolkit will
not provide complete assurance [CER00].
As an alternative, and to be able to rely on strong guarantees about behavior,
an IRM toolkit may choose to only trust external certificates for target applications
that are compiled from type safe languages. This was done, for example, in the
SPIN operating system [BSP+95]. In this case, however, the high-level language
compiler must in all cases correctly enforce its type safety guarantees—a statement
unlikely to hold true for a modern optimizing compiler [Mor95, MTC+96, Aba98].
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Here, adding a compiler to the TCB fails to increase assurance, as it fails with C
and C++, because the compiler itself is untrustworthy.
As a final attempt to increase assurance, static type-safety guarantees can be
augmented by runtime checking of the compiled-in evidence that is part of the
target application. Such dynamic safety checks can provide significant guarantees,
even for target applications compiled from legacy languages, but those guarantees
are likely to come at a high performance cost [KBA02, SD02]. Anyway, these
runtime checks, like SFI, are just an instantiation of a limited form of the IRM
approach, and do not alleviate the need for a trustworthy foundation for language-
based low-level actions in a general IRM toolkit.
3.1.2 Using Verifiable Code Certification
Verifiable Code Certification (VCC)3 is a technique that guarantees low-level ac-
tivity of a target application satisfies properties specified by a high-level language
(or, more generally, a formal theorem). VCC does not rely on certificates from
external trusted parties. Instead, VCC provides assurance by making use of a
low-complexity verifier, which avoids placing trust in compilers [NL98], analysis
engines or other proof generators [Nec97], or further translation [MWCG98]. Typ-
ically, what is verified is a high-level-language type safety property, such as the
assertion that all operations are on data of correct type.
To enable verification of each target application, VCC requires the application
to be accompanied by a formal statement that proves that its execution satisfies
the desired properties. This requirement enables VCC to make use of a natural
3This dissertation uses the term Verifiable Code Certification, or VCC, for what
is sometimes called self-certified code, but more often (and misleadingly) called
language-based security [Koz99, BL01].
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asymmetry—that the construction of a proof may be complex (and sometimes
impossible [Go¨d31]), but once a formal proof has been created, checking its cor-
rectness can be relatively straightforward. By using this asymmetry, the TCB can
remain trustworthy, despite its enforcement of language-based guarantees, as only
the VCC verifier—which is simple, and can be used at the time of IRM rewriting—
needs to be added as a trusted component.
There is a natural connection between IRMs and the creation of VCC-based
applications. Some compilers, such as for the Lisp language [Ste90], enforce a
type safety policy on their output applications only through embedded runtime
checks—in effect, rewriting their output with an IRM for this high-level language-
based policy. Such a compiler could be enhanced with an analysis that removes
superfluous runtime checks and thus obtains higher performance. For each removed
check, this analysis should be able to produce a proof that the type safety policy
was still in effect for all executions of the target application. The VCC approach
works by verifying exactly this type of proof, with runtime checks remaining where
the compiler cannot statically establish type safety. Therefore, an IRM, such as
that for x86 SASI SFI, can, in a sense, provide the same benefits as VCC, but
VCC achieves superior performance by eliding checks and also contributes less to
the TCB—providing the desired guarantees without trusting either a compiler or
a complicated runtime analysis.
VCC was popularized by Java applets—web page extensions expressed in Java
Virtual Machine Language (JVML)“bytecodes”that provide a form of VCC [YL96,
SA99]—but the VCC approach is not limited to Java. Several technologies have
extended the principles of VCC to properties other than type safety or to support
the x86 ISA [Nec97, MWCG98].
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The demonstrated practical applicability of the VCC approach, in combination
with VCC-based industrial initiatives such as Java and Microsoft’s .NET [BS02],
makes it an attractive option for security enforcement. In particular, VCC can be
leveraged as a trustworthy substrate for the mediation of language-based low-level
actions in implementations of the IRM approach.
3.1.3 On Application and Platform Interfaces
For a given security policy, even the set of all low-level actions (i.e., ISA operations,
actions triggered by the system runtime, or use of language-based primitives) is un-
likely to capture—without additional context—exactly the security-policy-specific
security events that an IRM must mediate. Most security policies do not apply
so directly to language or system abstractions; they instead originate as informal
requirements outside any computer system. So, a security policy is likely to de-
scribe invariants specific to a particular organization or application, and to restrict
processes so that these invariants are maintained [Ste91, CW87]. Such high-level
security policies typically map to restrictions on the use of certain components in
a particular target application, or to conditions that must hold before and after
transactions or function calls. Enforcing such security policies, therefore, requires
introspection into a target application.
Application-specific security policies like these can, fortunately, be enforced in
modern software: layered design and modular development enables the required
insight into the structure of applications. Target applications written as exten-
sions to an application platform will make use of fully-specified interfaces with
known semantics, both for convenience and for interoperability. These platform
interfaces comprise a rich set of events on which any practical security policy can
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be constructed, analogous to (at least for type safe target programs), but at a
significantly higher level than, the system-call interface of traditional reference
monitors [GS91, SR99].
IRM enforcement of security policies is also more trustworthy when specified
in terms of the APIs, or Application Programmer Interfaces, used by the target
application. These APIs are at a higher level of abstraction, so they are likely to
have semantics close to that of a given security policy’s security events, thereby
reducing the need for intricate and error-prone synthesis of security events. In fact,
although the IRM approach allows mediation of any low-level action, individual
policies will often primarily work by mediation of higher-level API security events.
This, because popular target platforms like Java and Microsoft’s .NET [GJS96,
BS02] typically fully encapsulate all low-level resources (including security-critical
data, such as the operating system) in one or more APIs, allowing such resources
to be protected at that level.4
Specifying the mediation of higher-level security events, such as the use of
platform APIs, is only a first step in the creation of a security policy. A policy
may, in subsequent steps, delineate how such security events are constrained or
combined to more accurately capture activity the policy aims to regulate. For
example, filesystem security events might be restricted to open only user files, and
applets might only receive file handle objects created for reading. A security policy
4Note that this platform-level enforcement also helps ensure that IRM rewriting
maintains the functional equivalence of the target application and the secured
application—the one goal (introduced in Figure 1.4) that IRMs do not share with
normal reference monitors—as platform users must ignore the type of perturbations
caused by IRMs: they may occur normally in different platform versions. Empirical
evidence from virtual machine products shows that such a de-facto platform exists
even for machine ISAs, as most software must provide the same function despite a
wide variety of hardware- and system-induced perturbations [SVL01].
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should be able to fully specify all security events of interest through a sequence of
such steps, with each step defining a set of new security events more relevant to the
task at hand from the existing security events, either through simple conditions or
more complicated synthesis.5
3.1.4 To Enforce Least Privilege
Few rules-of-thumb exist for implementing security policies and enforcement mech-
anisms, because such implementations are naturally tied to intricate details of
particular platforms and even specific target applications. However, the design
principles in Saltzer and Schroeder’s tutorial paper on protection of information
in computer systems remain as relevant today as when they were written, three
decades ago [SS75]. These principles mostly overlap with the properties of ref-
erence monitors, described in §1.2, except for their Principle of Least Privilege,
which states that a target application should be granted only the bare-minimum
capabilities its functionality requires.
Full implementation of the principle of least privilege is a worthy goal, but, in
practice, is difficult to achieve [Sch03]. It is greatly facilitated, however, by choosing
to enforce security at the right abstraction level. For instance, if a security policy
that aims to preclude filesystem access in a target application only restricts the
use of high-level platform APIs, the libraries that implement those APIs will still
be able to perform such filesystem accesses even though these libraries form part
5The strategy described here, of bottom-up synthesis of security events, first
from security-relevant actions, and then further from other security events, pur-
posefully blurs the distinction between policy and mechanism—even though main-
taining this distinction is a central tenet of system design [EKO95]. For security
enforcement, unlike many software systems, implementation and mechanism de-
tails cannot be abstracted from policies [Sch99a, Gar03, AG03].
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of the application. Such situations occur frequently in systems (e.g., a graphical
application that is to be restricted from file access might still need to use a platform
service that reads font outline files and writes back to a file cache of rendered
bitmaps). Thus, choosing to enforce policies by mediating a high-level API can hide
platform implementation details, allowing both greater functionality and simpler
enforcement.
Striving for least privilege exposes a balancing act between the simplicity and
exactness of security policies and mechanisms. The file access example above has
a simple policy if font drawing operations are treated as opaque and the platform
semantics are known and trusted by the policy writer. This trust is misplaced if the
font drawing operations are flawed or misunderstood—for example, if they allow
arbitrary files to be read and exposed as bitmaps. However, not trusting plat-
form semantics requires a security policy that explicitly permits all file operations
required for font-related functionality and, to do this, the policy must correctly en-
code the necessary platform configuration and implementation details. Avoiding
this increased complexity might lead to policies that preclude more activity than
necessary, simply to allow for trustworthy enforcement.
In this manner, one proposal advocates applying the principle of least privilege
by creating a multitude of policies, each of which puts simple restrictions on some
platform interfaces whose semantics are trusted [Sch03]. On its own, each such
policy would grant strictly more than the least privilege needed but would be simple
enough to allow for trustworthy enforcement. A more restrictive policy could then
be created for a given category of target applications by composing sets of these
simple policies, although such composed policies would likely still err on the side
of being too permissive for any particular target application. However, if generally
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accepted, such categories could allow assured enforcement of restrictions known
to both end users and creators of applications [SVB+03]. Despite the moderate
success of current systems that implement this proposal [CER00], few equally
promising alternatives exist.
Another useful source of general security policy guidelines is Clark and Wilson’s
work on commercial security policies, which addresses the issue of application-
specific validity checks [CW87, TW89]. In [CW87] the authors observe that real-
world security objectives limit, in an application-specific manner, application-
specific accesses and updates, and therefore any automatically-enforced security
policy must both be specific to the application and place trust in some application
procedures. Their proposed framework takes a transactional view of applications
and makes access contingent on application-specific runtime validity checks of nec-
essary preconditions. Finally, the paper lays down a challenge: discovering auto-
matic ways to increase assurance in preconditions, giving the two-phase-commit
solution to database serializability [LS81] as motivation. Here, VCC can play a
role by automatically assuring the type-safety of target applications, a requirement
previously only discharged by trusting a complex language infrastructure.
Eventually, security policies are inexorably tied to details of the system they
protect, the restrictions they aim to impose, and the activity to be permitted in
target applications. A general security enforcement framework can, at best, hope
to give policy writers the expressive power and flexibility they need to accurately
and correctly specify their intent. That is, the ability to specify exactly what de-
fines a security event, upon what invariants that definition relies (and how it is
maintained), which security events are mediated, and what validity checks are per-
formed upon those events. Moreover, to be trustworthy, the resulting specification
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Figure 3.1: The PSLang/PoET implementation of the IRM approach.
must allow for its inspection and analysis in isolation. The next section describes
an IRM toolkit that implements such a framework.
3.2 PSLang/PoET for Java
This section gives an overview of the PoET and PSLang implementation of the
IRM approach; its operation is depicted in Figure 3.1 and described in detail in
Appendix A. PoET and PSLang operate on JVML target programs [YL96], typ-
ically compiled from source code in the Java language [GJS96]. PoET builds on
the VCC guarantees of JVML to identify and expose a rich set of fundamental
JVML low-level actions. Security policies are expressed in PSLang6, an imperative
language with transparent and familiar semantics that are closely tied to JVML
target programs. Higher-level security events are captured easily in PSLang poli-
cies through decomposition and factoring, or by synthesis using arbitrary data
structures and computation. This IRM toolkit overcomes the three critical obsta-
cles to IRM trustworthiness that existed in SASI and that were detailed at the
beginning of this chapter.
The PoET policy enforcement toolkit includes an IRM rewriter, which oper-
6The “P” in PSLang is silent, as that in Psmith [Wod10].
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ates on target programs’ JVML class files. IRM security policies, specified in the
PSLang policy specification language, are also input to the PoET rewriter to create
a secured version of the target program. The secured application output by PoET
includes both added security state variables and added JVML code for security
updates, simplified by partial evaluation. The PoET rewriter inserts IRM enforce-
ment code either at places where security-relevant actions can be directly identified
or at places where such actions can be exposed by the insertion of additional code,
like exception handlers. PSLang policies define the implementation of security up-
dates that occur at each policy-relevant action, specify any validity checks that
are included in those updates, and specify what remedial action is taken (e.g., to
terminate the secured application) if those checks fail. The full implementation of
PSLang/PoET consists of approximately 15 thousand lines of Java code.7
3.2.1 The Policy Enforcement Toolkit
The PoET IRM rewriter, whose operation is outlined in Figure 3.1, turns JVML
class files of a target program into a secured application—including rewriting any
JVML code that is dynamically generated or implicitly or explicitly loaded at
runtime. This is depicted in Figure 3.2. Command-line arguments and other
invocation details for PoET are given in Appendix A.2.
All low-level actions of the JVML ISA are exposed by PoET to PSLang policies.
These low-level actions include class and object initialization and garbage collec-
tion, method calls, and member field access, as well as execution of basic blocks,
7Included is a JVML class file reflection library comprising 5K lines, which
would be unnecessary if PoET was made specific to a particular JVM implementa-
tion. PoET itself comprises only 2.5K lines, with the ADT libraries of Appendix A
included, and the remaining 7.5K lines implement PSLang, although, there, 4K
lines are automatically-generated lexer and parser code.
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Figure 3.2: IRM rewriting of dynamically-loaded or -generated code.
exception handlers, and individual JVML instructions; Appendix A.1 describes all
PoET events. The details of each JVML low-level action are exposed by PoET
through a set of runtime libraries, Event, Reflect, and State, explained in the
Appendix. PoET runtime libraries also expose certain JVML interfaces (e.g., for
handling primitive types) and form a basis for extending PSLang with new data
structures and functionality.
PoET uses the VCC guarantees of verified JVML bytecodes as the foundation
for ensuring the integrity of IRM enforcement code, the PoET toolkit, and PSLang
policies, all of which are co-located inside the secured application at runtime. Fig-
ure 3.2 shows how PoET ensures that a secured application complies with a PSLang
security policy. Both the initial JVML bytecodes of a target program and code
from explicit use of the JVML ClassLoader [Gon99] are run through the JVML
type safety verifier and rewritten by PoET. The details of how PSLang/PoET
ensures IRM integrity are discussed in §3.2.3.
IRM security state added by PoET is globally visible to all IRM enforcement
code and may use any JVML type. In addition, the State runtime library allows
security state to be embedded into JVML classes, object instances, and methods.
This allows individual data objects of the target application to carry annotations
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that dictate their handling by IRM enforcement code, reducing enforcement over-
head for many policies. For instance, a policy that limits the amount of information
read from files could associate a counter with every file object, incrementing that
counter on read operations—saving an indirection to such a counter through some
global data structure, whose maintenance is likely to be expensive. The VCC
guarantees of JVML help ensure this added state, like the IRM enforcement code
added by PoET, remains inaccessible to the target program.8
3.2.2 The Policy Specification Language
PSLang is designed to allow security policies to be specified in a straightforward
fashion that clearly describes both the high-level semantics of security enforcement
and its detailed implementation, while remaining a transparent language that is
simple enough to be trustworthy. To this purpose, PSLang is a small imperative
language (described in Appendix A) whose syntax and semantics are based on
Java and JVML and therefore easily understood by writers of policies for JVML
programs.
PSLang syntax contains little sugar but focuses on providing primitives natu-
ral to the factoring of security policies. Therefore, PSLang policies are structured
around security updates, where a JVML low-level action is coupled with an ex-
plicit condition stating when it is relevant to the security policy at hand, thereby
specifying a higher-level security event. PSLang security updates also specify an
8JVML also obscures from target programs implementation details such as
intra-instruction distance and memory layout of data. This helps ensure that a
secured application will be functionally equivalent to the original. However, noth-
ing is perfect, and a devious JVML target programs might still be able to detect
the presence of PoET additions, for example, by inference from the number of
object allocations required to exhaust memory.
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USES LIBRARY Lock;
GLOBAL SECURITY STATE {
int openWindows = 0;
Object lock = Lock.create();
}
ON EVENT at start of method
WITH Event.methodPrototypeIs("void java.awt.Window.show()")
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Lock.acquire(lock);
if( openWindows = 10 ) {
FAIL[ "Too many open GUI windows" ];
}
openWindows = openWindows + 1;
Lock.release(lock);
}
ON EVENT at start of method
WITH Event.methodPrototypeIs("void java.awt.Window.dispose()")
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Lock.acquire(lock);
openWindows = openWindows - 1;
Lock.release(lock);
}
Example 3.1: PSLang security policy that allows at most 10 open windows.
imperative program fragment that forms the IRM enforcement code to be trig-
gered by this security event (i.e., executed when the secured application performs
the low-level action and the condition is satisfied).9 PSLang policies can add secu-
rity state to the secured application, either globally through special syntax, or (as
discussed in the previous section) to individual JVML elements using the State
library.
PSLang libraries offer a rich set of data structures and functionality through the
syntax of Abstract Data Types (ADTs), and they form a back door through which
PSLang can be augmented with new ADTs written in Java. Default PSLang ADTs
include data structures for sets, associations, vectors, tuples, stacks, and queues;
9 Appendix A.1, gives more detailed information on the syntax and semantics
of PSLang security updates, starting on page 128.
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ADT extensions expose fundamental JVML operations, the runtime system, locks,
delay timeouts, and the Java Permissions framework [Gon99]. The resulting
PSLang increases overall assurance in security enforcement by enabling security
policies to be specified in a natural and clear manner. Example 3.1 illustrates
this with a PSLang specification for multi-threaded JVML target programs that
enforces a security policy that generalizes Example 1.1 from §1.3.
PSLang policies can also define functions, which allow common expressions
and statements to be factored out into a single imperative program fragment that
may then be invoked anywhere in a policy. Last, but not least, PSLang allows
one policy to extend another—thus, security policies may be layered into reusable
IRM enforcement code and security event specifications, increasingly specific to
the intent of particular application-specific security policies.
PSLang was designed to impose low performance overhead. Like SASI, PoET
achieves this by simplifying security policies using techniques that build on partial
evaluation of imperative programs [ASU85, JGS93, Thi03]. PSLang policies are
partially evaluated at each security-relevant action in the target program, using
information derived from the static context of each insertion point. The PoET
rewriter only inserts IRM enforcement code at security events, which are likely
to be a small fraction of the JVML low-level actions. To help ensure this, the
event predicate expression of each PSLang update, which defines security events,
is restricted to use only side-effect-free functions and ADT operations that are
guaranteed to return a value when statically evaluated. The writer of a PSLang
security policy can define his own side-effect-free functions, and they also help in
the simplification of security updates and other IRM enforcement code.
There are only cosmetic differences between PSLang and the SAL of Chap-
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ter 2—the imperative style of PSLang is simply an alternative presentation of
deterministic security automata, albeit more familiar. Admittedly, PSLang is en-
hanced by PoET’s identification and exposure of a large set of JVML low-level
actions (such as finalizer garbage-collection callbacks), as well as by the function-
ality in ADT libraries. However, SAL could accommodate such enhancements.
PSLang has one clear advantage for writing policies—namely, the availability of
typed state variables (e.g., strings, floating-point numbers, etc.). Apart from this,
PSLang is simply a more convenient way to specify security automata. But be-
cause PSLang is less opaque and has fewer hidden assumptions than SAL, it offers
increased transparency which results in greater reliability and assurance.
3.2.3 Protecting IRM Integrity
Not only do the VCC guarantees of verified JVML programs allow PoET to identify
language-based low-level actions, but they also create a trustworthy foundation
for protecting IRM integrity. PoET can be certain that target programs do not
refer to security state inserted by IRM rewriting, because any such reference to
non-existent state would have been rejected by the JVML verifier.10 Also, JVML
semantics guarantee at runtime that the instructions of the secured program cannot
be tampered with, that the stack and registers of a method are local to the thread
currently executing in that method, and that in a method some registers can be
set aside for exclusive use by IRM enforcement code.
Unfortunately the above guarantees are not enough to protect IRM integrity.
10 PoET was implemented on top of closed commercial JVMs and, therefore,
currently only the rewritten bytecodes of secured programs are passed through a
JVML verifier to ensure type safety. This vulnerability can easily be remedied by
running PoET on an open JVM implementation (such as Jikes [AAB+00]) where
the target program’s original bytecodes can also be verified.
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Because JVML allows both dynamic class loading and reflection, a malicious target
application might be able to access and subvert security state and IRM enforcement
code. PoET partially addresses these problems by rewriting all classes loaded at
runtime with a PoET rewriter in the secured application that applies the PSLang
policy to be enforced (as shown in Figure 3.2).
The key to IRM integrity protection lies in a unique prefix that is given to all
names used by IRM enforcement code.11 This prefix is used for the global security
state of the IRM, all local security state added to classes, ADT functions, the
PSLang policy, and the PoET runtime itself. At runtime, no access is allowed
from the target program code to any state named with this prefix—whether the
access comes directly from loaded bytecode instructions or through invocation of
reflection APIs. This restriction is sufficient to protect IRM integrity because,
as described above, state that cannot be given such a prefix (like the stack and
registers of methods) is already protected by JVML semantics.
PoET implements the above name-based access restrictions through a set of
PSLang security policies instead of hard-coding this functionality into the rewriting
process. Two of these policies are given in Appendices B.1 and B.2. During
rewriting, these PSLang policies are prepended to any other PSLang security policy
to be enforced; that is, they are used recursively by the PoET toolkit in a manner
analogous to the enforcement of SFI guarantees in x86 SASI (discussed on page 31).
By using explicit PSLang policies, IRM integrity enforcement itself benefits from
the increased trustworthiness and flexibility of isolated and complete security policy
11 Currently, in PoET, this prefix is pre-determined and fixed, which does not
scale to realistic deployments. A full solution could use random prefixes, or hashes
of the IRM enforcement code, in combination with the identity of those that per-
form rewriting (discussed in §3.5).
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USES LIBRARY JVML;
USES LIBRARY Set;
GLOBAL SECURITY STATE {
Object usedCategories = Set.create();
Object seenCompanies = Set.create();
}
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION Object getCategory(Object companyName) {
if( JVML.strEq(companyName, "IBM") ) { return "COMPUTERS"; }
if( JVML.strEq(companyName, "Apple") ) { return "COMPUTERS"; }
if( JVML.strEq(companyName, "GM") ) { return "CARS"; }
if( JVML.strEq(companyName, "BMW") ) { return "CARS"; }
return null; // should never happen
}
ON EVENT at start of method
WITH Event.methodPrototypeIs("void accessCompany(java.lang.String)")
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Object company = State.methodGetObject( "$methodArg1" );
Object category = getCategory( company );
if( Set.has(usedCategories, category)
&& !Set.has(seenCompanies, company) )
{
FAIL[ JVML.strCat6("Can’t access new company ",company,
": category ",category," is already used." ];
}
Set.put( seenCompanies, company );
Set.put( usedCategories, category );
}
Example 3.2: PSLang security policy for Chinese Wall.
specification.
3.2.4 Implementing Chinese Wall
Example 3.2 shows PSLang for the Chinese Wall security policy [BN89], previ-
ously discussed in §2.4. As the figure shows, PSLang allows a straightforward
specification of Chinese Wall in the spirit of the pseudo-code of Example 2.4.
Example 3.2 identifies, using a PSLang security event condition, the start of
the method accessCompany as the single place in the target program that forms a
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security-relevant action for the Chinese Wall security policy. The policy’s security
update maintains security state on used categories and seen companies and also
performs a validity check: accesses to the unseen companies in previously used
categories are deemed invalid. The overhead of enforcing this policy is likely to be
small, because partial evaluation of the PSLang event results in only one insertion
point for IRM enforcement code, namely the beginning of the company access
method.
The security policy of Example 3.2 is in many ways simplistic: it has a simple
fixed notion of categories, companies and their access, it assumes that only a single
“user” is responsible for all activity in the application, and it makes no attempt
to update the security state indivisibly in presence of multiple threads. These
shortcomings are easily remedied without significantly complicating the policy’s
PSLang representation. By using policy extensions, thread-safe PSLang primitives
for company access and required security state are easily constructed. PSLang
extensions and libraries can also associate policy enforcement with whatever notion
the target application or its platform has of users (e.g., login session, thread group,
etc.).
Finally, instead of a fixed mapping of strings representing companies and cat-
egories, the PSLang specification can simply use the target application’s own ab-
stractions for those concepts. And, unlike the strategies proposed for SASI in §2.4,
PSLang directly supports this refinement without requiring the PoET rewriter to
be modified or policy-specific changes to be made to PSLang.
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3.3 Security Event Synthesis
This chapter has argued that relying on security event synthesis (i.e., inferring from
observations of low-level actions the higher-level security events that are relevant
to the policy being enforced) reduces IRM trustworthiness and therefore, when
possible, IRMs should build on high-assurance static analysis like VCC. Security
event synthesis can never be completely avoided, however: to do so would re-
quire generic methods, like static verification of type safety, to exactly capture the
security-relevant actions and higher-level security events for all possible security
policies. Therefore, it is not surprising that even when relying on the guarantees
of the JVML verifier PoET is unable to identify many potential security events in
JVML target programs, making it necessary to synthesize those events in PSLang
policies. As this section shows, even seemingly fundamental language-based ac-
tions and events, not specific to any particular application or policy, may need to
be synthesized.
3.3.1 Exposing Security-relevant Actions
First, to enforce certain security policies, an IRM might need to mediate low-level
actions that would not otherwise occur in the execution of the original application.
For instance, a JVML target program may not specify a class initialization method
for a given class, providing no place, or IRM insertion point, for the low-level
action that occurs when that class is loaded and initialized. Such hidden actions
must be exposed by PoET so they can be referred to in PSLang security policy
specifications.
Each security-relevant action without any IRM insertion point in the JVML
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target program is exposed by PoET in a simple manner: the rewriter adds to the
target program JVML code that corresponds to the handlers and methods where
those actions occur. Typically, when such handlers are optional in JVML, the
addition of an “empty” handler routine, or program fragment, is guaranteed not
to alter JVML program semantics. Exposing these security-relevant actions does
not unnecessarily complicate PoET, since the rewriter must already discover their
insertion points in the target program and, when absent, “empty” handlers are
easily created.
A more difficult case, for PoET, is the misidentification of security-relevant ac-
tions in the target application—that is, when PoET identifies the same low-level
action to PSLang policies in two or more different manners. This puts the onus on
PSLang policies to consider alternative means of effecting actions. Such alternative
means do exist, not just hypothetically like the reading of files as font bitmaps, men-
tioned on page 61, but also in practice, as shown by the Java java.lang.reflect
reflection library. In fact, all JVML code outside the scope of the PoET rewriter
might encode such alternatives, and such external code might include anything
from the entire Java standard class libraries, the operating system, or rare call-
backs from the native windowing system.
The use of JVML reflection forms an example of how alternative forms of
security-relevant actions can be exposed to and dealt with by PSLang policies. The
PSLang policy of Appendix B.3, which is excerpted in Example 3.3, overcomes the
fact that PoET does not identify activity resulting from use of the reflection APIs
in the same way as other actions. (See page 130 of Appendix A for a description
of the PoET actions that can be used in PSLang policies.)
Of course, the security policy excerpted in Example 3.3 might be too strict for
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...
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION boolean isBlocked(Object string) {
if(JVML.strStartsWith(string,"java/lang/reflect/")) {
return true;
}
...
return false;
}
EVENT at start of loading class initialization
WITH isBlocked( Reflect.className(Event.class()) )
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
FAIL[ "Cannot declare class in package" ];
}
EVENT at start of loading instruction
WITH Event.instructionIs("new")
&& isBlocked( Reflect.instrClassName(Event.instruction()) )
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
FAIL[ "Cannot allocate object in package" ];
}
...
Example 3.3: Part of a PSLang policy precluding use of a Java package.
some purposes, because it immediately terminates any target program that starts
to reflect. A more permissive policy could be formed along the lines of the PSLang
of Appendix B.2, which checks the arguments to the reflection APIs at runtime and
restricts the target program to only accessing its own abstractions. At the cost of
some added specification complexity, functions could factor out the PSLang code
for event-condition and security updates that are common to both PoET low-level
actions and JVML reflection events. Such a convention for writing PSLang would
be a simple way to ensure policy enforcement was agnostic to whether low-level
actions originate through reflection or not.12
12At first glance, this style of writing PSLang would appear to result in very
high enforcement overheads, since it involves runtime checks. This is not the case,
because PoET simplification through partial evaluation of PSLang policies would
eliminate runtime checks except on reflection events, where they add negligible
extra overhead.
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Reflection is just one example where details of a given JVM implementation or
a PoET installation might significantly impact the semantics of IRM enforcement.
A PSLang policy written for early versions of Java (which did not include reflection
capabilities) might offer no protection against a knowledgeable attacker, if run on
modern JVMs. In many cases, like reflection, this problem can be eliminated by
applying the principle of fail-safe defaults articulated in [SS75].
However, adopting fail-safe defaults does not excuse policy writers from the bur-
den of carefully considering how both current and future implementations of per-
mitted interfaces might inadvertently invalidate their assumptions. For instance,
a callback mechanism in an apparently irrelevant component, like a native-code
implementation of a windowing system, can easily subvert the enforcement of a
PSLang policy that restricts each call-site of a certain method. Even more im-
portant, the semantics of a particular PSLang policy could depend on details of
the PoET rewriter, such as how PoET sees the Java standard libraries and how
it interacts with JVML ClassLoaders [Gon99]. PoET, currently, can only rewrite
the Java libraries if run in static mode (see Appendix A.2)—otherwise, it will only
rewrite code in the target program.
3.3.2 Building a Better Event
In addition to synthesizing security events that correspond to alternate or hid-
den security-relevant actions, IRM security policies must sometimes also bear the
burden of defining events that perhaps should be identified by the IRM toolkit as
low-level actions. For certain security-relevant activity, such as the end of an appli-
cation’s execution or the invocation of a function, there may not be any particular
low-level action whose occurrence should trigger IRM enforcement code. This am-
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biguity results from a tension between what constitutes activity relevant to security
policies and what semantics are provided by the ISA and the runtime platform.
In particular, there may be such a semantic gap between the ISA and the security
policy’s view of certain language-based concepts, such as program modules.
The start of the execution of a JVML target program illustrates this category of
security event synthesis of what might appear to be fundamental low-level actions.
Most JVML programs start their execution through a static main function in some
class. However, this distinguished class must first be properly initialized, which
might involve executing target program code. As a result of initializing the class,
other program classes might be initialized, arbitrary methods might be called,
and any object instantiated. In fact, such initialization activity can comprise the
entire execution of a JVML program and—if this activity terminates by throwing
an uncaught exception—the main method might never be invoked. Of course, a
writer of PSLang security policies might believe the start of the program to mean
an even-earlier point, before the initialization of the JVM runtime and the Java
standard libraries. Thus, policy writers may be disappointed with the PoET action
at start of program , which occurs only at the beginning of the aforementioned
main method.
It might seem best if PoET marked the start of executing a JVML target pro-
gram on a JVM using some well-defined PoET action. Although convenient, this
would only provide one fixed resolution of the above ambiguities—and the exact se-
mantics might remain either unclear or unsatisfying to policy writers.13 These dis-
13Even so, for some low-level actions, including the start of execution of a JVML
program, the definition of such a PoET action is perfectly feasible. Most JVMs
come with standard profiling and debugging interfaces that allow mediating such
activity. For the reasons described above, these low-level actions are not exposed
by PoET.
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IMPORT LIBRARY Lock;
GLOBAL SECURITY STATE {
boolean programNotBegunFlag = true;
Object beginProgramFlagLock = Lock.create();
}
EVENT at start of class initialization
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Lock.acquire(beginProgramFlagLock);
if( programNotBegunFlag ) {
programNotBegunFlag = false;
globalProgramStartFunction( Event.class() );
}
Lock.release(beginProgramFlagLock);
}
Example 3.4: PSLang synthesis for security event at start of target program.
advantages are avoided by defining the target program’s beginning through PSLang
security event synthesis, as illustrated by the PSLang policy in Example 3.4. That
policy defines the program’s beginning at the occurrence of the first initialization
of a class that has been rewritten by PoET. Such a synthesis might incur extra
performance overhead and lengthen PSLang policies, but, at the same time, it pro-
vides to policy writers a concise, reliable, and exact specification, with transparent
semantics, of this important security event.
In PSLang, a number of other fundamental language-based security events must
be synthesized in this manner. A naive definition of the target program termina-
tion, like that of the PoET action at end of program, might be taken to mean
the end of the main method. In a more realistic specification the PSLang policy
might mediate the use of threads and decide the target program has terminated
when its last thread has done so. The synthesis of this security event could be
further refined to include system activity, such as callbacks, that may happen even
after all program threads have terminated, by mediating all registration for such
future actions.
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Garbage collection and finalization of JVML objects is one example where—
after the target program might be expected to have terminated—program code
might still be executed. The PoET action object instance garbage collec-
tion corresponds to the JVM execution of an object’s finalize method, which is
called exactly once before that object is garbage collected. The finalize method
poses a challenge to PSLang event synthesis because, just like class initializers, it
can encapsulate a target program’s entire execution. More troublesome, however,
is that the invocation of an object’s finalizer does not guarantee that the object
won’t be used further, as a new “live” reference to the object instance might re-
sult from execution of the finalize method. JVML provides no mechanism to
detect such re-registration of object instances and, even worse, when it occurs,
that object’s finalize method will not be invoked again before garbage collec-
tion. To resolve these ambiguities and allow the trustworthy synthesis of garbage
collection and program termination events, a PSLang policy can limit finalization
activity to a reasonable subset, such as one that does not create new threads or
re-register the object instance variable. Such restriction can be imposed without
runtime penalty by load-time PoET security updates that effect a static analysis
of finalize methods.
However, the single most important language-based low-level action that must
be synthesized in PSLang policies is probably JVML virtual method invocation.
By the definition of a virtual method, JVML only refers to such methods by name
and determines the actual method code to execute from the type of an object in-
stance provided at runtime. This makes synthesizing a security event that removes
the ambiguity caused by this indirection both challenging and important, because
security policies are concerned not with names, but with execution behavior.
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Table 3.1: Virtual method map for a Socket with a write method.
Class Superclass Class of Virtual Method Implementation
Object — (toString,Object), ...
Writer Object (write,abstract), ...
Socket Writer (write,Socket), (toString,Socket) ...
Bar Socket (write,Socket), (toString,Bar), ...
One way of resolving this ambiguity is to insert IRM enforcement code in
the bodies of JVML methods, since this ties the IRM to the method’s execution
regardless of what name it used to invoke it. The example PSLang policies of this
dissertation are typically written in this manner. In some cases, however, PoET
may be unable to rewrite the actual code of JVML object methods, for example,
because that code is inaccessible or outside the scope of the rewriter, or the code
is shared by activity that is subject to different security policies.
A PSLang policy can attempt to resolve what method will be executed at
runtime by examining the constant class name given as an operand to the JVML
virtual method invocation instruction. However, relying on this call-site class name
is challenging for two distinct reasons. First, the method executed may be that
of a subclass of the call-site class: during execution the runtime object present at
the call site can either be an instance of the call-site class or an instance of any
of its subclasses. Second, the method executed may be that of a superclass of the
call-site class: even if the runtime object is an instance of the call-site class the call-
site class may not implement the method named—and in this case a superclass’s
implementation is executed. Thus, the call-site class name only constrains to a
limited extent what method implementation will be invoked.
Instead of the static call-site class name, designers of PSLang policies can always
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use a runtime check to determine, for each instruction that invokes a method the
class of the provided object instance.14 Table 3.1 shows an example where, if
writing to sockets is to be precluded, such runtime checking might be needed. In
the table, an abstract superclass Writer defines a prototype for the write method,
which Socket then implements. JVML instructions that invoke the Writer/write
method might, therefore, write to a socket when executed.
The use of virtual methods is a common pattern in object-oriented languages,
and runtime checks like the above might result in significant enforcement over-
head. This runtime overhead can sometimes be avoided by careful construction of
PSLang policies. In the example of Table 3.1, for instance, no runtime check of
write methods is needed if Socket is the only Writer subclass used by the target
program. Such simple static analysis can be implemented using PSLang load-time
security updates, and is particularly useful for the second type of virtual method
ambiguity described earlier: when superclass method’s code is executed at runtime
even though the invocation instruction specified the name of a subclass.
The last row of Table 3.1 illustrates this second type of ambiguity. In this case,
the Socket class, whose write method must be restricted, has been extended by
a class Bar. A JVML target program with this class hierarchy will actually invoke
Socket’s write method when executing a JVML invokevirtual instruction that
refers to Bar/write.
The PSLang security policy of Appendix B.4 resolves this ambiguity without
runtime performance penalty by maintaining for all loaded classes (in the order
14 JVML, unlike some object-oriented languages, ignores runtime types of
method arguments in the selection of what method implementation to execute
on virtual method invocations. Therefore, without loss of generality, this disserta-
tion sometimes uses JVML method names without specifying the argument type
definitions.
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EXTEND POLICY synthProgStart; // From Example 3.4
EXTEND POLICY virtualMethodMap; // Defined in Appendix B.4
FUNCTION void globalProgramStartFunction(Object class) {
restrictVirtualMethod("java/net/Socket", "getOutputStream");
}
EVENT at start of loading instruction
WITH virtualCallTo(Event.instruction(),
"java/net/Socket", "getOutputStream")
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
FAIL[ "Cannot retrieve output part of TCP socket" ];
}
Example 3.5: PSLang policy restricting disambiguated virtual method calls.
of their resolution, as specified by JVML semantics), a data structure like that of
Table 3.1. Example 3.5 shows how a PSLang specification can use the policy of
Appendix B.4 as a building block in restricting use of sensitive methods.15
This section has demonstrated, through examples in the context of JVML and
PSLang, that IRM policies might need to synthesize even the most common se-
curity events, often using non-trivial data structures and computation. This may
appear disappointing, as building on VCC guarantees held the promise of allevi-
ating the need for such synthesis. Such disappointment is misplaced, since the
security events discussed in this section cannot be exposed as low-level actions
on the JVML platform and, therefore, some synthesis would always be necessary.
Encoding security event synthesis in IRM policy specifications makes transparent
the intended and actual semantics, and is preferable to alternatives, such as fixing
one specific notion of these security events into the IRM rewriter.16
15In security policies that restrict network communication, the Socket class and
write method of this section might correspond to the java.net.Socket class in
the standard Java libraries and to its getOutputStream method.
16This said, if a strong advantage such as reliability can be gained, an IRM
toolkit for a particular platform could always register for external notification of
hard-to-synthesize security events and expose them as low-level actions. In the
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3.4 Writing Good IRM Security Policies
IRM security policies encode both policy and implementation—that is, both the
intent of security enforcement as well as the specifics of how that intent is accom-
plished. An IRM toolkit, like PoET, can therefore be thought of as a policy-free
rewriting mechanism that puts the entire burden of security enforcement onto the
writers of security policy specifications. As the PSLang examples of the previous
section illustrate, this burden can be lightened through the synthesis of higher-level
security events, which can be opaque and simple to use in further policy extensions.
Even so, the writing of good IRM security policies is likely to remain a diffi-
cult task, just like the creation of any infrastructure software. Security enforcement
mechanisms are often those system components that are hardest to implement cor-
rectly, because they are sensitive to (even hidden) implementation details and may
be subjected to non-independent faults during an attack. To help alleviate this,
PSLang allows security policy specifications to make use of many of the method-
ologies that are known to facilitate the creation of correct software. PSLang can
structure security policies as pre- and post-conditions on security events [Sch97],
as abstract state machines [BS01], directly as security automata, like in SAL, or
through most other imperative styles of programming. As this thesis argues, the
difficulty and complexity of creating security mechanisms is best addressed with
a well-written out-of-band IRM specification that fully specifies all enforcement
details.
The difficulty of hidden implementation details has already been mentioned
in §3.3.1, which discussed how to synthesize security events that expose security-
case of PoET, for example, a JVM debug handler could be registered to enable
mediation of program termination events without restricting the set of allowed
input programs.
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relevant actions. Unfortunately, the set of IRM low-level actions is likely to be
incomplete in a way that makes it impossible for IRMs to mediate certain security-
relevant actions. For instance, an IRM toolkit intended for securing applications
is unlikely to expose the low-level actions that correspond to the operating system
kernel forwarding network packets. In this example, it is even unlikely that an
IRM security policy would be able to synthesize a security event corresponding to
this forwarding activity.
The above failure demonstrates how IRMs may not be able to implement
all security policies that are currently enforced by traditional reference monitors.
Kernel-based reference monitors may have the advantage of being able to mediate
internal operating system abstractions, such as packet forwarding by the network
stack. As a result of such limitations, IRMs may sometimes be unable to enforce
important security policies. In those scenarios, the IRM toolkit may have to be
extended to mediate internals of the execution platform, e.g., by rewriting or in-
terpreting the operating system kernel.17 Yet, despite any such extensions, the
underlying IRM toolkit will always be subject to some limitations that must be
taken into consideration during the specification of IRM security policies.
Often the most convenient strategy is to write a more restrictive security policy
that completely eliminates the troublesome activity, when faced with the task of
writing IRM specifications that must resolve some difficult issue (like low-level
actions hidden from the IRM toolkit). This is the approach chosen in the policy
for dealing with JVML reflection excerpted in Example 3.3; that policy allows no
reference to the JVML reflection libraries, even though many of their uses (such
17 This is feasible in practice, even in commercial operating systems. The profiler
described in [BEL+00] interpreted all of the executed code in a running system,
apart from a handful of critical interrupt handlers.
85
USES LIBRARY JVML;
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION boolean isStdIn(Object s) {
return JVML.strEq(s,"java/lang/Runtime/inLjava/io/InputStream;");
}
FUNCTION stdInInvariant( Object newInputStream );
ON EVENT at start of instruction
WITH Event.instructionIs("putstatic")
&& isStdIn( Reflect.instrRefStr(Event.instruction()) )
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Object proposedInputStream = State.methodGetObject("$instrArg1");
if( ! stdInInvariant(proposedInputStream) ) {
FAIL[ "Illegal modification of standard input stream" ];
}
}
Example 3.6: PSLang security event synthesis for the modification of stdin.
as creating assertion error messages) are of little security concern.
This same draconian tactic could be used for the problem of forwarded network
packets: the IRM could, for example, disable packet forwarding, or (if unable to
be so selective) simply turn off all processing by the network stack. A well-written
IRM specification should not resort to such restrictive measures, because they un-
necessarily preclude execution of applications that would never violate the intended
security policy. Rather, IRMs should allow the greatest number of legitimate tar-
get applications to execute, perhaps at a cost of increased enforcement overhead
when they exercise boundary cases. In the case of JVML reflection, Appendix B.2
gives a PSLang specification for such a forgiving security policy.
In fact, the greater flexibility of IRMs should allow a larger set of target appli-
cations to be executed in a secure fashion: an IRM can easily mediate at runtime
many security-relevant actions that previous enforcement mechanisms cannot, and
have therefore statically prohibited. Example 3.6 shows one PSLang policy that
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leverages the flexibility of IRMs to mediate direct access to a global variable.18 Al-
lowing such direct modifications of global state allows target applications of both
higher performance and greater expressiveness since system state has traditionally
only been accessible through restricting APIs. IRM toolkits in general, and PoET
in particular, provide full support for enforcing security policies on any state, even
in face of arbitrary direct access to that state. IRM specifications should, therefore,
not allow such activity in applications while ensuring it complies with the intended
security policy.
If an invariant must hold for the contents of multiple states simultaneously,
instead of just for a single variable, like in Example 3.6, security policies must
consider concurrency and synchronization. If all interleaving of IRM enforcement
code is allowed then a multi-threaded security application can compromise the se-
curity state by using a “Time of Check to Time of Use” attack [BH78, BD96]. For
instance, this attack would be possible in the security policy of Example 3.1 if it
had been written without using locks (in the way that Example 3.2 uses no locks).
Then, the secured application could conspire to have multiple threads concurrently
evaluate the security event condition in one state (e.g., openWindows = 2, when
about to open a window) and, consequently, these threads would allow the medi-
ated activity and incorrectly update the security state (e.g., so openWindows = 3).
PSLang security policy specifications must make use of some locking discipline
to ensure that consistency is maintained for both the IRM security state as well
as the target program state. PSLang supports synchronization through the Lock
18 This example is drawn from an early vulnerability reported for Java, where
the globally-accessible field System.in was changed through direct access. Later
Java versions were modified to prohibit all direct modifications of this field, causing
incompatibility with many applications.
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IMPORT LIBRARY Lock;
GLOBAL SECURITY STATE {
boolean programNotBegunFlag = true;
Object beginProgramFlagLock = Lock.create();
}
EVENT at start of class initialization
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
if( programNotBegunFlag ) {
Lock.acquire(beginProgramFlagLock);
if( programNotBegunFlag ) {
programNotBegunFlag = false;
globalProgramStartFunction( Event.class() );
}
Lock.release(beginProgramFlagLock);
}
}
Example 3.7: Incorrect PSLang synthesis of target program beginning.
ADT library, which builds upon the fundamental JVML monitorenter and moni-
torexit operations [YL96]. Maintaining consistency is an arduous task in PSLang,
as in any concurrent programming language [Bir89]. Without exercising extreme
caution, it is easy to introduce race conditions, cause deadlock, or simply write an
incorrect specification. In Example 3.7, for instance, the policy writer’s attempt
at efficiency causes an insidious race condition. (described in [Bir03]). Even in the
correct version of this policy, in Example 3.4, the globalProgramStartFunction
must maintain the partial order of locks in the target program (e.g., by using only
locks exclusive to the IRM and this function) or risk runtime deadlock.
The “no network sending after file reading” security policy, discussed in Chap-
ter 2, further illustrates the dangers of concurrency. Without use of synchroniza-
tion, a secured application subject to this security policy might interleave the
reading of a file between the execution of a network send operation and the IRM
enforcement code that precedes that operation. A PSLang specification can encode
the security policy of Figure 2.1 in several ways that remove this race condition. For
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...
EVENT at start of instruction
WITH virtualCallTo( Event.instruction(),
"java/net/URL", "openConnection" )
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Object str = JVML.toStr(State.methodGetObject("$instance"));
if( notAcceptableNetworkURL( str ) ) {
FAIL[ "Attempt to access proscribed network URL" ];
}
Object url = JVML.newObjectInstance( "java/net/URL" );
JVML.objectInvokeMethod( "java/net/URL", "<init>",
"(Ljava/lang/String;)V", url, str );
State.methodSetObject( url, "$instance" );
}
...
Example 3.8: Outline of PSLang resolution of java.net.URL race conditions.
instance, PSLang security updates could acquire a specific lock before all reading
and sending operations, and only release that lock after those operations complete.
Sometimes the use of IRM locks is neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve
integrity of a concurrent secured application. In JVML and Java, for example, the
file system and network APIs typically operate on immutable object instances with
the properties of capabilities [WN79, Gon99]. Thus, a PSLang policy that wants
to restrict file access through java.io.File needs to consider only the immutable
string passed as the file name argument when creating such object instances. Such
immutable arguments cannot be changed (e.g., to refer to another string) because
they reside on the JVML stack and are therefore inaccessible to all other threads.
This type of immutable thread-local arguments often gives stronger guarantees
than use of the Lock ADT library, making it easy to specify many PSLang policies,
in spite of potential concurrency.
Unfortunately, not all potentially dangerous APIs in the Java libraries accept
only immutable arguments. For instance, in the java.lang.Runtime library, one
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of the exec methods that spawns execution of arbitrary programs takes its argu-
ments as an array of strings—and, in this case, the array might be modified after
its observation by IRM enforcement code and before its use in the exec method
implementation [Gar03]. However, often such potential race conditions can be con-
verted to use immutable arguments by making a copy of the arguments onto the
stack, and only considering those copies in IRM enforcement code. Because the
only reference to the copied arguments resides on the thread-local stack, JVML
semantics guarantee their inaccessibility to other threads. Example 3.8 shows part
of a PSLang security policy that could remove such a race condition in use of
java.net.URL objects, which are not immutable. In the example, the openCon-
nection method is performed only after the URL object instance it uses has been
replaced by a thread-local copy.
Locking, or some other synchronization, is especially important when multiple
IRMs cooperate to enforce a single security policy. As discussed in §2.4, security
policies can, in general, be specified either as a conjunction of many IRMs, each
with their own security state, or as a single IRM that updates centralized security
state. Every PSLang specification, in particular, can be thought of as a conjunction
of many separate security updates, each of which has its own local security state. In
PSLang, the IRM security state may be even more decentralized, because it may be
embedded within the JVML classes and object instances of the secured application.
Eventually, however, these distributed IRMs must somehow coordinate with each
other to enforce their intended security policy—just as the policy at the end of
§3.2.1, which sets a global threshold on file reading, must at some point aggregate
the local counters embedded in file objects.
Unlike traditional reference monitors—which can centrally maintain the secu-
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rity state for all enforcement activity in the operating system kernel—an IRM
toolkit is likely to require each secured application to use a separate IRM with its
own distinct security state. In PSLang/PoET, IRMs must cooperate in this man-
ner if a single security policy is to be enforced on all secured applications, even if
they are all running on the same JVM. To coordinate with other IRMs, PSLang
security policies can communicate through the primitives of the underlying system
(such as shared memory or network channels), as long as the integrity of those
primitives is also protected in the same PSLang specification. More generally, a
single global security policy may be concurrently enforced through any composi-
tion of IRMs in different secured applications or on different systems, as long as
consistency is somehow ensured, e.g., using the standard methods of distributed
systems [Sch90, Lam01, Lyn96].
Whenever the same target application is simultaneously subject to multiple
security policies, the writers of PSLang specifications must carefully consider their
composition. Ascertaining the behavior of such composed systems, or policies, is
known to be a difficult task with no simple solution [Hin98, BLW02a]. The IRM
approach introduces an additional composition problem: How to ensure correct
security enforcement when the same target application is rewritten multiple times
sequentially in succession, perhaps with different IRM toolkits. In this case IRM
enforcement code will be rewritten to include other IRM enforcement code, which
intuitively seems likely to cause inconsistency.
Successive rewriting of different IRM security policies is not equivalent to the
concurrent case and may not always give the expected result. To see this, consider
two PSLang/PoET IRMs A and B that both restrict some system APIs, and also
protect their own integrity, e.g., by limiting use of JVML reflection and reducing
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the target program’s privileges. Now, assume a JVML target program is rewritten
with A, to form a secured program, and that secured program is then rewritten
with B. Then, the IRM enforcement code of B may truncate the execution of the
final secured program as soon as the IRM enforcement code of A makes use of
JVML reflection or uses a privilege forbidden by B (such as instantiating a JVML
ClassLoader for IRM rewriting). This early termination is not a fault of the target
program, but results because the two security policies were applied sequentially—
since, if an IRM toolkit had simultaneously rewritten with both A and B, the
secured application might always execute to completion.
One solution to the above IRM composition problem might be to identify the
IRM enforcement code embedded within a secured application. Then, this IRM
enforcement code could be excluded from further rewriting by other IRM toolkits.
However, for such a solution to work, trust would have to be established between
the two different IRM toolkits and security policies. This brings up the issue of
deployment and management of implementation of the IRM approach, a frequent
stumbling block for security technologies.
3.5 Deploying the IRM Approach
The level of assurance provided by a computer security enforcement mechanism
can sometimes be increased by simple changes to its deployment and management,
i.e., how, and at what time and place, security is actually enforced. Network
firewalls are a good example, as their primary advantage as a security mechanism
is their ability to centralize enforcement to a single point. Such centralization
offers no technological advantage over distributing security enforcement over all
network nodes, yet has immense practical value, since it makes efficient use of
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management resources and easily allows a single policy to be consistently enforced
across a whole network [CBR03]. The cryptographic certification of software code is
another example where a shift in security enforcement brings benefits—namely the
potential of moving the onus of examining software for errors (or malicious intent)
from the software consumers to its producers or vendors by leveraging existing trust
relationships [Gon99]. Because of their deployment and management advantages
the above technologies are now ubiquitous, despite having shortcomings that limit
their value [CER00].
The IRM approach offers great flexibility in the timing and placement of secu-
rity enforcement and how that enforcement leverages existing trust relationships—
an advantage that IRMs share with some variants of VCC [SGB+98, Nec98]. Ap-
plications can be rewritten to include an embedded IRM by the application devel-
opers, vendors, distributors, administrators, or end users; IRM rewriting can take
place dynamically on demand, or statically ahead-of-time, and the IRM can ei-
ther be an explicitly identified or integral part of the resulting secured application.
This flexibility allows IRMs to reap many benefits, such as, in corporate settings,
the centralized application of security policies with an IRM toolkit operated by
network administrators. In that scenario, all applications that originate from the
network (e.g., through email or web browsing) could be transparently rewritten to
include IRMs that enforced a corporate policy during their execution.
Centralized IRM deployment has several benefits, but other distinct advantages
can come from leaving IRM rewriting to the discretion of the end user.19 One such
advantage is the potential for increased efficiency with lower security enforcement
19 Such end-user rewriting is easily accomplished, since each secured application
typically contains both an IRM rewriter and a specification of the intended security
policy in order to deal with potential runtime code generation.
93
overheads: Because each secured application may include a different IRM, the
end user can use simple IRMs, or no enforcement, for those applications that do
not handle sensitive data or where other external circumstances dictate that little
security enforcement is needed. The problem of composing IRM security policies
gives another reason to postpone IRM rewriting of applications. Trusting the
end user (or the end user’s operating system) to perform IRM rewriting allows
the conjunction of all intended security policies to be independently enforced on
the original target application and, thus, avoids the problem of nested rewriting
mentioned in the last section.
One scheme that combines many of the above benefits is to perform early and
centralized IRM rewriting but make explicit and certify all IRM enforcement code
embedded in the target application. Then—if he has the privilege to do so—an
end user could recover the original target application (by removing the inserted
IRM enforcement code), retain those IRMs that are certified by parties he trusts,
verify other IRMs (by rewriting them again from their PSLang policy), or the
end user could use his own IRM toolkit to enforce further security policies. A
PSLang/PoET implementation of this scheme could identify the inserted IRM
bytecode using the extended method attributes of JVML class files, and certify
this inserted code, as well as the PSLang specification, using Java’s code signing
infrastructure [YL96, Gon99].
Another alternative would be to separate the verification of IRM processing
from actual IRM rewriting, i.e., in the manner of VCC, separating the generation
of a rewriting proof from its validation [Nec97]. When compared to cryptographic
signatures, such a validation scheme is preferable since it does not rely on any
external trust relationships. As mentioned in §3.1.2, the process of IRM rewrit-
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ing can generate evidence that discharges a verification condition generated from
the security policy—whether or not any IRM enforcement code is inserted. As in
[Nec00], the simplification and elimination of inserted IRM code, if sound, can typ-
ically create evidence that proves its correctness. In the case of declarative policies,
like the SAL security automata of Chapter 2, target program modification might
even be proved unnecessary or one policy proved contained in another [BR02].
The adoption of some standard IRM deployment scheme, like the above, would
have a major benefit in the increased end-to-end transparency of software seman-
tics [SRC84]. Currently, it is often difficult to determine what security policy
is being enforced during execution, and, as a result, not only does lax security
go unnoticed but sometimes its enforcement is purposefully discontinued in an
attempt to resolve unrelated problems. If software vendors and administrators
embedded identifiable IRM security policies within applications there would be no
such ambiguity about what security policy was currently being enforced: a simple
disassembly would reveal exactly the security policy applied to their execution.
By using the IRM approach, software developers—or other interested parties
that know the details of platform and application API semantics—can produce
and publish multiple IRM security policies. When combined with the above de-
ployment scenarios, this could enable security administrators to choose different
security policies for each occasion, and yet make the currently enforced security
policy be transparent to the end users. This style of decoupled IRMs has the
potential to greatly simplify the management of security updates, since the late
binding of security enforcement to the time of end-user execution provides a point
of indirection where security policies can be patched or updated to a newer version.
Thus, IRMs could help ease the problem of security configuration management, one
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of the current challenges of computer security.
Adopting IRM enforcement does not come without its costs in terms of com-
plexity and other overhead. For example, as discussed in §3.3.2, synthesis of secu-
rity events as simple as virtual method calls can sometimes be both difficult and
inefficient. The simple solution, for this particular security event, may spend signif-
icant resources by using multiple copies of the Java libraries, each rewritten with
a different IRM. The possible nesting of IRMs mentioned earlier can also cause
complexity and waste of resources, as multiple ClassLoaders, each originating in a
separate IRM toolkit, form a chain of IRM rewriting at runtime. Such problems
would have to be resolved, e.g., by using the identity of certified IRMs to negotiate
a single rewriter to use at runtime [MHS00].
Despite such difficulties, deployment and management of the IRM security
enforcement is certainly preferable to one current alternative: the development
of a distinct built-in security mechanism for each new software application. If
each application comes with its own notion of security and its own enforcement
mechanism then it becomes intractable to establish a coherent system security
policy or even to determine what policy is currently being enforced. Numerous
applications, e.g., the Netscape web browser [Ros96], have adopted this approach
and implement complicated mechanisms that enforce security policies. However,
even if those applications allow some tuning of their security policies, and correctly
enforce those policies, it is very difficult to manage and reconcile the abstractions
of such multiple disparate mechanisms. Finally, as briefly discussed in §1.1, the
nature of computer security and software application development gives little hope
that such application security enforcement would be either sound or complete.
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3.6 Extending the Scope of IRMs
So far, IRMs have been presented according to their definition in Chapter 1,
which—in addition to satisfying the general requirements for reference monitors—
explicitly prohibited IRMs from changing the function or behavior of their target
application. This restriction, labeled (d) in Figure 1.4, is attractive because it not
only forms a reasonable constraint on IRMs, circumscribing their task, but it also
justifies their specification and analysis as security automata by placing IRMs in
the class EM of enforceable security properties.
Experience, however, shows that this restriction is both quite difficult to achieve
and also that it prevents the enforcement of a number of interesting security poli-
cies well suited to IRMs. Example 3.8 illustrates the difficulty of fulfilling this
obligation: security enforcement requires the removal of certain race conditions,
but—in doing so—non-deterministic behavior is eliminated and the secured ap-
plication may not behave the same as the original target application. Thus, the
IRM embedded in a secured application unavoidably changes some properties of
that application. At the same time by forbidding changes to application semantics,
IRMs are prevented from performing many tasks, such as the following:
• Creation of audit logs and traces of target application behavior, either us-
ing side channels or existing public APIs. With IRMs, it can be simple to
implement coherent system-wide audit policies and record use of otherwise
opaque application-level interfaces.
• Preventing resource completion and denial-of-service attacks by limiting the
consumption rate of some resources, such as memory, computation cycles,
and disk and network bandwidth [CvE98]. For those resources where this is
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not sufficient, such as locked data structures, IRMs could potentially perform
simple transactional rollback on timeouts [SESS96, HF03].
• Implementing security policies with alternate remedial actions that do not
truncate application execution. Such security policies might inform the appli-
cation when IRM validity checks fail, for instance by returning an innocuous
error status, by throwing a security exception for the application to catch,
or by reverting to some previous state [Pov99].
• Virtualizing the application’s execution environment by modifying each ac-
cess in the secured application to refer to alternate state. IRMs can easily
perform such virtualization, which is known to provide strong isolation and
security guarantees [KF91].
• Sandboxing the behavior of the application by silently eliding or otherwise
changing the semantics of certain activity. Such sandboxing is used by some
security mechanisms, for instance, by the MiSFIT SFI implementation dis-
cussed in §2.3.1.
There are a number of possible alternatives to the notion of application semantic
equivalence that is specified in Figure 1.4(d), and some of those alternatives can
enable IRMs to perform a number of the above tasks. Intuitively, such alternative
IRM definitions must allow for more non-determinism and reasonable perturbations
in the application’s execution environment—permitting activity that should not
be visible to the target application as well as changes that should not be under
its control. One attempt at formalizing such IRM requirements might require,
for each secured application trace, that there exist a target application trace in
some execution environment (including different interleaving due to concurrency),
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in which the sequence of named state values in that trace maps onto the same
sequence in the secured application trace. Recently, several such alternative formal
definitions have been introduced [BLW02b, WZL03, BLW02a].
PSLang/PoET is already capable of performing all of the extended tasks listed
above, even without the support of a formal definition. For instance, the PSLang
security policy of Appendix B.2 is written to modify the semantics of the JVML
reflection API to hide the inserted IRM and the PoET runtime. The current
PoET implementation is only limited in that it cannot completely elide selected
security-relevant actions from a JVML target program. This limitation can, how-
ever, typically be overcome by changing the arguments or return values of those
actions in the secured version of the JVML program.
Another potentially useful extension to the IRM approach might add to IRMs
the capability of performing static analysis of the target application. It is clear
that this enhancement would greatly increase the power of IRMs, since VCC and
the JVML verifier are one example of such static analysis, and the IRM approach
greatly benefited by leveraging their guarantees. Again, PSLang/PoET already
implements a form of this extension in its load-time security updates. This capa-
bility, and those security updates, can be crucial to the PSLang synthesis of more
intricate security events, such as §3.3.2’s unambiguous virtual method calls.
However, great care must be taken whenever the role of IRMs is extended
beyond that discussed in the previous sections of this dissertation. For instance,
if IRMs can modify application behavior, enforcing a collection of IRMs is no
longer equivalent to the concurrent, but independent, enforcement of each of those
IRMs—as is the case with the IRM definition of Figure 1.4 and was discussed in
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Chapter 2 in the context of security automata.20 In particular, such modification
to IRM abilities and semantics can make some of their difficulties into intractable
problems. For example, when sequentially composing so extended IRMs, an early
IRM may be completely removed: The later IRMs may simply silently elide the
installation of the IRM rewriter (in PoET, a JVML ClassLoader).
The trustworthiness of IRMs as a security enforcement mechanism is the most
significant factor in any consideration of IRMs of extended scope. When weighed
against this standard, some of the extensions proposed in this section appear
unattractive—either because they make it more difficult to reason about the effects
of IRM enforcement code or because they add too much to the trusted comput-
ing base. However, the simpler of the proposed extensions, such as logging and
auditing, seem perfectly reasonable. The next chapter gives a detailed example of
how the IRM approach can be used to implement a complex security policy whose
remedial actions inform the application of security violations.
20 To see this, consider two IRM security policies that both wish to prevent the
occurrence of F (1, 1) and F (−1,−1). Now, one of these policies might sandbox
F operations by negating the first argument, and the other might sandbox F
by negating the second argument. Then, however, the composition of these two
security policies might turn F (1, 1) into F (−1,−1), and vice versa, subverting the
intent of both policies.
Chapter 4
Java Stack Inspection IRMs
Stack inspection is a recently introduced security enforcement mechanism that orig-
inated with Java. The stack inspection mechanism is designed to enforce security
policies that are concerned with “confused deputy” attacks, where an unautho-
rized party are able to (indirectly) cause proscribed activity through interaction
with a privileged entity. To avoid this, a stack inspection security policy requires
that all parties responsible for a given activity have been granted suitable permis-
sions [Gon99, FG02].
4.1 Security Enforcement in Java
Java was designed to support construction of applications that import and execute
untrusted code from across a network. The language and runtime system enforce
access control policies that support downloading JVML programs, applets, from
a host computer and executing them safely on a client computer. In Sun’s Java
implementation [GJS96, YL96, Gon99], this access control is enforced by runtime
checks in the standard Java libraries, supported by VCC guarantees of JVML
bytecodes (described in §3.1.2), which are derived from the syntax and semantics
of the Java programming language.
The JVM access-control policies associate access rights with the bytecode of
JVML classes and, thus, regulate access based on the requesting class. The sandbox
policy of early (pre Java 2) JVM implementations distinguished between code
residing locally and code obtained from across the network. The more recent
Java 2 stack inspection policy refines this. Hence, in Java 2, whether an access is
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permitted can depend on the current nesting of method invocations. Enforcement
of the stack inspection access-control policy therefore relies on information found
on the JVM runtime call stack [Gon99, FG02].
Changing which access-control policy is supported by the JVM requires chang-
ing the JVM. Thus, programs expecting Java 2’s stack inspection policy to be
enforced will not execute correctly on earlier-generation JVM implementations.
Applications requiring other access-control policies might be ruled out altogether,
might require awkward constructions, or might be forced to employ their own
application-level custom enforcement mechanisms.1 Finally, a JVM that enforces
the stack inspection policy includes mechanisms that may or may not be needed for
executing any given Java application. For applications where memory is at a pre-
mium, such as those intended for use in embedded systems, the size of the JVM
footprint is crucial; there is considerable incentive to omit unused enforcement
mechanisms.
This chapter describes how IRMs can provide an alternative to enforcing access-
control on runtime platforms, like the JVM, without requiring changes to the plat-
form. To illustrate this, IRMs for Java 2 stack inspection are specified in PSLang,
added to JVML programs by PoET, and then executed with the policy (now, pos-
sibly, on any JVM, even those predating Java 2). Two IRM implementations of
stack inspection are discussed—one is a reformulation of security passing style pro-
posed in [Wal99b, WF98]; the other is new and exhibits performance competitive
with existing commercial JVM-resident implementations.
1With elaborate construction, the stack inspection mechanism can be made
to support more common policies. These constructions typically involve creating
multiple copies of the same class (in different code bases) or creating multiple
instances of identical class loaders.
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Java 2’s stack inspection policy is a particularly challenging one to enforce
with an IRM because state relevant to policy enforcement (the JVM runtime call
stack) is not directly accessible to Java applications. That PSLang/PoET can
obtain a new implementation exhibiting competitive performance reflects well on
the practicality of the IRM approach. Also, because an IRM implementation makes
stack inspection optional, it allows the use of simpler (or older) JVMs that can be
more efficient and more trustworthy, and—in the future—when alternate means of
enforcement supersede stack inspection, only a PSLang policy needs be changed.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews Java 2’s stack inspec-
tion policy and the primitives that implement this policy. An IRM version of
the security-passing style [Wal99b, WF98] implementation of stack inspection is
described in §4.3; an IRM implementation for more lazy enforcement of Java 2’s
stack inspection policy is given in §4.4. Finally, §4.5 concludes with some remarks
about the clarification of Java’s stack inspection policy that resulted from the
experience of implementing it with the IRM approach.
4.2 Review of Java Stack Inspection
Java 2’s stack inspection access-control policy is based on policy files which asso-
ciate permissions with protection domains. The policy file, which is read when the
JVM starts, defines application access controls as follows.
Protection domains. Each application initially is a sequence of bytes stored
outside the JVM. The bytes are fetched by a class loader and then executed
by the JVM. Prior to execution, the bytes are assigned to a protection domain
in accordance with the source of the bytes (a network address or a file name)
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Figure 4.1: Three protection domains set up for stack inspection.
and any attached cryptographic signature.2
Permissions. Each protection domain implies a set of permissions. This set in-
cludes all those permissions associated with the protection domain by the pol-
icy file, as well as other implied permissions. The definition of a permission—
a class—states what permissions it implies by defining an implies method.
As an example, Figure 4.1 depicts three protection domains: Untrusted Applet,
GUI Library, and File System. Permissions associated with each domain appear
in the box below the name of the protection domain; code associated with that
domain appears below the permissions. Notice that file access permissions are
given in the figure using patterns rather than complete file names—the implies
method would decode those patterns to generate permissions for actual files in the
expected way.
2 The Java class loader used to fetch those bytes can also be involved in de-
termining the protection domain of the bytecode [LB98, Gon99]. Since new class
loaders can be created at runtime, protection domains can be created dynamically,
thereby helping to overcome the static nature of policy files.
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For a permission P , invoking the checkPermission(P ) method of Java 2 throws
a security exception if access should not be allowed to proceed; it otherwise has
no visible effect. Whether a security exception is thrown depends on the protec-
tion domains assigned to the methods from which control has not yet returned—
methods having frames on the JVM call stack when checkPermission(P ) is in-
voked. Specifically, when checkPermission(P ) is invoked, the JVM call stack is
traversed from top to bottom (i.e., starting with the frame for the method contain-
ing the checkPermission(P ) invocation) until either the entire stack is traversed
or an invocation is found within the scope of a doPrivileged block. In that
traversal, the stack frames encountered are checked to make sure their associated
protection domains imply permission P ; if some frame doesn’t, a security exception
is thrown.
Observe that doPrivileged supports a form of rights amplification. Without
doPrivileged or some equivalent, it would be impossible to invoke methods that
require permissions not already held by the invoker. Such rights amplification is
crucial, for example, when untrusted code invokes a system routine. A system
routine is trusted to perform adequate checks before exercising the power that
comes with the more powerful permissions in its associated protection domain; it
should also be trusted to invoke only methods that are similarly prudent. So, a
construct like doPrivileged that allows an invoked method to exercise permissions
beyond those of its invoker is both sensible and useful.
The code in Figure 4.1 illustrates how doPrivileged is used. display directly
invokes the load method of File System and invokes the use plain font method
of GUI Library. Also note that use plain font invokes load—loading a font may
require loading a file that contains bitmaps for the font. Thus:
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• In invoking load(’thesis.txt’), the checkPermission will throw a secu-
rity exception if protection domains File System (the frame at the top of
the stack) and Untrusted Applet (the next and bottom frame on the stack)
do not each imply the needed permissions for reading that file. They do if
thesis.txt resides in /home/ue.
• In invoking load(’Courier’) from within use plain font, the resulting
call to checkPermission will throw a security exception if protection do-
mains File System (the frame at the top of the stack) and GUI Library (the
next frame on the stack) do not each imply the needed permissions for read-
ing that file. They do if Courier resides in /fonts. Untrusted Applet is not
checked for permissions, because the invocation of load in GUI Library is
within the scope of a doPrivileged.
Java’s stack inspection policy also handles dynamic creation of threads. When
a new thread T is created, T is given a copy of the existing runtime call stack
to extend. The success of subsequently evaluating checkPermission in thread T
thus involves permissions associated with the call stack when T is created.
4.3 A Security-Passing Style IRM
The first work on modifying JVML programs to enforce stack inspection is de-
scribed in [Wal99b, WF98]. There, an additional variable is introduced to repli-
cate information from the JVM runtime call stack. This variable is changed upon
invoking or returning from a method call as well as upon entering or exiting the
scope of a doPrivileged block; the variable is scanned when checkPermission is
evaluated. The resulting scheme is called security-passing style (SPS) because the
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new variable is passed to method invocations as an additional argument.
SPS is an example of the IRM approach, so it is no surprise that PSLang/PoET
can be used to create IRMSPS, an implementation of SPS. The updates associated
by IRMSPS with each security event—method call and return, checkPermission,
doPrivileged, and thread creation—are sketched in Table 4.1; the actual PSLang
formulation appears in Appendix B.5.
In the PSLang that specifies IRMSPS, variable domainStack replicates policy-
relevant information from the JVM runtime call stack; this variable is local to
each thread (and is equivalent to the additional explicit argument to method in-
vocations employed in [Wal99b, WF98]). It is worth noting exactly how IRMSPS
handles security updates associated with a method call from A to B. Permissions
for B could be added to security state domainStack either inside method A or
inside method B. But performing the update inside method A turns out to be less
desirable in part because when B is a virtual method (the Java equivalent of a func-
tion pointer), a dynamic lookup would be required to determine its permissions.
Therefore, IRMSPS does the security update inside method B.
4.3.1 Performance Overhead
In order to understand the performance of stack inspection implementations, the
frequency and cost of relevant security events in actual applications must be as-
sessed. Four applications were measured for these attributes: the Jigsaw 2.01 web
server [BS96], Sun’s javac Java compiler [GJS96], the tar utility [End98], and
an MPEG video player [And99]. All were run using modern JVMs3 with garbage
3For JDK 1.1.x, Symantec Java! Version 3.10.107(i) was used; for Java 2, Sun’s
JDK 1.2 distribution was used, which employs Symantec Java! Version 3.00.078(x).
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Table 4.1: IRMSPS implements security-passing style.
Method call/return: A→ B
Before calling B, look up permis-
sions PA for A’s code and push
PA on the thread-local domain-
Stack. After returning from B
(either normally or by a thrown
exception), pop domainStack, re-
moving PA.
doPrivileged {S}
Push a distinguished token
doPriv on domainStack, at the
beginning of the doPrivileged,
and pop the token off at the end
(whether an exception was thrown
or not).
checkPermission(P )
Scan domainStack from top to
bottom (without modifying it),
and look at each set of permissions
p. Throw a security exception if
p does not imply P , but accept if
p = doPriv or the bottom of do-
mainStack is reached.
Create thread: T
Set the domainStack of T to con-
tain a copy of the contents of
the domainStack of its parent
thread.
collection disabled on a 300 Mhz Pentium II running Windows 98 and connected
to a dedicated 100Mb Ethernet network. Since quantifying access-control overhead
was of interest, the first three benchmark applications used the same set of 500
small synthetic Java source files as their input, with each source file defining a class
containing only a single integer variable.
Table 4.2(a) shows how many times the various stack inspection primitives were
invoked in the benchmarked applications. The cost of performing doPrivileged,
checkPermission, and thread creation can be relative to the size of the JVM call
stack, and—because checkPermission is dominant—the average number of ac-
cessed stack frames (“avg checked”) for that operation is also reported. So that
the numbers are less dependent on irrelevant implementation details, stack in-
spection primitives used in the construction of permission objects have not been
counted. For instance, not counted are the doPrivileged invocations for creating
each java.io.FilePermission object in Sun’s implementation.
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Table 4.2: Assessing stack inspection performance.
Method
calls
doPrivileged
checkPermission
count avg checked
New
threads
Jigsaw 2,476,731 1,002 5,333 18.7 71
javac 1,456,970 0 1,067 12.4 0
tar 19,580 0 6,509 8.6 0
MPEG 35.997.662 101 205 5.7 201
(a) Frequency of stack inspection primitives.
Method call doPrivileged checkPermission New thread
1.00µs 1.66µs 7.7µs 6.5µs
(b) Benchmarked cost of IRMSPS primitives (at stack depth 10).
JVM IRMSPS
Jigsaw 6.2% 20.1%
javac 2.9% 46.2%
tar 10.1% 3.0%
MPEG 0.9% 72.5%
(c) Overhead of JVM-resident implementation and IRMSPS.
Table 4.2(b) shows the overhead, in microseconds, for the IRMSPS stack in-
spection primitives. The values shown are averages from a synthetic benchmark of
the primitives. The primitives in the last three columns were benchmarked using
a stack depth of 10—each operation accessed 10 stack frames.
Table 4.2(c) compares the runtime overhead of Sun’s JVM-resident implemen-
tation of stack inspection and IRMSPS. The column labeled JVM gives the percent-
age overhead between running the application on Java 2’s JVM with stack inspec-
tion enabled versus without stack inspection enabled; the column labeled IRMSPS
gives the percentage overhead between running the application with IRMSPS on
Java 1.14 versus without any IRM. Measurements did not include the cost of con-
4Java 1.1’s JVM was employed to measure IRMSPS because otherwise the stack
inspection already present in Java 2’s JVM would perturb the results.
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structing permission objects or evaluating their implies methods, in order to
better quantify the relative difference in overhead between implementations. For
each average, the computed standard deviation was small enough to be ignored in
interpreting the numbers.
The JVM-resident implementation is considerably cheaper for Jigsaw, javac,
and MPEG. This is not surprising because of the per method call cost of IRMSPS
and the large number of method calls each of these applications makes. However,
when an application has many permission checks relative to the number of method
calls, IRMSPS can exhibit less overhead than the JVM-resident implementation.
This is because IRMSPS is able to amortize the cost of creating domainStack over
a large number of checkPermission’s. The results for tar illustrate this benefit.
4.3.2 An Improved SPS Implementation Scheme
The overhead of an SPS stack inspection implementation would be improved if the
security state (i.e., domainStack) were not updated on each method call. In fact,
updates need to be made only when a method call crosses protection domains—
method calls within the same protection domain repeatedly push the same permis-
sion onto domainStack, and checkPermission is unaffected by replacing sequences
of identical stack frames with a single frame.
The implementation of [Wal99b, WF98] exploits this insight. The implementa-
tion comprises 12,800 lines of Java code, of which 1700 lines implement an analysis
to determine whether invoked methods are in the same or different protection do-
mains as the invoker and 6900 lines are produced by JOIE, the generic JVML
rewriter [CCK98]. With these optimizations, [Wal99b, WF98] reports overall secu-
rity enforcement overheads of between 13% and 17% of total execution time—still
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relatively high when compared to the overheads on the same applications run un-
der the JVM-resident implementation stack inspection. Adding this optimization
to IRMSPS does not seem worthwhile, given the performance gains achieved in
other ways with the IRM implementation of the next section.
4.4 A Lazy Stack Inspection IRM
Sun’s implementation of stack inspection profits from having direct access to the
JVM call stack, because then no overhead is incurred at method calls in order
to keep track of nested invocations for subsequent checkPermission evaluation.
Since method calls are the common case, the performance advantages of this design
should be obvious.
In order to specify such a scheme in PSLang, some facility is needed for accessing
the JVM runtime call stack. Fortunately, Java provides one. First, Java provides
an interface so that exceptions can print a textual description of the JVM call stack
when they are thrown; second, the Java SecurityManager contains a protected
method getClassContext that returns the JVM call stack as an array of Class
objects, each a unique identifier for the code at that JVM call stack frame. The
PoET runtime makes this latter interface accessible to PSLang specifications (as
part of PoET’s System library) by extending the SecurityManager.
Table 4.3 sketches security events and updates for IRMLazy, an IRM stack
inspection implementation that uses the JVM call stack. The actual PSLang for-
mulation appears in Appendix B.6. Notice how work has been moved from method
call/return to the implementation of doPrivileged, checkPermission, and new
thread creation (which all must make a copy of the call stack when they are in-
voked). doPrivileged pushes the frame number for the stack frame at the top of
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Table 4.3: IRMLazy uses the JVM call stack.
Method call/return: A→ B
Nothing.
doPrivileged {S}
At the start of doPrivileged
push the frame number of the cur-
rent JVM call stack onto privS-
tack; at the end pop it off
(whether an exception was thrown
or not).
checkPermission(P )
Let bottom be the position of the
top-most privileged stack frame on
privStack, or 0 if there is no
such stack frame. Scan the cur-
rent JVM call stack from top to
bottom and find the permissions p
for each stack frame—reject if ever
p does not imply P . If there was
no privileged stack frame, likewise
scan the ancestralStack.
Create thread: T
Let the ancestralStack of the
new thread T be either a copy
of the ancestralStack that is
present on its parent thread, with
the current JVM call stack pushed
on top, or—if there is a privi-
leged stack frame somewhere to be
found on privStack—the top por-
tion of the current JVM call stack
up to that privileged frame.
the current JVM call stack onto a separate thread-local variable, privStack. This
frame number then serves to bound the segment of the JVM call stack that must be
traversed in evaluating checkPermission—stack frames appearing lower on that
call stack are not checked. For each thread, the relevant stack frames of parent
threads are stored in thread-local variable ancestralStack, since this information
cannot be derived from the current JVM call stack and it is needed in evaluating
any checkPermission that does not terminate early by reaching a doPrivileged
frame.
Table 4.4(a) shows the cost of the stack inspection primitives with IRMLazy. As
with Table 4.2(b), reported measurements are averages from a synthetic benchmark
that repeatedly performed the subject operation.
Notice that, except for method calls, the measured costs for each stack in-
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Table 4.4: Assessing the IRMLazy stack inspection implementation.
Method call doPrivileged checkPermission New thread
0µs 23.4µs 22.4µs 29.8µs
(a) Cost of JVM-call-stack implementation primitives.
JVM IRMSPS IRMLazy
Jigsaw 6.2% 20.1% 6.4%
javac 2.9% 46.2% 2.0%
tar 10.1% 3.0% 5.4%
MPEG 0.9% 72.5% 0.4%
(b) Overhead of JVM-resident and IRMLazy implementations.
spection primitive in Table 4.4(a) are higher than the IRMSPS costs given in Ta-
ble 4.2(b). These higher costs arise because the entire stack is now being copied by
the implementations of all but the method call/return stack inspection primitives.
Even so, for the benchmark applications, IRMLazy exhibits overall performance that
is superior to IRMSPS and that is competitive with Sun’s JVM-resident implemen-
tation. This is seen in Table 4.4(b), and it is a consequence of method call/return
invocations dominating performance of the benchmarks. Where IRMLazy performs
better than the JVM-resident implementation, it is because of optimizations in
the PSLang specification, which do a better job of eliminating redundant work in
permission checking.5
4.5 Concluding Inspections
This section has shown how enforcement of stack inspection could be eliminated
from the JVM. The result is a smaller and simpler—hence, more trustworthy—
JVM, especially since the enforcement mechanism for stack inspection policies is
5Similar optimizations are done in IRMSPS.
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now isolated (as a PSLang specification) rather than being distributed throughout
the JVM.
The idea of separating mechanism from the policy that directs this mecha-
nism is advocated often. Java 2’s support for the stack inspection access-control
policy involves a mechanism (in the JVM) and the flexibility to direct that mech-
anism through policy files, protection domains, and permission classes (with their
implies methods). The IRM realizations of stack inspection actually draw a
somewhat different line between policy and mechanism. With no JVM-resident
mechanism, there is considerable flexibility about what policies can be enforced
using the IRM approach and about when that choice of policy must be made.
This flexibility allows enforcement of policies that alter or extend what the JVM
implements today. One might now contemplate remedying the various deficiencies
in the Java 2 stack inspection access-control policy, allowing
• protection domains, permissions, and the implies method to be changed
after execution of an application is commenced, enabling straightforward
creation of new protection domains as execution proceeds;
• the coupling between protection domains and bytecode origin to be refined so
that, for example, an application’s state is used in determining the protection
domain for code; and
• the operation of doPrivileged to be extended so that only some of the
privileges in a protection domain are amplified in a block of code.
It now even becomes possible to enforce different security policies on different
Java applications, raising questions about detecting and resolving incompatibilities
between those policies. However, these questions about policy composition are
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independent of whether or not the IRM approach is being used to enforce policies.
Flexibility is a double-edged sword. The IRM approach is not only flexible
enough to implement Java 2’s stack inspection (in multiple ways!) and to imple-
ment a host of variants that address apparent limitations in the policy, but it is also
flexible enough to allow policies to be defined that have unanticipated consequences
or vulnerabilities. There is no way to guarantee that the PSLang formulations of
stack inspection in Appendices B.5 and B.6 are indeed the policy supported by
Sun’s distribution. To get such assurance, a formal specification of Sun’s stack
inspection implementation would be needed, as well as a logic for PSLang specifi-
cations. Neither exists. But PSLang could be given a formal semantics in terms
of security automata, and then it would not be difficult to reason about and/or
simulate PSLang policies in order to gain confidence that they describe what is
intended.
Even without a logic for reasoning about PSLang specifications, the exercise
of formulating stack inspection in PSLang, a formal language, did prove enlight-
ening. Writing the PSLang security updates forced the asking of questions about
what really happens when security events occur. In seeking the answers to those
questions, several surprising things about the exact semantics of stack inspection
came to light:
• If a new thread is created from within a doPrivileged block then that thread
will continue to enjoy amplified privileges—even though its code might not
be within the scope of a doPrivileged block and even after its creator has
exited from within the doPrivileged. This is because the new thread starts
execution with a copy of its creator’s call-stack (whose top frame is marked
as being within the scope of a doPrivileged).
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• When a class B extends some class A but does not override A’s implementa-
tion of a method foo(), then the permissions associated with A (and not B)
are used by checkPermission for foo’s stack frame. Because B can extend
A in ways that may affect the semantics of foo, (such as by overriding other
methods), one might argue that the wrong permissions are being consulted.
Both of these “features” of stack inspection will become apparent to attentive read-
ers of the PSLang formulations in Appendices B.5 and B.6.6 This is not to say
that there aren’t also surprises in the PSLang formulations or there aren’t aspects
of the Java 2 behavior that were missed in constructing these formulations. But
having—in just a few pages—a complete and rigorous description of the security
policy being enforced seems like a necessary condition for understanding that pol-
icy.
6 For example, in Appendix B.5, the security event ON EVENT begin method
WITH appMethod() results in a security update that adds the protection domain
for the current method on the top of domainStack. This protection domain will
not reflect inheritance, since it is read from the class variable siDomain. Also in
Appendix B.5, the domainStack for a newly created thread is a direct copy of
its creating thread’s domainStack—including any doPriv tokens—and, therefore,
the new thread may be privileged throughout its lifetime.
Chapter 5
Related and Future Work
To the author’s knowledge, the first known use of program modification to enforce
security policies was in 1969 in the Informer execution profiler [DG71] for the
Berkeley SDS 940 time-sharing system. In that system, modules—object code
program fragments typically hand-crafted in machine language—could be inserted
into the operating system kernel, where they gathered and filtered profiling events.
Informer would reject modules that used privileged instructions or whose execution
time could not be statically bounded. In accepted modules, each memory reference
machine instruction would be modified so it was preceded by a runtime check that
restricted the access to profiler memory.
Later, SFI [WLAG93] re-discovered the use of software modification to achieve
runtime protection more typically enforced by hardware. SFI, again, used a com-
bination of static analysis and program modification to enforce runtime memory-
protection guarantees [ATLLW96, Sma97]. Meanwhile, program rewriting had
been used for execution monitoring and debugging purposes in multiple special-
ized tools that, like Informer and SFI, implemented one particular fixed function-
ality, or policy [HJ92]. These evolved into ATOM [SE94], the first general-purpose
program rewriting mechanism, which implemented a policy-free instrumentation
framework that was used to construct several tools for execution monitoring.
Until recently, general-purpose security enforcement mechanisms were imple-
mented in the manner of traditional reference monitors—by interpositioning be-
tween hardware-supported security boundaries [Sal74, Tan92]. Two examples of
this approach are Generic Software Wrappers [FBF99] and Janus [Wag99], both of
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which intercepted calls to the operating system kernel [Gar03]. Recently, a system
has enhanced system-call interception with policies based on a security automata
variant [SVB+03].
Apart from in SASI and PSLang/PoET, rewriting programs for security en-
forcement has recently been used in work that continues this tradition of wrapping
system interfaces. Naccio [ET99] modifies method-call instructions, redirecting
them through a wrapper method; Ariel [PH98] and Grimm and Bershad [GB98]
mediate method calls by inserting enforcement code between JVML bytecode in-
structions.
These refinements of traditional reference monitors were spurred on by the ad-
vent of Java [GJS96], which both facilitated program modification and also spurred
interest in novel security mechanisms. Java 2’s stack inspection [Gon99, WF98] and
its successor by Abadi and Fournet [AF03] are two such novel mechanisms where
the security policy depends on the previous execution history. Deeds [EAC98] is
another, and more general, history-based access control mechanism for Java.
Relying on high-level languages for security policy enforcement was pioneered
with the Burroughs B5000 computer [Org73], which required that applications be
written in Algol [OT97]. This approach has recently been adopted not only in Java,
but also in the SPIN and Vino extensible operating systems [BSP+95, SESS96],
which respectively relied on Modula-3 and gcc compilers [Nel91, Woe94], and
the Agent TCL mobile code platform [Gra97], which relied on a Safe TCL in-
terpreter [OLW96]. In these systems, the use of a high-level language was imposed
either by only accepting source code, and performing compilation internally in
the systems, or through verification of a cryptographic signature [RSA78] that a
particular trusted compiler has been used.
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Java innovated by not requiring that the Java compiler be trusted, but only
requiring that its JVML [YL96] output be verifiable. A JVML program is verified
using a relatively simple analysis that can establish the type-safety of that program.
Such trustworthy analysis techniques have become an active area of research. Effi-
cient Code Certification [Koz98] can check the safety of memory, jump, and stack
operations. Typed Assembly Language [MWCG98] provides a flexible type-safe
assembly language that prevents abstractions from being violated. Most generally,
Proof-Carrying Code [Nec97] allows for the verification of arbitrary proofs of pro-
gram behavior and also considers the implications of distributing the establishment
and verification of properties between multiple parties [Nec98]. Such relocation of
security enforcement work allows for more agile deployment of security policies,
and has been explored by Sirer, Grimm, and Bershad [GB98, SGGB99, SGB+98].
Another current path of security research relies not on language-based guaran-
tees but, rather, on SFI-like runtime checks inserted during dynamic translation of
programs [SCK+92]. Program shepherding [KBA02] uses this approach to imple-
ment non-executable memory in programs for the Intel x86 [INT94]; Strata [SD02]
uses the same approach but implements a more general framework.
Even so, approaches that build upon language-based guarantees—like those
provided by Java and Microsoft’s .NET [BS02]—seem destined to dominate, be-
cause of their many advantages in addressing concerns about reliability, flexibility,
and security. However, type safety is no panacea, as shown by PSLang/PoET as
well as by attacks that manage to subvert type-safety guarantees, e.g., by inducing
random bit errors in memory hardware [AG03]. Even with a flexible enforcement
mechanism that builds upon type-safe foundations, many challenges remain, as
demonstrated in this dissertation.
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Recently, progress has been made in addressing those challenges. Bauer, Lig-
atti, and Walker, in particular, in a series of papers [BLW02b, BLW02a, BLW02c,
BLW03] have improved the theoretical foundations for IRMs to encompass static
analysis, non-terminating remedial actions, and the composition of such IRMs.
With Zdancewic, this theory has also been applied in the context of the aspect-
oriented programming methodology [WZL03, KLM+97], which shares many prop-
erties with IRMs. On another front, Hamlen, Morrisett, and Schneider have clari-
fied the connection between set-theoretic specification of safety properties and the
runtime enforcement of those properties, constraining enforcement mechanisms
to allow maximum progress for each program execution [HMS03]. Meanwhile,
the SLAM effort at Microsoft Research has successfully used model checking and
declarative reasoning to statically verify that Windows device-drivers (given as C
source code) can never violate a security-automata-based policy at runtime [BR02].
Future implementations of IRM toolkits can build on these additional formal
results and also make use of new results that formalize the connection between
partial-evaluation and IRMs [Thi03]. Such IRM toolkits should, therefore, make it
easier to understand IRMs that have been extended along the lines of §3.6, as well
as the composition of such IRMs. Those IRM toolkits should not only be more
trustworthy, by lending themselves better to analysis, but also be more efficient,
as they could make use of complete verifiable partial-evaluation frameworks in the
insertion and simplification of IRM enforcement code.
Preferably, the environment of future IRM toolkits would be designed to expose
common execution activity as security-relevant actions—eliminating the need for
their synthesis as security events, like described for JVML in §3.3.2. Also, those
future IRM toolkits could provide transactional support, perhaps along the lines
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of [HF03], for both security state and updates, as well as for the execution of target
program fragments. These two improvements might be combined with a standard
IRM runtime environment and a standard for IRM embedding and identification,
as discussed in §3.5. In this case, few obstacles would remain to wide-spread
deployment of the IRM approach.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
Security enforcement mechanisms have been one of the most influential factors in
the design of operating systems [Lam74] and remain a topic of research for all infras-
tructure systems [Sch99a]. Multi-processing, virtual machines, processes, isolated
address spaces, threads, inter-process communication, shared memory, kernels, and
microkernels, all aim to to share computing resources in a controlled, yet efficient,
manner that prevents both accidental and deliberate protection violations [Tan92].
These abstractions are the framework in which computing is currently performed;
however, their design primarily results from that of hardware-supported traditional
reference monitors. IRMs—combined with strong language-based guarantees—are
an alternative to this traditional design for protection and, as such, hold the po-
tential to fundamentally change the abstractions of computing.
IRMs are strictly more powerful than previous security enforcement mecha-
nisms, because IRMs can mediate more activity and because more information is
accessible to them. This makes IRMs especially well suited for the increasingly
common class of applications that form extensible systems. In addition to this ex-
pressive power, IRMs have the potential for greater efficiency, because they can be
customized to each activity—for instance, allowing trusted applications to execute
with zero security enforcement overhead.
IRM security policies are specified in a structured manner that allows the com-
plete details of their implementation and enforcement strategy to be given, along-
side their higher-level policy objectives. IRMs can enforce any practical security
policy, whether it be traditional access control or sandboxing, virtualization and
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isolation, or simply the auditing of execution activity—the extended notion of
IRMs discussed in §3.6 can even enforce liveness and other policies outside of the
class EM. Such IRM enforcement can build upon any notion of security primitives,
such as principals, objects, and authentication, e.g., by using results from static
analysis or the primitives of an underlying platform. IRMs can also themselves
implement any required security primitives, thus eliminating the need for security
support from the execution environment.
By specifying both intended security policies as well as their implementation
details, IRMs can provide higher assurance in security enforcement. Apart from
the IRM toolkit (which can be of moderate size), and the actual semantics of
low-level actions (such as fundamental ISA operations or operating system primi-
tives), a single isolated IRM specification captures all details relevant to security
enforcement. This makes protection more trustworthy, because the properties of
this IRM specification can be derived in isolation, through its examination, analy-
sis, and testing. By careful construction of the IRM primitives, such analysis and
declarative reasoning is placed on a sound foundation by the many formal results
on the general semantics of low-level languages [MWCG98] as well as recent results
specific to modification of program behavior [BLW03].
Because IRMs become an integral part of a secured application (and because
they comprise both a security policy and the means for its enforcement) the IRM
approach applies especially well to distributed settings, where trust may be de-
centralized. With IRMs, security enforcement can be effected anywhere from the
development of a software application, through its deployment and management,
to its execution by an end user—whether or not the final execution environment
explicitly supports IRMs. In addition, IRM security enforcement can make use
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of any existing trust relationships, such as trusted network connections or trusted
cryptographic data-signing keys.
This agility of IRMs in distributed settings allow their deployment to be crafted
so that security is enforced in the most cost-effective and trustworthy fashion. Any
IRM adoption will, however, most likely be based on IRM specifications provided
by the developers and vendors of software applications and platforms: Those par-
ties are most likely to understand the semantics and implementation details of
any particular APIs, and this knowledge is necessary for the correct synthesis of
fundamental security events. Even so, with the IRM approach, basic security spec-
ifications can be enhanced by interested parties, such as system administrators or
third-party security professionals, for instance, to allow greater usability or secu-
rity. Eventually, such enhancements might form a diverse market for IRM security
policy specifications tailored to every scenario.
IRMs form a general-purpose security enforcement mechanism that can be
practically implemented, as demonstrated by PSLang/PoET and this dissertation.
Their flexibility, end-to-end transparency, and many other advantages, make the
IRM approach to security policy enforcement an attractive framework for tackling
current challenges in computer security.
Appendix A
PoET and PSLang:
Java Inlined Reference Monitors
A.1 PSLang/PoET: Syntax and Semantics
PoET, the Policy Enforcement Toolkit, is a mechanism that rewrites the JVML
class files of target programs and inserts IRM enforcement code implementing a
reference monitor into those programs. The security policy to be enforced by
the IRM is defined in PSLang, the Policy Specification Language, and specifies
to PoET what security state the policy needs to keep for the target program,
what JVML actions identified or exposed by PoET are relevant to this policy,
and what security updates those security-relevant actions should trigger. PoET
can be seen as confining its duty to monitoring references—mediating to allow
security decisions to consider any JVML low-level action—and leaving it to PSLang
policies to specify how each monitored reference should be handled. However, as
PoET performs all the rewriting for IRM enforcement, PoET is also responsible
for inlining both the security state and updates specified by PSLang policies.
This appendix describes the syntax of PSLang security policies in an extended
form of Backus-Naur grammar notation [ASU85] and describes the semantics of
both PoET and PSLang in annotations to that grammar. The intent is neither to
formally specify the syntax nor the semantics but, rather, to enable a person famil-
iar with the Java language to understand PSLang policies and how they interact
with PoET.
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Policy: Preamble ( GlobalState )? ( Function Update )*
A PSLang security policy is given in a file with a .psl extension; such files
are input to the PoET rewriter along with the target program. Each PSLang
policy contains a description of a set of security events and the security updates
they should trigger. Updates can make use of global security state, which may be
optionally defined at the start of a PSLang file. To factor out activity that is com-
mon to more than one event, PSLang allows function definitions to be interspersed
between events.
PoET interprets the content of a PSLang policy in an environment containing
the global state and any functions defined (or forward-declared) up to that point.
Not only is the information in a PSLang policy interpreted by PoET in the sequence
it appears, but the runtime behavior of a PoET-inserted IRM also reflects the
relative order and construction of the policy. So, if two PSLang updates that
result in runtime IRM activity are triggered by the same JVML low-level action in
the target program, PoET ensures the IRM enforcement code executes at runtime
in the order given by the original PSLang policy.
Preamble: Extensions Libraries
Extensions: ( EXTEND POLICY policyFileName ; )*
Libraries: ( USES LIBRARY libraryFileName ; )*
The start of each PSLang policy can have a preamble that optionally specifies
a set of PSLang policies that the current policy extends. Each policy that is to
be extended should be a PSLang .psl policy file found in the current working
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directory of the file system. The policies in the list of Extensions may themselves
specify other policies to be extended and PoET will interpret the policies bottom-
up based on their order of appearance.
The starting preamble of a PSLang policy also specifies what libraries are
available to that policy. Libraries expand the set of abstractions and interfaces
available in the PSLang language using syntax similar to Abstract Data Types
(ADTs) [AHU74]. Like #include in C [HS94], library inclusion propagates from
extended policies, so that if policy A uses a library and is extended by policy B
then B also uses the library. Three PoET ADTs, Event, Reflect, and State,
described in §A.3.1, §A.3.2, and §A.3.3, are always available, even if not explicitly
included in Libraries, since their use is integral to any PSLang policy.
The set of available libraries is extendible by implementing a new Java (or
JVML) class in the PoET.runtime package. In the Java program for a library
class, all ADT operations to be exposed are given as public static methods whose
name is prefixed with either proc$ or, if they have no side effects, func$. The ADT
library operations are then invoked by their library name, a dot, and their method
name, as in: Event.classNameIs("Foo"). If a library exposes mutable state
to PSLang, that state must be encapsulated as an opaque object. For example,
Set.create() returns an object that can be used in other Set operations like
Set.size(SomeSetObject).
GlobalState: GLOBAL SECURITY STATE { ( VarDef ; )* }
VarDef : Type variableName = Expr
Type: ( Object boolean int double void )
Each PSLang policy can optionally define globally accessible state just after
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the Preamble. Global state consists of a set of variables (which must be initialized
to null or to some less trivial expression) that can be used directly by name
anywhere after being defined. Like all PSLang state, global state can only be of
a type supported by PSLang, where PSLang types are a subset of the Java types
that were chosen so information isn’t lost when casting to a PSLang type. The
initialization of global variables takes place before PoET rewrites or executes any
part of the target program. Thus, initialization expressions are executed, in the
order they appear, before anything else.
Function: ( SIDE-EFFECT-FREE )? FUNCTION FuncDef
FuncDef : Type functionName ( FormalArgs ) FuncBody
FormalArgs: ( FormalArg ( , FormalArg )* )?
FormalArg: Type argumentName
FuncBody: ( ; StmtBody )
As mentioned before, PSLang allows definitions of functions to factor out com-
mon policy code. A function definition specifies its return type (possibly void),
name, zero or more typed formal arguments, and, optionally, an implementa-
tion. To support mutual recursion, function bodies can be omitted, but each such
forward-declared function must be specified with an implementation somewhere in
the PSLang policy, exactly once.
PSLang is designed to support simplification by partial-evaluation-based tech-
niques, so functions can be declared to be side-effect free.1 Judicious use of side-
effect-free functions is the key to efficient PSLang policies, since such functions
primarily add overhead to the rewriting and not to the execution of the target
1It is the responsibility of the policy writer to ensure that functions so declared
actually have no side effects.
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program. PoET simplifies functions and updates by evaluating expressions and
side-effect-free functions in an environment of known information, including known
constants and information about the security-relevant action exposed through the
Event ADT of §A.3.1. All PSLang code is simplified in this manner, but side-
effect-free functions are simplified at least twice—first in the environment existing
at the time of their definition and again in environment existing at each point of
their use, effectively inlining their invocation.
One distinguished user-defined PSLang function, the stealthCheck function
is treated specially by PoET (and is side-effect free). This function exists to
help implement IRMs on commercial JVMs, where implementation irregularities
can preclude inlining arbitrary code. PSLang policies specify the implementa-
tion of a stealthCheck as a function returning a boolean, and accepting a sin-
gle Tuple ADT object argument. Then, on PoET events that should invoke the
stealthCheck at runtime, PSLang policies use a special JVML ADT operation
to pass arguments to the function, including the runtime PoET instance object
and a command string.2 PoET implements stealthCheck by leveraging JVML
virtual method calls to masquerade a call to the PSLang-defined function as a
java.lang.Object.equals method call in the inserted IRM code. This indirec-
tion allows the stealthCheck function to be called at runtime when the target
program executes without any perturbation of the order in which the JVM loads
its system classes.
Update: ON EVENT Event PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE StmtBody
Event : ActionName ( WITH Expr )?
2See the getSpecObject State ADT operation in §A.3.3.
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Updates are the heart of any PSLang policy, with each Update defining a set
of PSLang statements and an Event that specifies, for those statements, what
insertion points should be used by the rewriter and when to trigger them at run-
time. For any ActionName , or named JVML low-level action (detailed in the
next paragraphs), the optional WITH predicate expression allows for the synthesis
of a more relevant security event. The WITH expression is limited to calling only
side-effect-free functions, which ensures it can always be fully evaluated during
rewriting. This does not limit the expressible set of security events because the
ADTs likely to be used, in particular Event and Reflect of §A.3.1 and §A.3.2, are
side-effect-free, and other operations can be moved into the statement body.
Each JVML low-level action that is identified or exposed by PoET, is named in
PSLang by that action’s place, the structural part of the target program the action
is tied to. The PoET rewriter uses those places as insertion points for the IRM
enforcement code for the PSLang policy. Then, security updates are triggered at
runtime whenever target program activity occurs in those places. For example, a
PSLang policy update named with a method action and no WITH predicate will be
triggered whenever a thread in the target program executes a method.
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ActionName: ( ActionTime )? ActionPlace
ActionTime: ( at start of )? ( loading )?
at exception thrown in
at normal completion of
at finally completed ( loading )?
ActionPlace: program
class initialization
object instance initialization
object instance garbage collection
method
exception handler
basic block
instruction
PSLang policies can optionally refine the named JVML low-level action with
an ActionTime , which specifies whether the update is triggered before or after the
action occurs at runtime. The execution of an update’s statements can be triggered
at start of an action, i.e., immediately before the execution of that action at
runtime. Alternatively, the update may be triggered at the end of the action
(by using at normal completion), only if the activity throws an exception (at
exception thrown in), or at either of those two times (at finally completed).
If not specified for an update in a PSLang policy, at start of the action is the
default. The triggering of updates nests in the natural manner, with (several)
instructions in each basic block, basic blocks in exception handlers and methods,
and exception handlers in methods. Finally, as shown in Table A.1, initialization
and garbage collection are also named as a method action, as is the program action.
Table A.1 shows how PoET actions are named3 by each major JVML struc-
3As discussed in §3.3, the names in Table A.1 are simplistic, for example, only
providing “correct” semantics for the program actions for certain classes of single-
threaded target programs.
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Table A.1: The place of PoET low-level actions and their insertion points.
PoET ActionPlace Insertion point
program The main method in the target
program’s “main” class, as spec-
ified to PoET according to the
rules of §A.2.
class initialization The special JVML class initial-
ization method <clinit> of a
loaded class.
object instance initialization Every JVML object instance ini-
tialization method <init> of a
loaded class.
object instance garbage collection The JVML finalizermethod of
a loaded class.
method Every JVML method of a loaded
class (including those above in
this table).
exception handler Every exception handler in every
JVML method of a loaded class.
basic block Every basic block in every JVML
method of a loaded class.
instruction Every JVML instruction in every
JVML method of a loaded class.
tural element, which also determines their insertion point. As discussed earlier,
specification of an ActionTime can refine the semantics of each insertion point in
Table A.1, so that IRM enforcement code will be triggered either before or after
the program’s runtime execution at that place. Not shown in Table A.1 is the
nesting of PoET actions. Just as a JVML method always consists of one or more
JVML instruction, one or more PoET instruction actions are embedded within a
PoET method action. At runtime one action may be nested within another action,
such that all updates for certain instructions are triggered between the triggering
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of updates at the beginning and end of those instruction’s method.
PoET can also trigger updates before and after loading each structural com-
ponent, or place, in the target program from its class file, deriving the order for
loading from that of the Java ClassLoader [GJS96, Gon99]. Static rewriting (also
discussed in §A.2) creates special difficulties for load-time updates as it introduces a
program load-time that is disjoint from execution time. Thus, if static rewriting is
used, PSLang policies must be careful not to specify load-time updates that refers
to runtime information.4 Because of this limitation, PSLang load-time updates
should primarily initialize and maintain information on target program structure
and insert target program security state.
StmtBody: { ( Statement )* }
Statement : VarDef ;
variableName = Expr ;
if (Expr ) StmtBody ( else StmtBody )?
while (Expr ) StmtBody
for (VarDef ;Expr ;AssignExpr ) StmtBody
FunctionCallExpr ;
return Expr ;
FAIL [ Expr ] ;
StmtBody
The PoET structure of named low-level actions, shown in Table A.1, lacks all
details such as the name of classes or methods. The predicate expressions and
statement body of PSLang updates allows for the examination of such details and
for the synthesis of higher-level security events. The use of the Event, Reflect,
and State PoET ADTs, described in §A.3.1, §A.3.2, and §A.3.3, is integral to the
interpretation of each action in Table A.1.
4This limitation could be partially alleviated by persisting all security state
(e.g., using Java serialization) at the end of static rewriting and restoring that
state when execution begins. Currently, this is not implemented in PoET.
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Expr : Expr || Expr
Expr && Expr
Expr == Expr
Expr != Expr
Expr <= Expr

same precedence
Expr < Expr
Expr >= Expr
Expr > Expr
Expr | Expr
Expr ̂ Expr
Expr & Expr
Expr + Expr
}
same precedence
Expr - Expr
Expr * Expr
Expr / Expr
 same precedence
Expr % Expr
- Expr
! Expr
 same precedence∼ Expr
variableName
Constant
FunctionCallExpr
( Expr )
PSLang statements inherit their semantics mostly from Java [GJS96] and indi-
rectly from C [HS94]. The most noteworthy exception is guaranteed simplification
based on partial evaluation that produces, for example, the inlining of side-effect-
free function calls. Expressions using conditional operators are always short-circuit
evaluated—even during simplification—with control flow potentially simplifying as
expected. The for statement encodes a while statement, as in C [HS94], but for
is further constrained in its pre- and post-statements. The break or continue of
Java are not supported, because their behavior can be programmed using multiple
functions and return. The FAIL statement can be thought of as a function that
prints its argument as a string and then halts the JVM.
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PSLang expressions, like PSLang statements, inherit their semantics mostly
from Java [GJS96], with the exception of guaranteed simplification. PSLang ex-
pressions operate on the limited set of PSLang types, propagating them as in Java.
Operator precedence is non-surprising and, as mentioned before, logical operators
short-circuit. Left-to-right order of evaluation is guaranteed for all operators, in-
cluding those of equal precedence.
Constant : ( StrConst IntConst DblConst true false null )
Constant expressions in PSLang are like those in Java [GJS96], for the subset
of types supported in PSLang; strings and null are the only Object constants.
PSLang does not support any escape sequences in string constants.
FunctionCallExpr : functionName ( ( Expr ( ,Expr )* )? )
PSLang function calls are as expected, with argument expressions evaluated in
left-to-right order.
A.2 PoET Invocation and Runtime
PoET is invoked with a PSLang policy by calling the public method main in the
class PoET.Main, which in most Java environments can be specified on the com-
mand line. The arguments to PoET are an array of strings of the following form:
javaCommand PoET.Main [ options ] policy
< -classes listFile | MainClass args... >
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The primary non-optional argument to PoET is the name of a PSLang policy
(which can be a file path, but should exclude the .psl suffix). PoET applies this
policy in one of two modes: statically on a list of classes specified in a file or
dynamically on a running Java program as it loads classes during execution. To
run PoET in the first mode, the -classes argument is given followed by a text file
listing classes by their JVML name (using “/” as package separator), one class on
each line. The first class listed in this file is taken to be the main program class—
that is, the class containing the main method on which PoET triggers the program
event. When PoET runs in the second mode, the name of the main program class
is given on the command line and PoET calls its main method with the remaining
command-line arguments.
The javaCommand used to execute PoET.Main should have a classpath to the
PoET classes, either through a CLASSPATH shell environment variable or through
an explicit argument, like -cp poetPath , that sets the path. At runtime, PoET
must know this file path, the root of its installation directory, and refers to the
PoET.path Java property value for that information. If PoET is not installed in
the default directory, c:\poetdist on Microsoft Windows, the PoET.path property
can be set with a javaCommand argument, e.g., -DPoET.path=e:\poet.
[-silent] Suppress all PoET output
[-debug] Prints extra debug information
[-in paths] Input classpaths (‘‘-in .;..’’)
[-out path] Path to output PoET-processed classes
[-java2support] Java2-support classes in runtime
The options for PoET include the ability to produce no output, with -silent,
allowing non-corrupted target program output, and the ability to produce verbose
output, with -debug. PoET loads class files from the current working directory or
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from paths given with the -in option. If PoET is run with the -out option then it
will output all class files it uses at runtime (including the PoET runtime library) to
the path specified there. Finally, if PoET is given the -java2support option, then
it will include in the PoET runtime versions of the Java 2 classes supporting stack
inspection, allowing the policies of §B.5 and §B.6 to enable that type of security
with older Java class libraries.
A.3 PSLang Libraries for PoET
The following three ADT libraries form a key component of PoET semantics that
allows PSLang to specify a finer granularity of actions than the ActionName syn-
tax of §A.1 and also allows the synthesis of higher-level security events. For each
PSLang Update , the Event library exposes a reflective data type that allows the
inspection and modification of target program structure at the place (or inser-
tion point) of the update. For this purpose, the opaque ADTs exposed by the
Event library are used as arguments to ADT operations in the Reflect and State
libraries. Thus, the return value of Event.class() can be used as the argument
to Reflect.className(arg) to retrieve the name of the class in which an event
is occurring.
A.3.1 The Event Library
The Event is intended for primary use in the WITH expression of an Event . The
library exposes a set of opaque objects that allow inspection and modification of
elements of the target program. All ADT operations in the Event library are
side-effect free and, therefore, can be used in event predicate expressions or in the
statements of their security updates.
137
Object Event.class()
Object Event.method()
Object Event.instruction()
The above three operations return opaque reflection objects for the current inser-
tion point—that is, the place of the current action. Depending on the action’s place
(i.e., the ActionPlace ), the Event.instruction() may return null ; however, all
actions are guaranteed to be placed in classes and all instructions are guaranteed
to be placed in methods.
Object Event.classSource()
int Event.basicBlockLen()
Object Event.basicBlockInstr(int ithInstruction)
The Event.classSource operation returns a URL to the source of the current
class, such as, for instance, file://c:/Main.class. The remaining two operations
can be used with basic block and instruction actions, allowing retrieval of reflective
objects for individual instructions in the basic block.5
boolean Event.classNameIs(Object nameString)
boolean Event.methodNameIs(Object nameString)
boolean Event.methodTypeIs(Object typeString)
boolean Event.instructionIs(Object nameString)
boolean Event.methodPrototypeIs(Object javaPrototypeString)
The first four operations above are shorthand for common reflective inspection
activity. For example, the first saves the PSLang policy writer from passing
the Event.class() object to Reflect.className and comparing the result with
JVML.strEq. The fifth operation goes a step further and allows PSLang policy
5Note that these operations allow several simple analysis to be directly encoded
in PSLang policies; for example, they allow the analysis for the policy of Figure 2.4
that is discussed in a footnote on page 27.
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writers to specify method names as in Java prototypes, instead of by using the
awkward JVML notation.
A.3.2 The Reflect Library
The Reflect library provides reflective operations on the attributes of Event ob-
jects. Like the Event library, all ADT operations in the Reflect library are side-
effect-free. For brevity, not all possible Reflect library operations corresponding
to JVML structural elements are shown below.
Object Reflect.instrName(Object instruction)
Object Reflect.instrClassName(Object instruction)
Object Reflect.instrRefStr(Object instruction)
Object Reflect.instrRefClassName(Object instruction)
Object Reflect.instrRefName(Object instruction)
Object Reflect.instrRefType(Object instruction)
The above operations return for an Event.instruction() a string of the instruc-
tion opcode name or its JVML class name argument if the instruction only operates
on classes. Otherwise, if the instruction references a field or method in a class or
object, a string with the full class name, / separator, and the name and type of
the class member can be retrieved. The last three operations individually return
the components of class member references; of these three, the last does not return
a string, but a Reflect.type object, that is to say, an object that may be passed
to Reflect.type operations.
Object Reflect.methodName(Object method)
Object Reflect.methodType(Object method)
boolean Reflect.methodIsEmpty(Object method)
For an Event.method() object, the above operations return a string of the method
name (excluding its class or package name), the method’s Reflect.type object,
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and a boolean indicating whether the method is effect-free (i.e., contains only null
operations), respectively.
Object Reflect.methodAccess(Object method)
boolean Reflect.methodIsSynchronized(Object method)
boolean Reflect.methodIsNative(Object method)
The above operations return the method’s Reflect.access object, in the first
operation, and Booleans, in the next two, that indicate whether the method is
synchronized or native (i.e., locked or referring to a non-JVML implementation).
Tuple Reflect.methodExceptions(Object method)
boolean Reflect.methodThrows(Object method,
Object exceptionName)
Tuple Reflect.methodExceptionHandlers(Object method)
For methods, a Tuple library object of the names of exceptions declared to be
thrown by the method can be retrieved. Alternatively, the second operation above
allows querying whether the method throws an exception by giving its string name.
The third operation allows retrieval of a Tuple of the actual exception handlers
within the method’s code.
Object Reflect.className(Object class)
Object Reflect.classSuperName(Object class)
Tuple Reflect.classInterfaces(Object class)
boolean Reflect.classImplements(Object class,
Object interfaceName)
For an Event.class() object, the first operation above returns a string of the
class name. The superclass of the class (i.e., the class’s immediate ancestor in the
class hierarchy) can be retrieved as a string. (The empty string is returned for
the root of the class hierarchy.) A Tuple library object of the names of interfaces
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implemented by the class can be retrieved, and this set can alternatively be queried
directly by name.
Object Reflect.classAccess(Object class)
boolean Reflect.classIsInterface(Object class)
Tuple Reflect.classFields(Object class)
Finally, for a class, its Reflect.access object can be retrieved, as can its status
as an interface (as opposed to a “real” class). The final operation returns a Tuple
of objects to be accessed by the Reflect.field operations below.
Object Reflect.fieldName(Object field)
Object Reflect.fieldType(Object field)
Object Reflect.fieldAccess(Object field)
boolean Reflect.fieldIsVolatile(Object field)
boolean Reflect.fieldIsTransient(Object field)
For each object representing a class or object field, the name and Reflect.type
object can be retrieved. The last three operations return the member variable’s
Reflect.access object and Booleans showing whether it’s volatile or transient.
Object Reflect.typeStr(Object type)
boolean Reflect.typeIsMethod(Object type)
boolean Reflect.typeIsObject(Object type)
boolean Reflect.typeIsArray(Object type)
For each object representing a type, a properly formatted string naming the JVML
type can be retrieved. Also, the type can be examined to show whether it’s referring
to a method call (i.e., a list of formal arguments and a return type), whether it’s
any type of object, or whether it is an array type.
Tuple Reflect.typeMethodArgTypes(Object methodType)
Object Reflect.typeMethodRetType(Object methodType)
Object Reflect.typeObjectClassName(Object objectType)
Object Reflect.typeArrayType(Object arrayType)
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For the more complex types, type objects for the actual formal arguments of the
method type can be retrieved, as can its return type. For object types, the JVML
class name of the object can be examined. Finally, for array types the type of the
array elements can be retrieved (note that the element type can also be an array
type).
boolean Reflect.accessStatic(Object access)
boolean Reflect.accessPublic(Object access)
boolean Reflect.accessPrivate(Object access)
boolean Reflect.accessProtected(Object access)
boolean Reflect.accessPackage(Object access)
boolean Reflect.accessFinal(Object access)
boolean Reflect.accessAbstract(Object access)
For access objects, whether the access is static, public, private, protected, package,
final, or abstract can be retrieved. Note that these may or may not apply or be
combined depending on what JVML structural element they describe access.
A.3.3 The State Library
The State library allows the examination and modification of the state of JVML
structural elements. In this library, only the reading of state is considered side-
effect-free—although this might be moot because only the rewriter makes use of
this distinction (to direct simplification) and this library is typically used later, at
runtime.
Very importantly, although this section only shows the integer version of State
library operations, appropriate operations exist for all PSLang types—in particu-
lar, for objects and floating-point doubles. The syntax for the State operation of
these other types is as expected. The operations for object instances are useful,
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because they allow the addition of Tuple and other PSLang data-structure state
to elements of the target program.
void State.classAddInt(Object class, Object fieldName)
void State.classSetInt(int value, Object classAndFieldName)
int State.classGetInt(Object classAndFieldName)
The above operations allow PSLang policies to add named integer state values to
JVML classes in the target program and then to read and write them. The addition
operation—which takes an Event.class() object and a name for the integer field
to be added to that class—must be used before operations that access the integer.
This means the addition operation should be invoked in a PSLang update guar-
anteed to be triggered at runtime before any other updates where the added field
may be used; practically, this means the addition should be triggered at a load-time
class initialization action. The read and write operations on the added variable
must specify the full field name in JVML format (e.g., /java/io/Foo/barName)
and can be used in all runtime PSLang updates.
void State.instanceAddInt(Object class,
Object fieldName)
void State.instanceSetInt(Object instance, int value,
Object classAndFieldName)
int State.instanceGetInt(Object instance,
Object classAndFieldName)
The above three operations add and access integer instance variables in objects.
These operations exactly correspond to the State.class operations above, and
they are used in the same manner. The only difference is an extra argument—of
the actual object instance—to the access operations that read and write the added
field.
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The PSLang policy writer must use these operations to access only object
instances whose type is a class where they’ve added the instance variable (and this
can be tricky because fields may be inherited into subclasses). PSLang writers
can simplify this, and their life, by sacrificing some performance and checking the
object type at runtime using a JVML library operation.6
void State.methodAddInt(Object method, Object variableName)
void State.methodSetInt(int value, Object variableName)
int State.methodGetInt(Object variableName)
Local state can also be added to individual methods, using the above three oper-
ations, which are analogous to the State.class operations. In these operations,
the name of the added variable need not be in JVML member format, but can be
an arbitrary string as long as it does not start with $.
$instance Current object instance, if not a static method
$methodArgK K-th argument to the current method (starting at 1)
$methodRet Return value of the current method
$instrArgK K-th runtime argument to this instruction (start at 1)
$instrRet Value returned (on the stack) by the current instruction
$exception Exception object for the current exception (in handlers)
State.method operations are also used expose to PSLang certain critical state
about PoET method actions. Thus, the operations are overloaded to access state
of the methods that existed in the target program, as well as the state added
by PoET. This pre-existing state includes, e.g., the method arguments, and is
distinguished by being available only at runtime PoET method actions (or actions
nested within them at runtime, as discussed in §A.1). This state is described in
6One possible enhancement to PoET might be to make all objects in the target
program implement an interface allowing access to added state. This would not,
however, remove the need for dynamically checking the object instance’s type to
determine whether the added field has any meaning for the object.
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the box above, which also gives the special variable names used by PSLang policies
to access this state.
Object State.getSpecObject()
Finally, in the State library, the above operation allows retrieval of the runtime
object instance that represents this PSLang policy. This operation is primarily used
to implement the stealthCheck described in §A.1, as these checks masquerade as
object equality tests against this runtime object instance.
Appendix B
PSLang Security Policies
The examples in this appendix are specific to Java 2 and Sun’s JDK 1.2.
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B.1 IRM Integrity Policy for JVML Bytecodes
IMPORT LIBRARY JVML;
//
// PoET defines the unique prefix of names for this IRM instance
//
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION boolean isIRM(Object string) {
return JVML.strStartsWith(string,#irmInstanceNamePrefix#);
}
ON EVENT at start of loading class initialization
WITH isIRM( Reflect.className(Event.class()) )
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
FAIL[ "Cannot declare class with IRM prefix" ];
}
ON EVENT at start of loading class initialization
WITH isIRM( Reflect.classSuperName(Event.class()) )
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
FAIL[ "Cannot inherit from class with IRM prefix" ];
}
ON EVENT at start of loading instruction
WITH Event.instructionIs("new")
&& isIRM( Reflect.instrClassName(Event.instruction()) )
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
FAIL[ "Cannot allocate object with IRM prefix" ];
}
ON EVENT at start of loading instruction
WITH ( Event.instructionIs("invokevirtual")
|| Event.instructionIs("invokeinterface")
|| Event.instructionIs("invokespecial")
|| Event.instructionIs("invokestatic") )
&& isIRM( Reflect.instrRefStr(Event.instruction()) )
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
FAIL[ "Cannot access method with IRM prefix" ];
}
ON EVENT at start of loading instruction
WITH ( Event.instructionIs("putfield")
|| Event.instructionIs("getfield")
|| Event.instructionIs("putstatic")
|| Event.instructionIs("getstatic") )
&& isIRM( Reflect.instrRefStr(Event.instruction()) )
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
FAIL[ "Cannot access field with IRM prefix" ];
}
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B.2 IRM Integrity Policy for Reflection
IMPORT LIBRARY JVML;
IMPORT LIBRARY Tuple;
IMPORT LIBRARY Stack;
//
// PoET defines the unique prefix of names for this IRM instance
//
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION boolean isIRM(Object string) {
return JVML.strStartsWith(string,#irmInstanceNamePrefix#);
}
//
// Helper: We are restricting methods in java.lang.Class
//
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION boolean isReflection(Object strMethodName) {
return Event.classNameIs("java/lang/Class")
&& Event.methodNameIs(strMethodName);
}
//
// Prevent access by name to IRM classes
//
ON EVENT at start of method WITH isReflection("forName")
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
if( isIRM(State.methodGetObject("$methodArg1")) ) {
JVML.throwException("java/lang/ClassNotFoundException");
}
}
//
// Prevent access by name to IRM fields and elide them from listings
//
ON EVENT at start of method
WITH isReflection("getField") || isReflection("getDeclaredField")
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
if( isIRM(State.methodGetObject("$methodArg1")) )
JVML.throwException("java/lang/NoSuchFieldException");
}
ON EVENT at normal completion of method
WITH isReflection("getFields") || isReflection("getDeclaredFields")
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Object oldRet = Tuple.createArray( State.methodGetObject("$methodRet") );
Object retStack = Stack.create();
for( int i = 0; i < Tuple.size(oldRet); i = i+1 ) {
Object f = JVML.typeCast(Tuple.get(oldRet,i),"java/lang/reflect/Field");
Object name = JVML.objectInvokeMethod("java/lang/Class","getName",
"()Ljava/lang/String;",f);
if( ! isIRM(name) ) {
retStack.push( f );
}
}
Object rs = Stack.toTuple( retStack );
Object ret = JVML.typeCast(Tuple.toArray(rs),"[Ljava/lang/reflect/Field;");
State.methodPutObject( "$methodRet", ret );
}
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B.3 Blocking use of a Java Package
IMPORT LIBRARY JVML;
//
// Define the packages and classes we are restricting use of
// This example blocks all use of reflection.
//
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION boolean isBlocked(Object string) {
if(JVML.strStartsWith(string,"java/lang/Class")) { return true; }
if(JVML.strStartsWith(string,"java/lang/reflect/")) { return true; }
return false;
}
ON EVENT at start of loading class initialization
WITH isBlocked( Reflect.className(Event.class()) )
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
FAIL[ "Cannot declare class in package" ];
}
ON EVENT at start of loading class initialization
WITH isBlocked( Reflect.classSuperName(Event.class()) )
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
FAIL[ "Cannot inherit from class in package" ];
}
ON EVENT at start of loading instruction
WITH Event.instructionIs("new")
&& isBlocked( Reflect.instrClassName(Event.instruction()) )
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
FAIL[ "Cannot allocate object in package" ];
}
ON EVENT at start of loading instruction
WITH ( Event.instructionIs("invokevirtual")
|| Event.instructionIs("invokeinterface")
|| Event.instructionIs("invokespecial")
|| Event.instructionIs("invokestatic") )
&& isBlocked( Reflect.instrRefStr(Event.instruction()) )
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
FAIL[ "Cannot access method in package" ];
}
ON EVENT at start of loading instruction
WITH ( Event.instructionIs("putfield")
|| Event.instructionIs("getfield")
|| Event.instructionIs("putstatic")
|| Event.instructionIs("getstatic") )
&& isBlocked( Reflect.instrRefStr(Event.instruction()) )
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
FAIL[ "Cannot access field in package" ];
}
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B.4 Static Resolution of Virtual Method Calls
IMPORT LIBRARY JVML;
IMPORT LIBRARY Association;
IMPORT LIBRARY Lock;
/* Initialize policy state: the virtual method map
*/
GLOBAL SECURITY STATE {
Object virtualMethodMap = Association.create();
Object virtualMethodMapLock = Lock.create();
}
/* Map helpers
*/
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION Object cloneSuperClassMethods(Object class) {
Object o = Association.get(virtualMethodMap,Reflect.classSuperName(class));
if( o != null ) {
return Association.clone(o);
}
return Association.create();
}
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION Object getClassMethods(Object className) {
return Association.get(virtualMethodMap, className);
}
/*
** Each new class inherits all virtual methods from parent class
*/
ON EVENT at start of loading class initialization
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Lock.acquire( virtualMethodMapLock );
Object dad = cloneSuperClassMethods( Event.class() );
Association.put(virtualMethodMap, Reflect.className(Event.class()), dad);
Lock.release( virtualMethodMapLock );
}
// For each newly defined method, is it a virtual definition?
// NOTE: Should handle class and object initializers in another policy
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION boolean nonVirtualMethod(Object method) {
return Reflect.accessStatic(Reflect.methodAccess(method))
|| Reflect.accessFinal(Reflect.methodAccess(method))
|| JVML.strEq(Reflect.methodName(method),"<clinit>")
|| JVML.strEq(Reflect.methodName(method),"<init>");
}
/*
** Each virtual method defined in a class overrides any from a parent
*/
ON EVENT at start of loading method
WITH ! nonVirtualMethod(Event.method())
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Lock.acquire( virtualMethodMapLock );
Object map = getClassMethods( Reflect.className(Event.class()) );
Association.put( map,
Reflect.methodName(Event.method()),
Reflect.className(Event.class()) );
Lock.release( virtualMethodMapLock );
}
150
/* For an invokevirtual instruction, its real target code
*/
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION
Object realVirtualCallClassName(Object instruction, Object methodName) {
Lock.acquire( virtualMethodMapLock );
Object callClassName = Reflect.instrRefClassName(instruction);
Object virtualMethods = Association.get(virtualMethodMap, callClassName);
if( virtualMethods != null ) {
return Association.get(virtualMethods, methodName);
}
Object realName = Association.get(virtualMethods, methodName);
Lock.release( virtualMethodMapLock );
return realName;
}
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION
boolean isVirtualCallTo(Object instr, Object cName, Object mName) {
Object realClassName = realVirtualCallClassName(instr, mName);
return JVML.strEq(cName, realClassName);
}
/*
** Helper function for users of this policy
*/
FUNCTION void restrictVirtualMethod(Object cName, Object mName) {
Lock.acquire( virtualMethodMapLock );
Object methodMap = getClassMethods( cName );
if( methodMap == null ) {
methodMap = Association.create();
Association.put(virtualMethodMap, cName, methodMap);
}
Association.put( methodMap, mName, cName );
Lock.release( virtualMethodMapLock );
}
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION
boolean virtualCallTo(Object instr, Object cName, Object mName) {
return JVML.strEq( Reflect.instrName(instr), "invokevirtual" )
&& isVirtualCallTo(instr, cName, mName);
}
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B.5 PSLang Formulation of IRMSPS
IMPORT LIBRARY JVML;
IMPORT LIBRARY System;
IMPORT LIBRARY Stack;
IMPORT LIBRARY Java2Permissions;
//
// define the default permissions and doPriv token
//
GLOBAL SECURITY STATE {
Object doPrivToken = Lock.create();
Object defaultPerms = Java2Permissions.createAllDomain("");
}
//
// limit most rewriting to application classes and methods
//
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION boolean appClass() {
return ! JVML.strStartsWith(Reflect.className(Event.class()),"java/");
}
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION boolean appMethod() {
return appClass() && ! Event.methodNameIs("<clinit>");
}
//
// initialize extra member in loaded classes with default permissions
//
ON EVENT at start of loading class initialization
WITH appClass()
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
State.classAddObject(Event.class(), "siDomain");
}
ON EVENT at start of class initialization
WITH appClass()
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
State.classSetObject(defaultPerms, "siDomain");
}
//
// create the domainStack at the start of the application
//
ON EVENT at start of loading class initialization
WITH Event.classNameIs("java/lang/Thread")
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
State.classAddObject(Event.class(), "domainStack");
}
ON EVENT at start of program
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Object stack = Stack.create();
Object thread = JVML.typeCast(System.currentThread(),"java/lang/Thread");
State.instanceSetObject(thread, stack, "java/lang/Thread/domainStack");
System.useSecurityManager();
}
//
// Maintain domainStack at method calls
//
ON EVENT at start of method
WITH appMethod()
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Object thread = JVML.typeCast(System.currentThread(), "java/lang/Thread");
Object stack = State.instanceGetObject(thread,"java/lang/Thread/domainStack");
Stack.push(stack, State.classGetObject("siDomain"));
}
ON EVENT at finally completed method
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WITH appMethod()
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Object thread = JVML.typeCast(System.currentThread(), "java/lang/Thread");
Object stack = State.instanceGetObject(thread,"java/lang/Thread/domainStack");
Object discard = Stack.pop( stack );
}
//
// on doPrivileged, push the doPriv token onto the domainStack
//
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION boolean doPrivilegedCall(Object instr) {
return Event.instructionIs("invokestatic")
&& JVML.strEq(Reflect.instrRefStr(instr),
JVML.strCat("java/security/AccessController/doPrivileged",
"(Ljava/security/PrivilegedAction;)Ljava/lang/Object;"));
}
ON EVENT at start of instruction
WITH doPrivilegedCall(Event.instruction())
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Object thread = JVML.typeCast(System.currentThread(), "java/lang/Thread");
Object stack = State.instanceGetObject(thread, "java/lang/Thread/domainStack");
Stack.push( stack, doPrivToken );
}
ON EVENT at finally completed instruction
WITH doPrivilegedCall(Event.instruction())
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Object thread = JVML.typeCast(System.currentThread(), "java/lang/Thread");
Object stack = State.instanceGetObject(thread, "java/lang/Thread/domainStack");
Object discard = Stack.pop( stack );
}
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//
// Check the domainStack on a checkPermission
//
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION boolean checkPermissionCall(Object instr) {
return Event.instructionIs("invokestatic")
&& JVML.strEq(Reflect.instrRefStr(instr),
JVML.strCat("java/security/AccessController/",
"checkPermission(Ljava/security/Permission;)V"));
}
ON EVENT at start of instruction
WITH checkPermissionCall(Event.instruction())
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Object permissionToCheck = State.methodGetObject("$instrArg1");
Object thread = JVML.typeCast(System.currentThread(), "java/lang/Thread");
Object stack = State.instanceGetObject(thread,"java/lang/Thread/domainStack");
Object stackCopy = Stack.clone(stack);
boolean finished = false;
Object prevDomain = null;
while( !finished && !Stack.empty(stackCopy) ) {
Object domain = Stack.pop(stackCopy);
if( domain == doPrivToken ) {
finished = true;
if( !Stack.empty(stackCopy) ) {
domain = Stack.pop(stackCopy);
}
}
if( domain != null
&& domain != prevDomain
&& ! Java2Permissions.implies(domain, permissionToCheck) )
{
FAIL[ JVML.strCat4("DOMAIN ",domain,
"DOESN’T IMPLY ",permissionToCheck) ];
}
prevDomain = domain;
}
}
//
// clone the domainStack whenever a thread is created
//
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION boolean newThreadCreation(Object instr) {
return Event.instructionIs("invokespecial")
&& JVML.strEq(Reflect.instrRefClassName(instr), "java/lang/Thread")
&& JVML.strEq(Reflect.instrRefName(instr), "<init>");
}
ON EVENT at normal completion of instruction
WITH newThreadCreation(Event.instruction())
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Object newThread = State.methodGetObject("$instrArg1");
Object oldT = JVML.typeCast(System.currentThread(), "java/lang/Thread");
Object oldS = State.instanceGetObject(oldT, "java/lang/Thread/domainStack");
Object newStack = Stack.clone( oldS );
State.instanceSetObject(newThread, newStack, "java/lang/Thread/domainStack");
}
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B.6 PSLang Formulation for IRMLazy
IMPORT LIBRARY JVML;
IMPORT LIBRARY System;
IMPORT LIBRARY Association;
IMPORT LIBRARY Stack;
IMPORT LIBRARY Tuple;
IMPORT LIBRARY Java2Permissions;
GLOBAL SECURITY STATE {
Object classToDomain = Association.create();
Object defaultPerms = Java2Permissions.createDomain("",
"java.lang.RuntimePermission:createClassLoader");
Object domainPerms = Java2Permissions.createAllDomain("");
}
// constant that tells us to ignore top two stack frames
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION int stackSkipPart() { return 2; }
//
// Add thread-local security state to java.lang.Thread
//
ON EVENT at start of loading class initialization
WITH Event.classNameIs("java/lang/Thread")
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
// is this thread a security-relevant thread, i.e., not a deamon thread?
State.instanceAddInt(Event.class(), "notDeamon");
// stack of call stacks of ancestral threads, at thread-creation time
State.instanceAddObject(Event.class(), "parentStacks");
// stack of doPriv call-frames, always relative to curr thread call stack
State.instanceAddObject(Event.class(), "privStack");
// ”collapsed” parentStacks, lazily computed at first checkPermission
State.instanceAddObject(Event.class(), "parentTuple");
}
//
// add domain state for each class at load time, init to correct domain
//
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION boolean appClass() {
return ! JVML.strStartsWith(Reflect.className(Event.class()),"java/");
}
ON EVENT at start of class initialization
WITH appClass()
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Object class = JVML.getClassByName(Reflect.className(Event.class()));
Association.put(classToDomain, class, domainPerms);
}
//
// set the initial empty stack when the program begins
//
ON EVENT at start of program
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
// this is a security-relevant thread
Object thread = JVML.typeCast(System.currentThread(), "java/lang/Thread");
State.instanceSetInt(thread, 1, "java/lang/Thread/notDeamon");
// empty ancestral call stack
Object parents = Stack.create();
State.instanceSetObject(thread, parents, "java/lang/Thread/parentStacks");
// empty doPriv stack
Object privs = Stack.create();
State.instanceSetObject(thread, privs, "java/lang/Thread/privStack");
// use security manager
System.useSecurityManager();
}
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//
// Create parentStacks for child thread: copy parentStacks & add curr stack
//
FUNCTION Object childParentStacks(Object parentStacks, Object thisStack) {
Object ret = Stack.clone( parentStacks );
Stack.push( ret, thisStack );
return ret;
}
//
// Create parentStacks for a child thread constructed inside a doPriv block
//
FUNCTION Object computePrivChildParentStacks(int first, Object thisStack) {
// get privileged part of stack---keep PoET part of stack: it’s expected
int privSize = Tuple.size(thisStack) - first + 1;
Object privStack = Tuple.create( privSize ); {
for(int i = 0; i < privSize; i = i+1) {
Tuple.put(privStack, i, Tuple.get(thisStack, i));
}
}
// return a stack of one elementStack
Object newDads = Stack.create();
Stack.push( newDads, privStack );
return newDads;
}
//
// combine ancestral ”stack of stacks” into one tuple of parent stack frames
//
FUNCTION Object computeParentTuple(Object parentStacks) {
// compute size of collapsed stack, always ignoring PoET at each bottom
Object reverseStacks = Stack.create();
int size = 0; {
while( ! Stack.empty(parentStacks) ) {
Object elementStack = Stack.pop( parentStacks );
size = size + Tuple.size(elementStack) - stackSkipPart();
Stack.push( reverseStacks, elementStack );
}
}
// copy into return tuple, and re-create parentStacks from reverseStacks
Object ret = Tuple.create(size); {
int pos = size - 1;
while( ! Stack.empty(reverseStacks) ) {
Object elementStack = Stack.pop( reverseStacks );
int elementSize = Tuple.size(elementStack);
for(int i = elementSize-1; i >= stackSkipPart(); i=i-1) {
Tuple.put(ret, pos, Tuple.get(elementStack, i));
pos = pos - 1;
}
Stack.push( parentStacks, elementStack );
}
}
return ret;
}
//
// clone threadStack whenever a thread is created
// NOTE: This follows Sun’s Java2 implementation so a thread created inside
// doPriv block is privileged for all of its lifetime
// NOTE: A thread created inside a doPriv never has to check it’s parents’
// stack frames before the doPriv, hence we trim that prefix away
//
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION boolean newThreadCreation(Object instr) {
return Event.instructionIs("invokespecial")
&& JVML.strStartsWith(Reflect.instrRefStr(instr),"java/lang/Thread/<init>");
}
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ON EVENT at normal completion of instruction
WITH newThreadCreation(Event.instruction())
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
// get security state in current thread
Object this = JVML.typeCast(System.currentThread(),"java/lang/Thread");
Object dads = State.instanceGetObject(this,"java/lang/Thread/parentStacks");
Object privs = State.instanceGetObject(this,"java/lang/Thread/privStack");
// create and initialize security state in new thread
Object child = State.methodGetObject("$instrArg1");
Object newPrivs = Stack.create();
State.instanceSetObject(child, newPrivs, "java/lang/Thread/privStack");
State.instanceSetInt(child, 1, "java/lang/Thread/notDeamon");
// compute child’s parentStacks---use only curr stack if we’re in doPriv
Object thisStack = System.stackTrace();
if( Stack.empty(privs) ) {
Object ndads = childParentStacks(dads, thisStack);
State.instanceSetObject(child, ndads, "java/lang/Thread/parentStacks");
} else {
int privEnd = JVML.toInt( Stack.peek(privs) );
Object ndads = computePrivChildParentStacks(privEnd, thisStack);
State.instanceSetObject(child, ndads, "java/lang/Thread/parentStacks");
}
}
//
// Check permissions
//
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION boolean checkPermissionCall(Object instr) {
return Event.instructionIs("invokestatic")
&& JVML.strEq(Reflect.instrRefStr(instr),
JVML.strCat("java/security/AccessController/",
"checkPermission(Ljava/security/Permission;)V"));
}
ON EVENT at start of instruction
WITH checkPermissionCall(Event.instruction())
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
// get thread-local data
Object this = JVML.typeCast(System.currentThread(), "java/lang/Thread");
int notDeamon = State.instanceGetInt(this,"java/lang/Thread/notDeamon");
if( notDeamon > 0 ) {
Object privs = State.instanceGetObject(this,"java/lang/Thread/privStack");
Object curr = System.stackTrace();
int currSize = Tuple.size(curr);
Object toCheck = State.methodGetObject("$instrArg1");
// if not privileged, do normal check on current & ancestral stacks
if( Stack.empty( privs ) ) {
checkStack(curr, stackSkipPart, currSize, toCheck);
Object d = State.instanceGetObject(this,"java/lang/Thread/parentTuple");
if( d == null ) { // lazily compute collapsed version of dads
d = State.instanceGetObject(this, "java/lang/Thread/parentStacks");
d = computeParentTuple( d );
State.instanceSetObject(this, d, "java/lang/Thread/parentTuple");
}
if( Tuple.size(d) > 0 ) { // if dadSize > 0
checkStack(d, 0, dadSize, toCheck);
}
}
// if privileged, do simple check on the current stack only
else {
int privEnd = currSize - JVML.toInt(Stack.peek(privs)) + 1;
checkStack(curr, stackSkipPart, privEnd, toCheck);
}
}
}
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// FAIL inside a doPriv block, so we are sure to have exitVM privilege
//
FUNCTION void stackFail(Object domain, Object permissionToCheck) {
Object this = JVML.typeCast(System.currentThread(), "java/lang/Thread");
Object privs = State.instanceGetObject(this,"java/lang/Thread/privStack");
int privStackFrameNumber = Tuple.size(System.stackTrace()) - stackSkipPart;
Stack.push(privs, JVML.intToObject(privStackFrameNumber));
FAIL[ JVML.strCat4("DOMAIN ",domain," DOESN’T IMPLY ",permissionToCheck) ];
}
// Check the permissions of all domains
//
FUNCTION void checkStack(Object stack, int first, int last, Object toCheck) {
Object prevDomain = null; // skip domain and class repetitions
Object prevClass = null;
for(int i = first; i < last; i=i+1) {
Object class = Tuple.get(stack,i);
if( class != prevClass ) {
if( verbose ) {
Object className = JVML.getNameOfClass(class);
System.printStr(className);
}
Object domain = Association.get(classToDomain, class);
if( domain != null {
&& domain != prevDomain
&& ! Java2Permissions.implies(domain, toCheck) )
{
stackFail(domain,toCheck);
}
prevClass = class;
prevDomain = domain;
}
}
}
//
// push a privileged bit on doPriv calls
//
SIDE-EFFECT-FREE FUNCTION boolean doPrivilegedCall(Object instr) {
return Event.instructionIs("invokestatic")
&& JVML.strEq(Reflect.instrRefStr(instr),
JVML.strCat("java/security/AccessController/doPrivileged",
"(Ljava/security/PrivilegedAction;)Ljava/lang/Object;"));
}
ON EVENT at start of instruction
WITH doPrivilegedCall(Event.instruction())
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Object this = JVML.typeCast(System.currentThread(),"java/lang/Thread");
int notDeamon = State.instanceGetInt(this,"java/lang/Thread/notDeamon");
if( notDeamon > 0 ) {
Object privs = State.instanceGetObject(this,"java/lang/Thread/privStack");
int privStackFrameNumber = Tuple.size(System.stackTrace()) - stackSkipPart;
Stack.push(privs, JVML.intToObject(privStackFrameNumber));
}
}
ON EVENT at finally completed instruction
WITH doPrivilegedCall(Event.instruction())
PERFORM SECURITY UPDATE {
Object this = JVML.typeCast(System.currentThread(),"java/lang/Thread");
int notDeamon = State.instanceGetInt(this,"java/lang/Thread/notDeamon");
if( notDeamon > 0 ) {
Object privs = State.instanceGetObject(this,"java/lang/Thread/privStack");
Object discard = Stack.pop( privs );
}
}
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